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The Vermont political environment is home to three, frequently lauded, unique attributes 
that separates it from other states. This thesis investigates why and how Vermont sees such a 
prevalence in split ticket voting, how the most successful third party in the country, the Vermont 
Progressive Party, has been able to establish and maintain success in Vermont for the last forty 
years, and investigates of the current state, successes, failures, and future of direct democracy in 
Vermont’s town meetings. The thesis then asks whether each of these elements is replicable 
outside of the Vermont political environment and what the implications are for expansion of 
these attributes to other states and nationwide. The research uses a range of methodologies: an 
IVR survey and in-depth follow up interviews for split ticket voters, in-depth interviews of 
members of the Vermont Progressive Party, and an online survey of Vermont town clerks. This 
thesis finds that split ticket voters in Vermont point to a number of reasons for splitting their 
ticket, most prominently, however, it is due to the close connection that Vermonters feel to their 
political representatives which can transcend party label. The Progressive Party’s success is 
largely due to Bernie Sanders’ proof of concept when he became mayor of Burlington, VT, in 
addition to community-building organization techniques, and a legislative environment that does 
not overly hinder third party candidates and parties. Direct democracy in the form of open and 
hybrid town meeting in Vermont provides benefits in the form of negotiation, issue-education, 
and community building. However, lower participation rates and recent events that are pulling 
towns away from direct democracy indicate an uncertain future for town meeting direct 
democracy. The research finds that these three aspects of Vermont’s political environment are 
more complicated and less than the ideal that many academics, pundits, and activists argue for. 
However, they also present significant positives and it is clear that certain political environments 
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could lead to expanding split ticket voting and the presence of successful third parties and 
ultimately potentially less contentious and more representative democracy to states outside of 
Vermont and the nation.  
This Master’s thesis was completed under the direction of Dr. Dorothea Wolfson, Dr. 





 I was born in California and have lived in five different U.S. states and three different 
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many of the unique attributes that I investigate in this thesis. I met and talked with split ticket 
voters, town clerks, and members of the Progressive Party. I bought chickens from our then-
Lieutenant Governor. I participated in town meeting day. In choosing what to study for my 
thesis, I wanted to highlight these fascinating, and often overlooked, aspects of Vermont politics. 
In so doing, I hope to expand our understanding, not only of Vermont, but of possibilities for the 
future of our national political system. I hope that my research will be read and considered by 
both academics and individuals, particularly Vermonters, interested in the fascinating intricacies 
and possibilities of Vermont’s political environment. 
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 At 7:01pm on election day 2020, the Vermont results were called for future President Joe 
Biden. At 7:01pm on election day 2018, Vermont results were called for Senator Bernie Sanders. 
At 7:01pm on election day in 2016, Vermont results were called for Secretary Hillary Clinton. 
This consistency combined with the paucity of Vermont’s electoral college votes camouflages 
fascinating and unique aspects of the political environment in Vermont. Vermont, a consistently 
“blue state” at the federal level has one of the highest rates of split ticket voting in the country. 
Vermont is home to the most successful third party in the country, which has had consistent 
representation in the state legislature for over 30 years and, in state’s largest city of Burlington, 
achieved the first successful realignment in the United States since the Republican Party 
emerged prior to the Civil War. In addition, Vermont is the one of the last remaining homes of 
direct democracy in this country, even surpassing other New England states where direct 
democracy has less presence. Learning about these aspects of Vermont politics can teach us 
about our democracy and how and whether these unique elements of the Vermont political 
environment could or should be expanded across the nation’s political landscape. 
 After all, how many times do we hear or read statements similar to the following: 
• “95% of voters want the two parties to work together to solve the country’s 
problems, with 86% saying they ‘strongly’ support bipartisan cooperation.”1 
                                                        
1 Michael Hayes, “Biden, Republicans each have a good reason to compromise (Commentary),” Syracuse.com, 




• “Nearly two-thirds of Americans say the U.S. needs a third major political party 
because the GOP and Democratic Party ‘do such a poor job representing the American 
people,’”2 
• “Americans don’t feel Congress represents them very well… only 25 percent of 
respondents felt people like them were even somewhat well represented in Congress, with 
60 percent saying they were not well represented.”3 
 This thesis investigates these three aspects of Vermont’s, and the nation’s, politics and 
strives to use this research to determine how these unique elements have occurred in Vermont, 
whether they meet the expectations of those who vocally call for similar changes across the 
country, how they could potentially be replicated, and the implications of expanding these 
aspects to other states and across the country.  
 
Split Ticket Voting in Vermont 
 The first chapter in this thesis investigates split ticket voting in Vermont’s 2018 election.4 
In 2018, prominent news agencies declared the election a “blue wave” for Democrats.5 
Nationally, this election continued a long-term trend towards fewer divided state governments: a 
                                                        
2 John Bowden, “62 percent say third political party is needed in US,” The Hill, February 15, 2021, 
https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/538889-62-percent-say-third-political-party-is-needed-in-
us?fbclid=IwAR2R40EU3pHgMw8CBOysr6HbZOzqTSdrugkw7pge6IIIBZCD8meobucXmzg.  
3 Mark Mellman, “Mellman: How well does Congress represent America,” The Hill, April 23, 2019, 
https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/440326-mellman-how-well-does-congress-represent-america. 
4 There are multiple ways of defining split ticket voting. In many instances, it references voting for a presidential 
candidate from one party and a member of the House or Senate that represents another party. This chapter defines 
split ticket voting as any defection from a party-line vote from president (although 2018 was not a presidential 
election) to votes for state Representatives and Senators. 
5 Harry Eten, “Latest House results confirm 2018 wasn't a blue wave. It was a blue tsunami,” CNN, December 6, 
2018,  https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/06/politics/latest-house-vote-blue-wave/index.html.; Matthew Yglesias, 
“Democrats’ blue wave was much larger than early takes suggested,” Vox, November 13, 2018, 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/13/18082490/blue-wave.; and Sabrina Siddiqui, “The Democratic 




government where the executive branch and either or both branches of state legislatures are 
controlled by the same party. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, prior 
to 2006, over half of state governments were divided. Following the 2018 election, only a quarter 
(26%) of state governments were divided. Figure 1 shows the percentages of state governments 
that were divided between party control since 1997.  
 
 
(National Conference of State Legislatures, “State Partisan Composition,” Last Modified August 
8, 2019,  http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisan-composition.aspx.) 
 
 Related to the decreasing numbers of divided governments, the 2018 election was also 
notable for how infrequently voters decided to choose candidates from both parties. The 2018 
election had the smallest number of split ticket voters for almost three decades.6 This trend has 
only continued, with reports of even less split ticket voting occurring in the 2020 election.7 
Currently, and looking specifically at split ticket voting within states, only a little over one in 
                                                        
6 Geoffrey Skelley, “Split-Ticket Voting Hit A New Low In 2018 Senate And Governor Races,” FiveThirtyEight, 
November 19, 2019, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/split-ticket-voting-hit-a-new-low-in-2018-senate-and-
governor-races/. 
























































Figure 1: Divided State Governments Over Time 
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five Americans live in a state with a divided government.8 Vermont is one of only three states 
with a Republican governor and a Democratic legislature.9.  
In Vermont in 2018, left-leaning politicians continued their winning streak: democratic 
socialist and Independent Senator Bernie Sanders was elected along with Democratic Senator 
Peter Welch and Progressive Democrat Lt. Governor David Zuckerman. In addition, Vermont 
voters elected a veto-proof Democratic and Progressive majority to the state legislature.10 
However, in addition to these resounding liberal and Democratic victories, Vermont voters also 
re-elected Republican Governor Phil Scott.11 This occurred because of substantial split-ticket 
voting across Vermont.  
It is also important to note that since 2018, split ticket voting at the federal level has 
continued to decrease while split ticket voting in Vermont has increased. In his analysis of the 
2020 election, Geoffrey Skelley of FiveThirtyEight found, “Just 16 out of 435 districts backed a 
presidential nominee from one party and a House candidate from the other party…That translates 
to just 4 percent of districts ‘splitting’ their tickets in 2020, the smallest share in the past 70 
                                                        
8 Ballotpedia, “State government trifectas,” accessed May 3, 2021 
https://ballotpedia.org/State_government_trifectas.   
9 Ibid. The two other states with Republican governors and Democratic legislatures are Maryland and 
Massachusetts. In addition, there are eleven states total with divided states governments: Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
10 Office of the Vermont Secretary of State, “Official Report of the Canvassing Committee United States and 
Vermont Statewide Offices: General Election, November 6 2018,” accessed October 24, 2018, 
https://sos.vermont.gov/media/awufmkui/2018generalofficialresults.pdf; Ballotpedia, “Veto-proof state legislatures 
and opposing party governors in the 2018 elections,” accessed October 18, 2019, https://ballotpedia.org/Veto-
proof_state_legislatures_and_opposing_party_governors_in_the_2018_elections.  
11 Vermont Secretary of State, “Official Report of the Canvassing Committee United States and Vermont Statewide 
Offices: General Election, November 6, 2018.” 
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years.”12 Meanwhile, in the 2020 election in Vermont, Governor Phil Scott received over 10 
points more than in his 2018 victory: receiving 55% of the vote in 2018 and 69% in 2020.13  
 The first chapter in this thesis investigates the reasons behind Vermont’s divided 
government and split ticket voting.  The research conducted includes both qualitative and 
quantitative research: an IVR survey to identify split ticket voters in Vermont, followed by 78 
interviews conducted by this researcher with split ticket voters. 
The chapter finds and discusses the correlation between the split-ticket voting patterns 
observed in 2018 in Vermont against the literature’s prominent theories to determine the 
motivating factors in split-ticket voting in the 2018 election and the possible motivations for 
upcoming races including the 2020 Vermont gubernatorial race. The research answers what is 
driving this split-ticket voting? It provides key insight into what may increase split-ticket voting 
not only in Vermont, but across the country. 
 
The Vermont Progressive Party 
 In addition to disproportionate numbers of split ticket voting, Vermont is currently home 
to the most successful third party in the country: The Vermont Progressive Party.  
The existence of a consistently electorally successful third party in the United States is 
extremely rare. While a number of independents have succeeded at reaching political office 
across the country, sustained success across multiple candidates who identify as part of the same 
party is an extreme anomaly.  For decades, scholars have pointed to various election laws and 
                                                        
12 Geoffrey Skelley, “Why Only 16 Districts Voted for A Republican And A Democrat in 2020,” FiveThirtyEight, 
February 24, 2021, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-only-16-districts-voted-for-a-republican-and-a-
democrat-in-2020/.  




rules that have encouraged and ensured the two-party system. This stands in stark contrast to the 
majority of other democracies around the world with multiparty political systems. The 
Progressive Party, however, has been able to overcome many of the hurdles placed on third 
parties in the United States.  
 The beginning of the Progressive Party dates back to Senator Sanders 1981 victory in the 
Burlington mayor’s race. His victory, and the group of individuals who helped him lead the 
largest city in Vermont, led to the creation of the Progressive Coalition, and then the remarkable 
success of the Vermont Progressive Party. On its website, the Progressive Party proudly states, 
“For nearly 40 years, an unbroken stream of Progressives have served on the Burlington City 
Council and Vermont Legislature. These range from Progressive-endorsed independents, like 
Senator Bernie Sanders, to fusion candidates endorsed by the Progressive Party and Democratic 
Party.”14 In the last 40 years, Progressives have consistently been represented in the state 
legislature, have elected the highest ranked third party official in the country, Former Lieutenant 
Governor David Zuckerman, and have become one of the two major parties in the city of 
Burlington. Figure 2 below shows the 2021-2022 party breakdown for the Burlington City 
Council, Vermont Senate and Vermont House of Representatives, demonstrating Progressives’ 
presence in these three bodies. 
                                                        





(Vermont General Assembly, “Vermont House Membership by Party,” accessed February 18, 
2020, https://legislature.vermont.gov/house/clerk-of-the-house/legislative-statistics/membership-
by-party/.; Vermont General Assembly, “Legislators: All Senators,” accessed February 18, 2021, 
https://legislature.vermont.gov/people/all/2022/Senate.; The City of Burlington, “City Council,” 
accessed February 18, 2020. https://www.burlingtonvt.gov/CityCouncil.) 
The second chapter of this thesis uses 18 in-depth interviews with key members and 
activists associated with the Vermont Progressive Party to investigate the Party. Research 
questions focused on: how and why Progressive party activists are drawn to the party, what has 
contributed to the Progressive Party’s success, how the Progressive Party differs from the 
Democratic Party, the activists’ position on fusion candidacies - the laws that allow for electoral 
                                                        
15 Note: the numbers represented in this chart categorize a “Progressive” as an individual who identifies themselves 
as a “Progressive/Democrat” but not one that identifies as a “Democrat/Progressive. Were all 
“Democrat/Progressives” to be included under the “Progressive” label the numbers for the Vermont House would 
be: P:12, D:87, R:46, I:5, and the numbers for the Vermont Senate would be: P:4, D:19: R:7. The numbers for the 
















Figure 2: Party Breakdown - Vermont House, Vermont Senate, 
and Burlington City Council 
Progressives Democrats Republicans Independents
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success at the state level but also inherently tie Progressive officials to the Democratic Party - 
and the future of the Progressive Party.  
 An investigation into the Vermont Progressive Party is a unique opportunity to determine 
how third parties can be successful and compare these findings to the many scholarly works that  
have laid out the hurdles to success and how laws could be changed or circumvented by third 
parties to achieve success. The research also allows for an investigation of how a third party has 
been able continue to succeed in a two-party environment – an environment that scholars see as 
hostile to third parties.  
This chapter allows us learn more about third parties in our political party system and 
what would and could be the case around the country if more political party options were able to 
be presented to voters and non-voters as viable options on their ballots. For members of third 
parties across the country, the Vermont Progressive Party can also present some clear guidance, 
not only on how to overcome barriers to gain electoral success, but also to maintain that success. 
Lastly, an investigation of the Vermont Progressive Party and the environmental factor that have 
led to its success forces us to answer the questions: How do we define third parties? Where does 
the line blur between being one party and another? And does our definition of major party need 
to be changed regionally?   
 
Town Meetings and Direct Democracy in Vermont 
In 1838, Alexis De Tocqueville described that in New England town meetings, “the 
principle of popular sovereignty is not, as in certain nations, hidden or sterile; it is recognized by 
mores, proclaimed by laws. It expands with freedom’s expansion and meets no obstacle on the 
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way to its ultimate ends.”16 The town meeting-style of direct democracy that De Tocqueville 
described almost two centuries ago still exists in its original form in areas of Vermont.  
For centuries, every year on the first Tuesday in March, Vermonters come together in 
their local municipalities to discuss issues and vote on town meeting day. Topics range from the 
school budget to mergers, and which local officials will represent their communities in the years 
to come. Many Vermonters are deeply proud of this form of democracy in addition to the 
consistency with which Vermont has held true to direct democracy: The Secretary of State’s “A 
Citizen’s Guide to Vermont Town Meeting” describes that: 
“Vermont town meeting is a tradition dating back to before there was a Vermont. The 
first town meeting was held in Bennington in 1762, 15 years before Vermont was created. 
In the late 1700s, as today, town citizens in Vermont held meetings so that they could 
address the problems and issues they faced collectively. Popular matters of legislation in 
earlier town meetings included whether or not to let pigs run free or whether smallpox 
vaccinations should be allowed in the town (some thought vaccinations were dangerous). 
Voters also decided what goods or labor could be used as payment for taxes… Town 
meeting also served a social function (as it does today), bringing people together who 
might not otherwise know each other. This can strengthen social ties within a town and 
help people work together to tackle community problems.”17 
 
The final chapter of this thesis investigates the future of town meetings in Vermont. 
While the quote above seems to paint a straightforward picture of town meeting day in Vermont, 
the reality is much more complicated. While many rural towns have maintained town meeting 
day in its original form, many others have transitioned towards hybrid systems that combine a 
town meeting or a town meeting-like informational meeting with government-organized ballot 
voting (also called the Australian ballot), while other towns and the few cities in Vermont solely 
                                                        
16 Alexis de. Tocqueville, Democracy In America (New York: G. Dearborn & Co., 1838), 62. 




use Australian ballots. One town, Brattleboro, uses representative democracy in its town 
meetings.18 Other New England states have experienced similar changes, updates, and migrations 
away from the traditional in-person town meeting. This migration away from in-person town 
meeting day has only been exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic. In fact, for the last two 
years, this in-person style meeting has been discontinued almost unanimously across the state in 
favor of coronavirus-safe town meeting voting procedures.19 In addition, many Vermonters and 
legislators are advocating for making universal mail in ballots a permanent fixture of election 
day in Vermont.20  
The final chapter of this thesis investigates the benefits and detriments of the in-person 
town meeting as it compares to Australian ballot system. It investigates whether the current 
system still reflects the various aspects of town meetings though the centuries that scholars have 
both praised and criticized, what the future of town meetings in Vermont might hold, and, were 
they to disappear, what Vermonters could lose. It does so through a quantitative survey of over 
half of the town clerks in Vermont– the group most intimately acquainted with town meeting day 
– in addition to in-depth interviews with four clerks to ascertain more qualitative information 
about the findings and these clerks’ reactions to the survey results in addition to some additional 
questions about the future of town meeting in light of the new rules and regulations put into 
place during the coronavirus pandemic. 
While the research for this chapter was conducted prior to and then just following the 
coronavirus pandemic’s shutting down in-person town meeting day, the implications of the 
                                                        
18 Ibid. 
19 Kevin O’Connor, “Majority of Vermont’s floor-meeting towns turn to ballots for March 2,” VT Digger, February 
24, 2021, https://vtdigger.org/2021/02/24/majority-of-vermonts-floor-meeting-towns-turn-to-ballots-for-march-
2/?fbclid=IwAR0v6JCGdgylCPBFTJrCGW7vw_gsR0rq04ZXXrdHCCzLadegzVUNH_vWHkE.  




findings have gained importance as Vermont considers moving away from the in-person town 
meetings that scholars have lauded as the purest form of direct democracy. This research 
demonstrates what Vermont could lose, and gain, if it continues along this path. 
 
Together, these three chapters delve into some of the unique aspects that sets Vermont’s 
political system and democracy apart from other states. They also investigate three key elements 
of democracy that political scientists, pundits, and average Americans look to as solutions to our 
growing partisanship and political dissatisfaction. Learning about the intricacies of split ticket 
voting, successful third parties, and town-meeting style direct democracy teaches us not only 
about Vermont, but also holds valuable insights into the state of, and potential paths forward, for 
how states could potentially replicate these elements and change our democracy at the national 




CHAPTER 1: AN INVESTIGATION OF THEORY IN 




The 2018 midterm election was labeled a “blue wave” by prominent news agencies.21 
After the dust settled, House Democrats had gained 40 seats, “the largest Democratic House gain 
since 1974.”22 Further, “House Democrats to [won] about 10 million more votes than House 
Republicans. That’s the largest raw vote margin in a House midterm election ever.”23 
Democratic wins, however, were not solely at the national level. Democrats also reduced the 
Republican lead in governorships from 17 to 4, and gained 332 state legislature seats.24  
The 2018 election also continued a long-term trend of fewer divided state governments. 
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, before 2006, over half of state 
governments were divided—when any of the two legislative chambers or the governorship is 
held by a different party. Following the 2018 election, only a quarter (26%) of state governments 
were divided. Figure 1 shows the percentages of state governments that were divided between 
party control since 1997.  
 
                                                        
21 Harry Eten, “Latest.”; Matthew Yglesias, “Democrats’”; and Scot Siddiqui, “The Democrats.”  
22 Harry Eten, “Latest.” 
23 Harry Eten, “Latest.”  





(National Conference of State Legislatures, “State Partisan Composition,” Last Modified August 
8, 2019,  http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisan-composition.aspx.) 
  
Related to the decrease in divided government, the 2018 election was notable for how 
infrequently voters decided to choose candidates from both parties. According to 
FiveThirtyEight, “2018 is part of a trend that shows fewer Americans are splitting their tickets…. 
This election had the smallest median difference of any midterm cycle going back to at least 
1990”25   
Looking specifically at Vermont, the 2018 voters elected independent and democratic 
socialist U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders (66% of the vote), Democratic Congressman Peter Welch 
(68%), Progressive Democrat Lt. Governor David Zuckerman (57%), and a veto-proof 
Democratic and Progressive majority to the state legislature.26 Vermont voters, however, also re-
                                                        
25 Geoffrey Skelley, “Why Only 16 Districts Voted for A Republican And A Democrat in 2020.”  
26 Office of the Vermont Secretary of State, “Official Report of the Canvassing Committee United States and 
Vermont Statewide Offices: General Election, November 6, 2018”; Ballotpedia, “Veto-proof state legislatures and 























































Figure 3: Divided State Governments Over Time 
14 
 
elected Republican Governor Phil Scott (54%).27 This was only possible because of party-line 
defection in the form significant split-ticket voting.  
The 2018 election was Governor Scott’s first reelection after having been elected as 
Vermont’s 82nd Governor in 2016. Governor Scott previously served three terms as Vermont’s 
Lieutenant Governor, and represented Washington county as a state senator. Since his election in 
2016, Scott has frequently made national news for expressing opinions and signing legislation 
that has deviated from President Trump’s or the Republican Party’s position on the issue. 
Examples of this include Governor Scott calling for Trump’s resignation following the January 
6th assault on the capitol,28 voicing that he would not vote for President Trump in 2020,29 and 
signing substantial gun control legislation.30  Governor Scott faced Democratic challenger 
Christine Hallquist in his 2018 reelection bid. Hallquist received substantial national attention as 
the “first transgender candidate to be nominated for a governorship by a major party.”31 
However, despite the historic nature of her candidacy, was not considered to be a strong 
candidate with the Cook Political Report maintaining the prediction of “solid Republican” 
throughout the campaign.32 Governor Scott would then go on to win reelection against a stronger 
candidate, Lieutenant Governor David Zuckerman during the 2020 election. 
                                                        
27 Office of the Vermont Secretary of State, “Official Report of the Canvassing Committee United States and 
Vermont Statewide Offices: General Election, November 6 2018.” 
28 Wislong Ring, “Vermont’s Republican governor: Trump shouldn’t be in office,” AP, February 7, 2020, 
https://apnews.com/article/vermont-donald-trump-trump-impeachment-vt-state-wire-politics-
4bd062c6be264be69c130d03137a515f  
29 Jemima McEvoy, “Vermont Gov. Scott Joins Republicans Who Won’t Vote Trump – But Not Ready To Endorse 
Biden, Either,” Forbes, August 21, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jemimamcevoy/2020/08/21/vermont-gov-
scott-joins-republicans-who-wont-vote-trump-but-not-ready-to-endorse-biden-either/?sh=1ed0cc22564b. 
30 Jason Hanna and Lawrence Davidson, “Vermont governor signs sweeping gun control measures” CNN, April 11, 
2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/11/us/vermont-gun-control.  
31 Jess Bidgood, “Christine Hallquist, a Transgender Woman, Wins Vermont Governor’s Primary,” The New York 




 The strength of Governor Scott’s 2018 victory, as well as its deviation from the 
overarching trend in the United States raises the question: what is driving this split-ticket voting? 
Answering this question provides insight into modern day split-ticket voting not only in 
Vermont, but across the country. It also presents insight into how a Republican governor has 
been successful in what has become a consistently blue state.  
 This chapter outlines the scholarly research on split-ticket voting and reasons behind 
divided government to establish a number of theories to why split-ticket voting occurs, describes 
the methodology for collecting both qualitative and quantitative data from Vermont, reports the 
findings from interviews conducted, and discusses the correlation between the split-ticket voting 
patterns observed in 2018 in Vermont against the literature’s prominent theories to determine the 
motivating factors in split-ticket voting in the 2018 election and the possible motivations for the 
2020 Vermont gubernatorial race.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Over the years, a number of theories have emerged to explain split-ticket voting and 
partisan defection. They can be split into two main categories: motivated/intentional split-ticket 
voting and unintentional split-ticket voting. Intentional split-ticket voting theories interpret 
voters’ split-tickets as behavior as intentionally designed to lead to a divided government. In 
other words, the voters split their tickets on purpose. Unintentional theories of split-ticket voting 
interpret split-ticket voting as a result of a lack of understanding or caring about the results of the 
election or of that type of voting. The next few sections lay out some of the most prominent 




Intentional Split-Ticket Voting  
 The most prominent theory on intentional split-ticket voting is the Balancing Theory. The 
Balancing Theory describes split-ticket voting as an intentional act on the part of the voter to 
create a divided government: “voters understand … that the executive and the legislature 
together determine public policy, so that when control of the two institutions is divided any 
adopted policies must be compromises between the two party’s platforms.”33 Therefore, 
moderate voters, whose ideal policy positions lie between the two parties, will split their ticket in 
order to create a government where the opposing parties will necessarily need to compromise 
and ultimately coalesce around more moderate positions.  
Thus, according to this theory, “ticket-splitters come from the central, moderate range of 
the ideological spectrum. More extreme voters cast straight tickets, while moderate voters are 
more likely to split their tickets.”34 The author of the Balancing Theory, Morris Fiorina, 
predicted that less partisanship and less difference between the parties would lead to less need 
for balancing behavior and therefore less ticket splitting while more partisanship and more 
differences between the parties would lead to more need for balancing behavior and ticket 
splitting. 
 The Balancing Theory has been corroborated by a number of scholars.35 Looking 
specifically at the state level, one study finds evidence of balancing split-ticket voting behavior 
                                                        
33 Morris Fiorina, Divided Government (Needleman Heights: Allyn & Bacon, 1992), 74. 
34 Fiorina, Divided Government, 76.  
35 See: Thomas Carsey and Geoffrey Layman, “Policy Balancing and Preferences for Party Control of Government,” 
Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Dec., 2004): 541-550.;  
James Garand, and Marci Glascock Lichtl, “Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing an 
Intentional Model of Split-ticket Voting,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Jan., 2000).; and 
Dean Lacy, Emmerson Niou, Phillip Paolino, and Robert Rein, “Measuring Preferences for Divided Government: 




at the state government level,36 while other scholars have built off of the original balancing 
theory to argue that the decision to split-ticket vote is part of “moderating behavior” that voters 
engage in strategically: straight ticket votes can be considered “moderating behavior” if the party 
of the president is known or predicted.37 Similarly, another study put forward “Cognitive 
Madisonianism,” a theory that draws significantly from the balancing theory and suggests that a 
number of voters split their tickets due to, “a conscious decision that it is somehow “good” to 
check power and balance policy, as our nation’s Founders might have wanted.”38 
While many scholars have corroborated and built off of the Balancing Theory, a number 
of studies also challenge its assumptions. For example, several studies have evaluated a number 
of the propositions that would be outcomes of the Balancing Theory (e.g. that greater 
polarization would lead to increases in split-ticket voting). One study found that sincere voting 
and incumbency bias to be more likely factors behind split-ticket voting.39 Other scholars also 
find more evidence of sincere voting than strategic/balancing behavior in their work.40 Another 
prominent intentional theory of split-ticket voting revolves around “Sincere Voting.” This theory 
                                                        
36 Michael Bailey and Elliot Fullmer, “Balancing in the U.S. States, 1978-2009,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 
Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2011): 148-166. 
37 Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, “A Theory of Divided Government,” Econometrica, Vol. 64, No. 6 
(Nov., 1996): 1311-1341. 
38 Michael Lewis-Beck and Richard Nadeau, “Split-ticket Voting: The Effects of Cognitive Madisonianism,” The 
Journal of Politics, Vol. 66 No. I, (February 2004): 97-112. 
39 See: Richard Born, “Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model,” 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1 (February 1994); and Richard Born, “Congressional Incumbency and 
the Rise of Split-Ticket Voting,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3 (August 2000): 365-387. 
40 See: Thomas Brunell and Bernard Grofman, “Testing sincere versus strategic split-ticket voting at the aggregate 
level: Evidence from split house–president outcomes, 1900–2004,” Electoral Studies, Vol. 28, Issue 1, (March 
2009): 62-69; Barry Burden and David Kimball, “A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting,” The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (Sept. 19, 1998); John Geer, Amy Carter, James McHenry, Ryan Teten, and 
Jennifer Hoef, “Experimenting With the Balancing Hypothesis,” Political Psychology, Vol. 25, Issue 1, (Mar. 2004): 
49-63; Jeffrey Karp and Marshall Garland, “Ideological Ambiguity and Split-ticket Voting,” Political Research 
Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 4, (December 2007); and Franco Mattei and John Howes, “Competing Explanations of 




argues that split-ticket voting is not a tactical move made by a voter, instead, it is a sincere 
representation of his or her policy positions.41  
 There are a number of versions of this Sincere Voting theory. The most cited argues that 
split-ticket voters vote for the different parties based on the parties’ different “strengths” in 
different offices. This theory, developed following a significant period of divided government 
when Democrats held firm control over Congress, while Republicans held the White House, 
surmises that, “offered two presidential candidates, voters choose the one they think more likely 
to keep taxes low and defense strong and to govern competently. Offered two House candidates, 
voters choose the one they think more likely deliver local benefits and to protect their favorite 
programs.”42 Thus, voters are sincerely splitting their ticket based on an analysis of how the 
candidates’ strengths match up with the roles of the office.  
 Another sincere voting model is called the Comparative Midpoints Model.43 This model 
looks at House and Presidential races as two separate calculations made by a single voter. Voters 
in a House districts who are represented by more conservative Democrats or more liberal 
Republicans may split-ticket vote because they are ideologically closer to the presidential 
candidate of the other party. Figure 4 visually represents the comparative midpoints model. 
 
  
                                                        
41 Gary Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1990.) 
42 Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government, p119. 
43 Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael McDonald, and Thomas Brunell, “A New Look at Split-Ticket 
Outcomes for House and president: A Comparative Midpoints Model,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 62, No. 1 
(February 2000): 34-50. 
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Figure 4: Comparative Midpoints Model 
 
(Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael McDonald, and Thomas Brunell, “A New Look at 
Split-Ticket Outcomes for House and president: A Comparative Midpoints Model,” The Journal 
of Politics, Vol. 62, No. 1 (February 2000): 34-50.) 
 
As the comparative midpoints model suggests, the capital “D” and “R” represent the 
ideological placement of the Democrat and Republican candidates for the presidency while the 
lower case letters (d1, r1, d2, r2, d3 and r3) represent the Democratic and Republican House 
candidates in three different districts. The lower case m1, m2, and m3 represent the median 
voters in each of the three districts, while the upper case M represents the median voter. A voter 
in district 3 may find that their ideological preferences exist between the republican candidate for 
president and the democratic candidate for the House in their district. Therefore, a split-ticket for 
this voter would be a sincere representation of his or her ideological preferences.44  
Like the Balancing Theory of split-ticket voting, “sincere” voting theories have also 
received significant criticism. The most prominent criticism argues that both the balancing 
theory and sincere voting theories assume that voters know enough about the candidates to 




understand either: how the candidates’ positions would balance out in the context of a divided 
government or exactly how proximate the candidates’ positions are to the voters’ positions.45 
In more recent years, the notion of Ambivalence—an individual being torn between the 
two parties by cross-pressures—has emerged as another intentional or “motivated” theory of 
split-ticket voting. One study that focuses on ambivalence uses American National Election 
Study (ANES) data to determine that ticket splitting is, in part, driven by ambivalence: where 
voters feel conflicted between the two parties and project this conflict onto their voting behavior. 
That study concludes that “divided government occurs in part because citizens are divided within 
themselves.”46  
Building off of this finding, another study found that access to information plays a 
significant role in the decision-making process for these ambivalent voters.47 Ambivalent voters 
with low political knowledge and/or no access or exposure to campaign information are likely to 
engage in economic voting. In contrast, ambivalent voters with high political knowledge and/or 
exposure to campaign information are more likely to engage in ideological voting.48 
 
Unintentional Split-Ticket Voting  
 In contrast to the intentional theories of split-ticket voting that place significant weight on 
the voters’ intentions in the ballot box, unintentional theories of split-ticket voting argue that 
split-ticket voting is a result of external influences, and are not due to a calculated motive on 
behalf of the voter.  
                                                        
45 Karp and Garland, “Ideological Ambiguity.”  
46 Kenneth Mulligan, “Partisan Ambivalence, Split-Ticket Voting, and Divided Government,” Political Psychology, 
Vol 32, No. 3, (2011). 
47 Scott Basinger, and Howard Lavine, “Ambivalence, Information, and Electoral Choice,” The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 2 (May, 2005). 
48 Christopher Armitage and Mark Conner, “Attitudinal Ambivalence: A Test of Three Key Hypotheses,” 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 26, Issue 11, (2000): 14-21. 
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A number of scholars have compared partisan affiliation with split-ticket voting.49 They 
consistently find that voters who identify with more extreme ideologies or partisanship are less 
likely to split-ticket vote. This theory of Partisan Sorting predicts that, over time, increasing 
polarization will contribute to ideological sorting and should therefore reduce split-ticket voting: 
first because “As the psychological self-concept narrows, voters are unable to bring themselves 
to cross party lines”50 and second, because “as sorting increases, Americans increasingly dislike 
and distrust each other on a social level—even more than they disagree on policy outcomes.”51 
Ultimately, this partisan-sorting theory predicts that split-ticket voting will decrease as 
partisanship increases and conversely, split-ticket voting will increase as partisanship decreases. 
Corroborating this, academics have found that, “split ballots are most common when 
[Republican] and the Democratic candidate are nearest each other, blurring their ideological 
differences enough to make partisan considerations in voting behavior less important.”52 These 
predictions and findings are in direct contradiction with Fiorina’s balancing theory prediction 
that polarization will lead to more split-ticket voting.  
 Taking the link between a lack of partisanship and split-ticket voting further, many 
scholars also point to Indifference as a driver for split-ticket voting. To clarify the terminology: 
in the political context an ambivalent individual holds an equal number of positive and negative 
views of both parties or candidates while an indifferent individual has no opinions of the parties 
or candidates. For instance, “when people are indifferent about candidates, the choice is neither 
                                                        
49 See: Paul Beck, Lawrence Baum, Aage Clausen, and Charles Smith, Jr., “Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting 
in Subpresidential Voting,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 4 (December 1992); and Ian McAllister 
and Robert Darcy, “Sources of Split-ticket Voting in the 1988 American Elections,” Political Studies, XL, (1992): 
695-712. 
50 Nicholas Davis and Lilliana Mason, “Sorting and the Split-Ticket: Evidence from Presidential and Subpresidential 
Elections,” Political Behavior. 38(2) (2015): 337-354. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-015-9315-7. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Burden and Kimball, “A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting.” 
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difficult nor crucial. However, when citizens are ambivalent about them, the choice may be 
difficult but substantial in election.”53 Thus, scholars have investigated the difference in split-
ticket voting between indifferent and ambivalent individuals. Proponents of the “indifference” 
theory demonstrate that while ambivalence is positively correlated with split-ticket voting, in 
fact, “indifference—the complete absence of affective political attachments—has a greater 
positive effect on split-ticket voting.”54 Thus, while some voters may be split within themselves 
and using the ballot box to voice those cross-pressured feelings, others are simply indifferent to 
the candidate options before them and thus, they are more likely to select their candidates at 
random which leads to an increased proportion of these individuals who split-ticket vote.55  
The last overarching theory of unintentional split-ticket voting points to Incumbency 
Advantage as one of the driving factors behind split-ticket voting. A number of scholars have 
used regression analyses to investigate the motivations behind split-ticket voting and in many 
instances the findings single out incumbency as a driving factors behind split-ticket voting.56 
Specifically during the increase in split-ticket voting in the 1956-68 and 1972-92 periods, 
“incumbency was a powerful determinant of [this] step jump in ticket-splitting that occurred.” In 
fact, “22.4% of the overall rise from 1956-68 to 1972-92, and 32.5% of that specifically 
occurring in losing-presidential-party districts, can be attributed to nothing more elaborate than 
this one factor.”57  
                                                        
53 Sung-jin Yoo, “Two Types of Neutrality: Ambivalence versus Indifference and Political Participation,” Journal of 
Politics, Vol. 72 Issue 1, (January 2010): 163-177. 
54 Nicholas Davis, “The Role of Indifference in Split-Ticket Voting,” Political Behavior. 37(1) (2014): 67-86, 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-013-9266-9. 
55 See also: Judd Thornton, “Getting Lost on the Way to the Party: Ambivalence, Indifference, and Defection with 
Evidence from Two Presidential Elections,” Social Science Quarterly, v. 95, issue 1, (March 2014): 184-201. 
56 Beck, Baum, Clausen, and Smith, “Patterns and Sources.” 
57 Born, “Congressional Incumbency.” 
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The theory argues that incumbent visibility advantages the incumbent by encouraging 
“cross-party” or split-ticket voting because, voters will give the incumbent the “benefit of the 
doubt” when confronted with the options the ballot box.58 Ultimately, even small amounts of 
benefit of the doubt can “dramatically change the nature of electoral competition and generate 
barriers to entry”59 for challengers. In addition, the insulating effects of benefit of the doubt are 
magnified the closer the incumbent’s positions are to the ‘center’ or median voter.60 This 
correlates with split-ticket voting theories like Partisan Sorting that find that split-ticket voting is 
more likely when the parties are closer together. 
Incumbency advantage is frequently pointed to by scholars as a driving or at least a 
supplementary force in split-ticket voting: due to name recognition, fundraising capacity, and 
experience.61 In fact, incumbency is such a recognized influence on split-ticket voting that some 
scholars criticize other theories for not including or discounting the incumbency advantage: 
“Jacobson and Fiorina assume that all seats are open at the same time or with the same 
frequency.”62 Instead, proponents of this theory find that majority or minority status will lead to 
decreased and increased (respectively) rates of retirement in the two parties. Minority party seats 
will disproportionately turn into open races which will further disadvantage the minority party.63 
Therefore, these scholars argue party control of the legislature and executive branches are not as 
representative of the will of the people as Jacobson and Fiorina suggest in their theories. 
                                                        
58 Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman, “Incumbency Advantage, Voter Loyalty, and the Benefit of the Doubt,” Journal 
of Theoretical Politics, 3(2) (1991). 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid 
61 See: Burden and Kimball, “A New Approach;” Richard Forgette and Glen Platt, “Voting for the Person, Not the 
Party: Party Defection, Issue Voting, and Process Sophistication,” Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 2, (June 
1999); Mattei and Howes, “Competing Explanations;” and Mcallister and Darcy, “Sources of Split-ticket Voting.”  
62 Stephen Ansolabehere and Alan Gerber, “Incumbency Advantage and the Persistence of Legislative Majorities,” 




Ultimately the academics behind these intentional and unintentional theories of split-
ticket voting recognize that these theories are not mutually exclusive. Even Fiorina qualified his 
theory, stating that, “all in all, the empirical support for this kind of policy balancing model is 
mixed… [and] many colleagues believe that such models make too severe informational 
demands on the voter. But I never advanced such a model as an explanation of all ticket 
splitting.”64 Ultimately, the goal of each of these theories is to investigate the motivations or 
reasons behind the split-ticket voters who may have substantial influence on the outcomes of 
elections and the creations of divided government. My research below investigates the Vermont 
2018 election when a group of split-ticket voters led to a divided Vermont government. The 
discussion of my results will parse out which theories of split-ticket voters fit best within the 
context of the 2018 election in Vermont.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
The first goal of the methodology was to identify Vermont split-ticket voters for further 
research. To locate these split-ticket voters, data from the Vermont Secretary of State were 
utilized. The Vermont Secretary of State’s website provides town and precinct-level vote totals 
and percentages for Vermont elections. To determine the towns and precincts with the highest 
proportions of split-ticket voters, it was necessary to compare key race vote totals. These 
calculations were accomplished by finding the average absolute difference between Senator 
Bernie Sanders’ and Governor Phil Scott’s percent of the vote, between Representative Peter 
Welch’s and Governor Phil Scott’s percent of the vote, and between Lieutenant Governor David 
Zuckerman’s and Governor Phil Scott’s percent of the vote.   
                                                        
64 Fiorina, Divided Government, 153. 
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The full calculations used to determine which precincts were likely to have high 
proportions of split-ticket voters can be found in Appendix B. For example, the calculations for 
the Addison precinct, including the percentage of the vote received by each candidate and the 
absolute difference in vote total between Governor Scott and each of the other candidates are 
included in Table 1. Addison was chosen because it is the first county in Vermont alphabetically. 
Table 1: Addison Precinct Vote Percentages and Absolute Difference 
















50.93% 71.76% 21% 54.48% 71.76% 17% 37.81% 71.76% 34% 
 
The absolute differences between Governor Scott and each of the other candidates’ 
percentages of the vote was averaged. The average absolute difference was 34.02% for Addison. 
Precincts with high levels of split-ticket voters are more likely to have lower absolute differences 
because a lower average absolute indicates that more voters voted for both Governor Scott and 
each of the more liberal candidates. In other words, in towns and precincts with very low average 
absolute difference, there is a higher percentage of split-ticket voters.   
Therefore, the towns and precincts were ranked to establish which precincts had the 
lowest average absolute differences and should be targeted to maximize contact with split-ticket 
voters. Comparing Addison’s average to the other Vermont precincts, Addison is ranked 188th 
out of 246 towns and precincts and therefore was not targeted as part of this research.  
Once the towns and precincts with high split-ticket voting were identified, a telephone list 
was procured of 95,000 Vermont landline phone numbers from around the state with a focus on 
the selected towns and precincts. An IVR survey was then conducted to identify voters who 
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voted a split-ticket and to collect data on some non-split-ticket voters. Between August 16, and 
August 21, 2019, the IVR survey identified 207 split-ticket voters who met the following criteria: 
1. Voted in the 2018 election; 
2. Identified as: A Democrat, an Independent-lean Democrat, or a Strong Independent; and 
3. Voted for Governor Scott in 2018, is either somewhat or very likely to vote for Governor 
Scott in 2020, or is favorable to Governor Scott. 
The IVR questionnaire included minimal questions to maximize response rate. These 
included the three key questions related to Governor Scott (favorability, 2018 vote, and likely 
2020 vote), knowledge of and favorability toward other prominent politicians in Vermont, a right 
direction/ wrong track question, and demographic information. The full IVR questionnaire and 
topline responses are included in Appendix A.  
While the 207 voters identified by the IVR survey were not all split-ticket voters in 2018 
(some were favorable to Governor Scott but had not voted for him), their favorability, past 
voting behavior, and potential future voting behavior placed them within the category of either a 
split-ticket voter or a potential split-ticket voter. Following the identification of these 207 split-
ticket voters, two attempts were made to contact each individual for possible in-depth interviews. 
The attempts were made over the phone and at different times during the day to maximize 
possible contact. Ultimately, 78 follow-up interviews were conducted with these voters between 
August 26, and September 17, 2019.  
The goal was to collect both quantitative and qualitative data on Vermont political issues 
and Governor Scott. These voters were also asked to complete a projection exercise about how a 
Democratic candidate potentially running against Governor Scott could appeal to them. The full 
follow up interview questionnaire and topline results are also included in Appendix A. 
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As with most surveys, there are a number of elements to this methodology that may 
contribute to some bias in the results. First, it is important to acknowledge potential response 
bias in that these individuals elected to participate not once but twice in this survey and that split-
ticket voters who elected participated in this survey may have different opinions from those who 
elected not to participate.65 Second, selection bias may also be at play. The methodology was 
designed to target the areas with highest concentration of split-ticket voters in Vermont. It may 
be the case that split-ticket voters in different areas of the state hold different opinions and that 
this methodology may not have fully captured that range of opinions. Prominent research 
organizations mitigate this type of selection bias by ensuring demographic consistency.66 
Therefore, demographic information for this survey was tracked. Gender, education, works 
status, and marital status were all relatively consistent with Vermont demographics. However, 
the survey skewed slightly older and more retired than the full Vermont population. In addition, 
this survey was conducted using a landline telephone sample due to cost constraints. While, 
according to the National Health Statistics Report from the Center for Disease Control, Vermont 
has traditionally been one of the states with the fewest cellphone-only households,67 split-ticket 
voters from households with landlines who were surveyed may hold different opinions than 
those who live in cellphone-only households.  
 
                                                        
65 Scott Keeter, Nick Hatley, Courtney Kennedy, and Arnold Lau, “What Low Response Rates Mean for Telephone 
Surveys,” Pew Research Center: Methods, May 15, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/2017/05/15/what-
low-response-rates-mean-for-telephone-surveys/. 
66 Andrew Mercer, Arnold Lau, and Courtney Kennedy, “For Weighting Online Opt-In Samples, What Matters 
Most?,” Pew Research Center: Methods, January 26, 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/2018/01/26/for-
weighting-online-opt-in-samples-what-matters-most/. 
67 Stephen Blumberg, Nadarajasundaram Ganesh, Julian Luke, and Gilbert Gonzales, “Wireless Substitution: State-
level Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, 2012,” National Health Statistics Reports, No. 70, 
December 18, 2013, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr070.pdf; and National Center for Health Statistics, 





Interactive Voice Response Survey 
 Overall, the IVR survey found that split-ticket voters differed from overall Vermont 
voters. Split-ticket voters were more likely to say that Vermont is headed in the right direction 
(all voters: 46%, split-ticket: 61%) and less likely to say that Vermont is on the wrong track (all 
voters: 42%, split-ticket: 27%). Figure 5 compares all voters to split-ticket voters on the right 
direction/wrong track question.  
 
The IVR survey also collected responses on name recognition and favorability for key 
Vermont politicians amongst all Democrats and Independents compared to split-ticket voters. 
The results demonstrate that there was little variation between split-ticket voters and Democrats 
and Independents on name recognition. Senator Sanders (Dems/Inds: 99%/ Split-ticket: 100%), 
Representative Welch (96%/96%), Senator Leahy (98%/97%), and Governor Scott (97%/98%) 
had near-universal name recognition in both groups while name recognition dropped for 
Lieutenant Governor Zuckerman (Dems/Inds: 85%/ split-ticket: 86%), Attorney General TJ 
Donovan (74%/73%), and 2020 candidate for the Democratic nomination for Governor of 
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There were, however, some slight differences in favorability of these individuals between 
split-ticket voters and all Democrats and Independents. While the more moderate politicians saw 
similar favorability numbers from these two groups, split-ticket voters were slightly less likely to 
be favorable towards Senator Sanders and Lieutenant Governor Zuckerman, who are both more 
progressive politicians. While 76% of Democrats and Independents were favorable to Sanders, 
71% of split-ticket voters were favorable. Similarly, while 59% of Democrats and Independents 
were favorable to Zuckerman, only 49% of split-ticket voters were favorable. The split-ticket 
voters were also much more likely to be favorable to Governor Scott (71%) than Democrats and 
Independents (51%)68 Figure 6 compares Democrat and Independent voter and split-ticket voter 
favorability of prominent Vermont politicians. 
 
                                                        
































In-Depth Interviews  
As mentioned above, the original IVR survey was designed to identify individuals who 
met at least one of the following criteria for further research. 
(1) are favorable to Governor Scott; 
(2) voted for Governor Scott in 2018; or  
(3) were either very or somewhat likely to vote for Governor Scott in 2020. 
Ultimately, 207 were identified and 78 of those participated in further research. The 
results outlined below are from those 78 more in-depth interviews.  
 The first couple questions in the interviews were designed to obtain a broad 
understanding of these voters’ overarching ideological and voting preferences. First, having 
previously collected party identification in the IVR survey, the question was asked again to 
ensure relative continuity. The results demonstrated that the vast majority of these individuals 
did meet the party identification criteria for the research and were also comprised of a good mix 
of Democrats, Independents, and Progressives. The respondents were split between identifying 
as Democrats (41%) and Independents (41%). Additionally, six self-identified as a Progressive 
and seven indicated that they did not have a preference. One individual gave different answers – 
he identified himself as an independent in the IVR survey but as a Republican in the follow-up 
interview. 
 The respondents were also asked about their 2018 votes. The results demonstrated that 
the vast majority of these individuals had split their vote in some fashion during the 2018 
election, 86% had voted for independent Bernie Sanders, 91% for Democrat Peter Welch, 77% 
for Progressive Democrat David Zuckerman, and 83% for Democrat TJ Donovan. Figure 7 
shows the consistency with which this group voted for these more liberal politicians and 
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compares those percentages with their vote for Governor Scott. Therefore, with some variation, 
the group of individuals identified and interviewed for this survey had, for the large part, voted 
down-ticket Democrat/Independent for all races except for the gubernatorial race. Therefore, 
these were not simply split-ticket voters, they were Democratic-defecting split-ticket voters. 
Figure 7: In-Depth Interview Split Ticket Voter 2018 Vote
 
 
 Questions about specific policy issues were also included in order to assess whether these 
voters’ party identification lined up with their issue preferences. The survey respondents were 
presented with a number of proposals that “may be or are being considered by the Vermont State 
Legislature.” The included proposals were derived from a list of pending legislation from the 
Vermont State Legislature’s website and some issues championed by the Scott administration.69 
The respondents were asked how much they supported or opposed these proposals. The 
respondents’ answers indicated that not only had the majority of these individuals voted for 
down-ticket Democrat/Independent in the 2018 election, but they also supported many of the 
Democratic-leaning legislative proposals. In fact, they were more likely to support the more 
liberal ideas than they were to support Governor Scott’s administration’s preferences.  
                                                        
69 Vermont General Assembly, “Bills Released for Introduction But Not Yet Introduced,” accessed October 20, 
2019, https://legislature.vermont.gov/bill/released/2020; Vermont Official State Website, “Office of Governor Phil 
Scott,” accessed October 12, 2019, https://governor.vermont.gov/. 
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 The proposals with the highest support were either neutral or traditionally Democratic 
positions. For example, 94% of respondents supported “improving the water quality in Lake 
Champlain,” 91% supported “investing in renewable energy sources,” 91% supported 
“increasing access to broadband throughout Vermont,” and 90% supported “expanding access to 
healthcare.” The respondents also expressed significant support for many of the most liberal 
positions: 88% supported “passing a 24-hour waiting period for handgun purchases,” 82% 
supported “raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour,” 77% supported “passing paid family 
leave,” 74% supported “adding abortion rights to the Vermont Constitution,” 73% supported 
“providing free tuition at Vermont state colleges and universities,” and 71% supported 
“legalizing the sale of a small amount of marijuana for personal use.” Figure 8, on the next page, 




Republican issues, and specifically those championed by the Scott administration, 
received low support from this group of split-ticket voters. For example, only 46% of voters 
supported “implementing an education voucher program in Vermont,” 46% opposed “providing 
financial incentives to workers who move to Vermont.” Thus, these voters were not only 



















Providing financial incentives to workers who
move to Vermont
Implementing a fuel or gas tax to fund projects
to decrease energy consumption
Implementing an education voucher program
in Vermont
Ensuring that the government does not raise
taxes
Appointing a Vermont director for LGBTQ
equity
Legalizing the sale of a small amount of
marijuana for personal use
Providing free tuition at Vermont State
Colleges and Universities
Adding abortion rights to the Vermont
Constitution
Passing a four year term for governor
Passing paid family leave
Reducing the state’s prison inmate population
Raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour
Passing a 24-hour waiting period for handgun
purchases
Addressing the opioid crisis
Expanding access to healthcare
Investing in renewable energy
Increasing access to broadband throughout
Vermont
Improving water quality in Lake Champlain




Governor Scott. Later questions in the survey addressed the question of why this discrepancy 
occurred in the 2018 Vermont gubernatorial election.  
The final question on issue preference asked the respondents to choose between two 
competing priorities: progressive values or economics. When asked to specifically choose 
between supporting a candidate (or lean towards supporting a candidate) who “focuses on 
progressive values and economic justice” or “a candidate who focuses on issues like the 
economy and balancing the state budget,” 46% of respondents either supported (26%) or leant 
towards supporting (21%) candidates who focus on progressive values and economic justice. 
Thirty eight percent either supported (24%) or leant towards supporting (14%) candidates who 
focus on issues like the economy and balancing the state budget. Fifteen percent of respondents 
volunteered that both best describe how they generally support candidates in Vermont. 
Therefore, these split-ticket voters not only largely supported more democratic policy positions, 
when they were forced to choose, a plurality said they would support a candidate who focused on 
progressive policies over one that focused on the economy and balancing the state budget. Later 
questions in the survey investigated these voters’ decisions in 2018 to determine why they did 
not follow this path in 2018. 
This liberal-leaning amongst these split-ticket voters did not emerge as strongly when 
asked about their political priorities in an open-ended format. Fifty-nine percent of the split-
ticket voters’ responses mentioned the economy, high taxation, and the need to create jobs in 
Vermont. These responses largely focused on the split-ticket voters’ own bottom lines and many 
articulated the fear that any increased taxation would harm their standard of living. This was the 
first real evidence of these split-ticket voters being drawn in two different directions 
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ideologically. They agreed with many liberal positions but were also concerned that those 
policies might directly burden them financially.  
 
“I’m a retired person - trying to make my fixed income be able to keep up with the 
out-of-control costs both for myself and both local and state taxes. I haven't been 
able to keep up with their demands. It’s getting harder and harder for fixed 
income Vermonters to live here.” – Male, 60-69, Strong Independent 
 
Table 2 shows the most mentioned issues by these split-ticket voters. 
Table 2: In-Depth Interview Priorities for Vermont Coded Open End Responses 
  All Split-Ticket Voters 
The economy, high taxation, and the need for jobs 59% 
Healthcare and better access to healthcare 29% 
The environment, climate change, and cleaning up Lake 
Champlain 
15% 
Gun control 12% 
Education 9% 
Women’s issues 4% 
Other 9% 
Don’t know 6% 
 
Following these questions about political ideology and priorities, the respondents were 
asked a number of broad open-ended questions about Governor Scott: why they are favorable to 
Governor Scott, why they had voted for Governor Scott in 2018, and why they would be likely to 
voter for Governor Scott in 2020. The questions were only asked of the segment of the sample 
for whom the question applied (i.e. if they had indicated that they were favorable, had voted, or 
would vote for Governor Scott). 
Favorable to Governor Scott  
Sixty of the split-ticket voters interviewed indicated that they were favorable to Governor 
Scott. When this group was asked why they were favorable to Governor Scott, they painted a 
picture of the Governor as a genuinely honest, nice, and pragmatic individual. Governor Scott 
had impressed them by listening to all Vermonters, not just to his Republican base. In addition, 
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they felt positively about the fact that he had not always followed Republican Party lines 
(especially on gun rights and abortion). Finally, they saw Governor Scott as honestly willing to 
compromise with Democrats when new information was presented to him. The following 
paragraphs describe each of these sentiments in greater detail. 
Split-ticket voters who were favorable to Governor Scott were most likely to give 
examples of his good character rather than specific policy positions. In fact, 45% of responses 
included compliments of this kind. These included: praise of his intelligence, his pragmatism, 
and his integrity. Other positive characteristics mentioned were his work ethic and his 
interactions with the public. Table 3 lists some examples of these categories. 
Table 3: In-Depth Interview Examples of Good Character Language Used to 
Describe Governor Scott 
Intelligence Pragmatism Integrity Other 
• Knowledgeable 
• Intelligent 
• An independent 
thinker 
• Not closed 
minded 
• Pragmatic, 




• Rational  
• [Having] 
common sense 
• Upstanding guy 
• Sincere 
• Honest  
• A decent human 
being  
• A gentleman 
• A person of 
integrity 
• Doesn't make 




• A really nice 
guy 
• Personable 
• Good attitude 
 
The next most frequently mentioned reason by these split-ticket voters for favorability 
towards Governor Scott was that he frequently deviated from traditional Republican positions. 
Thirty-three percent of responses mentioned this and many mentioned that, in deviating from 
Republican positions, Governor Scott had supported Democratic issues that the split-ticket voters 
cared about. Many split-ticket voters clarified that while Governor Scott carries the Republican 




“I don't consider him a true Republican. If the U.S. Senate is what the Republican 
Party is, Scott is not a true Republican. He does not blindly follow that. He is a 
Democratic-Republican rather than a true Republican.” – Female, 60-69, 
Democrat 
 
Many respondents gave specific examples of the ways that he has deviated from some 
traditional Republican positions. The respondents most frequently mentioned his more liberal 
positions on gun legislation and abortion—two issues that had recently dominated the political 
news in Vermont. Similarly, 27% mentioned that he was willing to compromise (or had been 
forced to compromise) with the Vermont legislature and Democrats across the aisle.  
 
“I would like to see him compromise more but I think he has compromised 
especially in gun control. That shows to me that a pragmatic Republican still 
exists and he has been less polarizing that our current national politics.” – Male, 
50-59, Progressive 
 
Another group of responses were simply generally positive. Twenty three percent of 
responses included a simple generic description that Governor Scott was doing a “good job” and 
that they simply did not have anything to complain about.  
Next, 20% of responses pointed to the feeling that Governor Scott’s approach to 
governing considers and cares about all Vermonters not just his base. These Democratic 
defectors felt that Governor Scott respects them and other Democrats and Independents as his 
constituents just as much as the Republicans in the state. These split-ticket voters mention that he 
does this “even though” he is a Republican. 
 
“I don't think he necessarily represents the Republican Party as much as he is 





Only 12% of responses mentioned Governor Scott’s economic position on the budget and 
taxation in Vermont. The individuals who gave these responses tended to be seniors who tied 
Governor Scott’s position on the economy and taxes directly to their own ability to maintain 
their current standard of living. This low percentage of economic-focused responses in this 
section contrasted sharply with the split-ticket voters’ prior focus on economic issues when 
asked about political priorities in Vermont. 
 
 “He is the only thing that is keeping the Vermont government spending in check. 
Taxes are way too high. Phil Scott is more in line with people shouldn't be taxed 
so much… Because I'm 70 years old I see increased taxes as taking away things 
that I worked my entire life to save. My beliefs align with people who want to keep 
taxes down.” – Male, 70 years old or older, Strong Independent 
 
Another twelve percent of responses mentioned the need for a balance of partisanship in 
the Vermont State Government. These individuals felt that a Republican Governor, like 
Governor Scott, was necessary to maintain order, compromise, and a steady path forward for 
Vermont due to the strongly Democratic and Progressive legislature. 
 
“It’s mostly that I like the idea that Vermont has a Republican Governor. I think 
that that shows the political diversity in our state… I think there is danger in 
alienating the more conservative population in Vermont if we had a liberal 
Governor.” – Male, 30-39, Independent-Lean Democrat 
 
Other reasons given for favorability towards Governor Scott were that he was a moderate 
politician (10%), that he was a businessman and understood blue collar workers (7%), and that 
there have been no good Democratic candidates (3%). Seven percent were unsure of why they 
were favorable to Governor Scott.  




Why They Voted For Governor Scott in 2018 
Fifty-six of the 78 split-ticket voters had voted for Governor Scott in the 2018 election. 
When asked why they had voted for Governor Scott, these split-ticket voters were most likely to 
mention his policy positions. A significant number also mentioned that they were unimpressed or 
carried significant distain for the Democratic candidate who had run against him in 2018. 
Another significant portion of respondents pointed to Governor Scott’s incumbency status as a 
demonstration that they could trust him to do well in the future because he had done well in the 
past.  
A third of these split-ticket voters indicated that they had voted for Governor Scott 
because of some of his specific policy positions. The most frequently mentioned policy was his 
position on taxes and the budget. However, respondents also mentioned his position on guns, 
ways to address population decline, the opioid crisis, wind energy, education consolidation, and 
marijuana legalization.  
 
Table 4:  In-Depth Interview Reasons Given For Favorability for Governor Scott 




Good demeanor, intelligent, hardworking, true to his word 45% 
Supported Democratic positions/ Not a real Republican 33% 
Willing to compromise 27% 
He is doing a “good job” 23% 
Cares about Vermont and all Vermonters 20% 
His position on budget and taxation 12% 
Needed change from Democratic governor, needed to balance 
government 
12% 
Is a moderate 10% 
He is a businessman and understands blue collar workers 7% 
No good Democratic candidates 3% 
Don’t know 7% 
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“He does support jobs in Vermont. he wants to keep people in Vermont. He 
supported paying people to come into Vermont. I thought that was creative and I 
think we need that.” – Male, 60-69, Democrat 
 
Interestingly, the next most frequently given reason for voting for Governor Scott in 2018 
was that Christine Hallquist, the Democratic nominee for Governor, was not a good candidate. A 
full quarter of responses mentioned her inadequacy in some form. Objection to her ranged from 
some of her specific policy positions with which they disagreed (for instance, that she was a 
“corporate democrat”) to insults and questions about whether her gender transition indicated an 
inability to be Governor of Vermont.  
 
“I listened to the debate and he just made more sense. Christine Hallquist really 
blew it. She was totally out of it. She came down on him about who he had voted 
for and he said he would write it in [rather than saying Trump.] She didn't do her 
homework.” – Female, 60-69, Democrat 
These split-ticket voters’ familiarity with Governor Scott also seemed to benefit him in 
2018. Sixteen percent of responses simply mentioned that they were familiar with him and his 
work as Governor. One respondent stated outright that their vote was driven by “the incumbent 
thing.” Another respondent talked about the fact that Governor Scott had high name recognition 
and that she liked that she had, “seen him out there… in the community.”  
Fourteen percent of responses used generic terminology to describe Governor Scott. In 
addition, only a few responses mentioned the fact that Governor Scott was willing to 
compromise (5%) and that having a Republican Governor balances out the Democratic 




“No specific policies. He comes across as being genuine and truthful.” – Female, 
60-69, Independent-Lean Democrat 
 
Interestingly, nineteen percent of respondents were unsure or said that they didn’t 
remember why they had voted for Governor Scott in 2018. This could be an indication that split 
ticket voters relied on his high name recognition. Alternatively, Hallquist was the, “first 
transgender candidate to be nominated for a governorship by any major party”70 and there may 
have been some discomfort talking about her candidacy.  
Table 5 shows the various reasons given for a 2018 vote for Governor Scott.  
Table 5: In-Depth Interview Voting for Governor Scott Coded Open End 
Responses  
Split-Ticket Voters Who Voted for 
Governor Scott in 2018 
Specific policy agreement  33% 
Christine Hallquist was not a good candidate 25% 
Incumbency benefits: name recognition, solid 
performance, no big bad changes 
16% 
He is a good guy 14% 
Willing to compromise 5% 
Able to balance the Democrats in the legislature 4% 
Don’t know 19% 
 
Why They Are Likely to Vote for Governor Scott In 2020 
Seventy-six percent of split-ticket voters indicated that they were either somewhat or very 
likely to vote for Governor Scott in 2020. When these respondents were asked why they were 
likely to vote for Governor Scott, a small but significant shift emerged in their answers. While 
Governor Scott’s policy positions and his track record in the office were major points brought 
forward by the respondents, a plurality of respondents qualified their answer with the fact that 
                                                        
70 Jess Bidgood, “Christine Hallquist, a Transgender Woman, Wins Vermont Governor’s Primary.” 
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their vote in 2020 could largely depend on the Democratic candidate who would be running 
against Governor Scott.  
Twenty-eight percent of these split-ticket voters said that their decision in 2020 would 
depend on the candidate or candidates who run against Governor Scott. Some mentioned specific 
candidates who they would rather vote for, while others spoke in more generalities. 
 
“Depends who he is running against. I pick character over party in Vermont. We 
can do that here we are lucky.”- Female, 50-59, Progressive 
 
Twenty-six percent of these split-ticket voters mentioned Governor Scott’s policy 
proposals, especially his stance on taxes and the economy. Those that mentioned policies were 
largely concerned with spending in Vermont and drew a direct connection between Governor 
Scott’s policy positions on the economy and taxes with their own bottom line. Other’s used the 
question as an opportunity to talk not only about the policies that he supported but those that they 
would want him to support more. The largest subset of this group of split-ticket voters were 
those who mentioned the need to continue to hold firm in his position on the state budget, the 
economy, and especially keeping taxes low.  
 
“[I would want him] to continue to try to make the state more affordable. At my 
age, I knew more people I grew up with who are moving out of the state and the 
primary reason is that they can’t afford to live here in their retirement years. 
There are too many elected officials who don't live month to month on that fixed 
income. I have lived here my whole life and we are thinking about moving 
because in a handful of years I won’t be able to pay for my standard of living. I 





 Twenty four percent of these split-ticket voters mentioned that Governor Scott’s track 
record as an incumbent contributed to their 2020 vote calculation. Interestingly, a number of 
these individuals used rather apathetic terminology when describing why incumbency drove their 
vote choice. In fact, some individuals admitted they would vote for him in 2020 simply because 
they were familiar with him. 
 
 “It’s a name I am familiar with. I don’t really follow Vermont politics very much 
except when it comes down to taxes. [It’s] brand recognition.” – Female, 60-69, 
Independent-Lean Democrat 
Nine percent of these split-ticket voters mentioned Governor Scott’s ability to 
compromise and work with Democrats and seven percent mentioned his character and demeanor 
in the job. Fourteen percent were unsure.  
Table 6 shows these various categories for responses to why these split-ticket voters 
were likely to vote for Governor Scott in 2018.  
Table 6: In-Depth Interview Reasons for Likely 2020 Governor Scott Vote Coded 
Open-End Responses 
  Split-Ticket Voters Likely to 
Vote for Gov. Scott in 2020 
Depends on who is running against Governor Scott 28% 
Specific policy agreement 26% 
He has done a good job so far in the office 24% 
Compromises and works with Democrats 9% 
He has a good character 7% 
Don’t know 14% 
 
Advice for Governor Scott’s 2020 Democratic Opponent 
 While the research outlined above delved into the reasons why these split-ticket voters 
were favorable to, voted for, or would vote for Governor Scott, the research also included an 
investigation of the choice that most did not make in 2018 or likely would not make in 2020, 
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voting for Governor Scott’s Democratic opponent. Therefore, the split-ticket voters were asked 
to “give advice” to a Democratic candidate running for Governor in 2020. This specific approach 
of asking for “advice” was used to maximize honest answers rather than putting the respondents 
on the defensive by asking “why they had not” voted for the Democratic nominee in 2018. The 
results indicated that these split-ticket voters cared very much about which issues the Democratic 
governor candidates take on. They believe in many progressive issues but want to ensure that a 
candidate’s more liberal issues are balanced with fiscal restraint. Many also want a candidate 
who is honest and truthful, and who cares about and listens to Vermonters.  
 Forty percent of these split-ticket voters mentioned a certain favorite policy when asked 
what advice they would give to a prospective Democratic candidate for governor. Once again, 
the economy, employment, and lowering taxes rose to the top. Twenty-six percent of responses 
included mentions about Democratic candidates needing to be more fiscally sound in terms of 
the Vermont budget, economy, employment, and taxes. Twenty-four percent of total responses 
included mentions of progressive issues like healthcare, taking care of the environment, raising 
the minimum wage, and climate change. However, some responses included overlap between 
socially liberal and fiscally conservative policy ideas. This indicates that many split-ticket voters 
were supportive of more Democratic and progressive policies, but recognized that choices need 
to be made in order to maintain a balanced budget.  
 
“Stick to the basics. No pie in the sky stuff. I like minimum wage and Medicare 
For All but pick one of those pieces. I think we need to raise minimum wage. If 
they are going to do something stick to something that is meaningful to the 
majority of Vermonters. Things that are tangible. Stick to the economy and 




 Twenty-one percent of responses mentioned the need for the Democratic candidate to be 
more moderate, more realistic, and to avoid “fringe issues” that could tend to isolate more 
moderate voters. However, a couple or respondents qualified that this was largely dependent on 
which issues they were talking about.  
 
“Stop talking to specific groups only. That is the downfall of the progressive 
agenda. You are looking at the small group of progressives and that makes 
everyone else feel left out. That is not a good idea.” – Female, 50-59, Strong 
Independent 
 
Eighteen percent of these split-ticket voters wanted the candidate to be genuine, honest 
and truthful. Some of these respondents pointed to national politics as an example of a path that 
they did not want Vermont politics to go down. In addition, 17% included the need for the 
Democratic candidate to connect with and listen to every day Vermonters.  
 
“The state of Vermont does not end at Rutland and White River Junction. 
Southern Vermont is the stronghold of the Democrats. in 2016 and 2018 the 
candidate for governor came to Billows Falls. When candidates come to our 
towns and talks to us that makes a difference. It is critical to me that we see our 
candidates. Whenever they are in town I take the time to visit them and find out 
what they are doing.” – Male, 60-69, Democrat 
 
Thirteen percent of responses included a desire for a candidate who would be willing to 
compromise with the other side of the aisle and to work with the legislature. Nine percent of 
responses mentioned a need for a solid track record. Another eight percent of responses 
encouraged the Democratic candidate to be more progressive – sometimes pointing to Senator 
Sanders as the example. Ten percent of respondents indicated that they were unsure.  
 In addition to the findings above, two key insights emerged from the responses to these 
questions. Only two respondents indicated that they would hesitate to vote for any Democratic 
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candidates because of their desire for a split Vermont state government. Similarly, only nine 
percent of these split-ticket voters indicated that they had ruled out voting for a Democrat.  
 
“I would be nervous to have a Democratic governor because I think they would 
have too much leeway. I vote Democratic all the way through but not for 
Governor. I would be scared about the broad sweeping changes. I would be leery 
of them. I want checks and balances. I don't want anyone with absolute power.” – 
Female, 40-49, Strong Independent 
 
Table 7 categorizes the advice given to the Democratic candidate running in 2020. 
Table 7: In-Depth Interview Advise To Potential Democratic Challengers Coded 
Open End Responses 
  All S-T Voters 
Focus on the economy, employment, and lowering taxes 26% 
Focus on specific policies (environment/climate change, healthcare, 
education, raising the minimum wage, gun control, the opioid crisis) 
24% 
Be more moderate, realistic, and avoid “fringe issues” 21% 
Be truthful and honest 18% 
Listen to “every day” Vermonters  17% 
Compromise and work with the legislature to accomplish something 13% 
They need a good track record and experience 9% 
Nothing; I am voting for Governor Phil Scott 9% 
Don’t know/ Other 10% 
 
The full survey and top-lines statistics for both the IVR survey and the follow up 
interviews can be found in Appendix A.   
 These data paint a picture of Vermont split-ticket voters as fairly conflicted between 
being fiscally conservative and socially liberal. They are more likely than the average voter to be 
happy with the direction of Vermont under Governor Scott and they focus heavily on economic 
issues as top priorities for Vermont. However, a large majority agree with many strongly liberal 
policy proposals and they generally voted down-ticket Democrat for most of the other Vermont 
elections in 2018. When specifically asked about Governor Scott, they are favorable to and voted 
for him because of his character and his willingness to deviate from traditional Republican 
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positions. However, these split-ticket voters are not set on voting for Governor Scott in 2020 and 
are relatively open to a Democratic opponent, depending on his or her issue-focus. It is clear that 
Governor Scott is a popular Governor and has a relatively strong hold on the governorship. 
While Vermonters elected a divided state government in 2018, if the 2020 election had been 
decided by these split-ticket voters in a coronavirus-free environment, a strong Democratic 
candidate may have endangered Governor Scott’s position as the only Republican statewide 
official in Vermont.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 Most theories about split-ticket voting use aggregate data to find correlations between 
split-ticket voting and potential motivations. The methodology used in this research does not 
allow such broad sweeping statements. However, it does enable the testing of Vermont split-
ticket voters’ stated reasons for splitting their tickets against some of the more prominent 
theories. 
 The most striking outcome of this research is that there was little evidence of the 
Balancing Theory. Only two individuals of the seventy-eight Vermont split-ticket voters 
indicated that they had voted for Governor Scott to “balance” the Democratic legislature.  
 
“I favored him over Hallquist because I thought he was moderate on issues and 
would balance against a Democratic legislature”- Male, 50-59, Independent-
Lean Democrat 
 
 In contrast, there was far more support for the Sincere Voting Model. While this theory is 
generally used to talk about the differences between presidential and congressional split-ticket 
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voting, the theory can easily be adjusted to the differences between gubernatorial and 
congressional split-ticket voting. In both instances, voters are considering an executive in 
addition to members of Congress. These are two very different and distinct roles. This theory 
argues that, “Offered two presidential candidates, voters choose the one they think more likely to 
keep taxes low and defense strong and to govern competently. Offered two House candidates, 
voters choose the one they think more likely deliver local benefits and to protect their favorite 
programs”71  
The results indicate that this may have been a frequent calculation made by these 
Vermont split-ticket voters. The Vermont split voters’ answers correlated significantly with a 
Sincere Voting Model’s prediction that economy and taxation play a larger role in electing an 
executive. When asked in an open-end format about their policy priorities for Vermont, the vast 
majority of split-ticket voters immediately spoke about the Vermont economy, taxes, and 
keeping people and jobs in Vermont. Similarly, when asked why they had voted for Governor 
Scott in 2018 or would vote for Governor Scott in 2020, many immediately mentioned his stance 
on taxes and the budget. Thus, many of these split-ticket voters sincerely believed that a vote for 
Governor Scott was in line with their fiscal vision for the state. While this research did not delve 
into the motivations behind the votes for Senate, U.S. House or Lieutenant Governor, there is a 
possibility that split-ticket voters used a separate calculation for those races.  
 
“[Governor Scott] does support jobs in Vermont. he wants to keep people in 
Vermont. He supported paying people to come into Vermont. I thought that was 
creative and I think we need that.” – Male, 60-69, Democrat 
 
                                                        
71 Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government, 119. 
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Cross-pressures that make a voters’ opinions of both parties neutralize any lean in either 
direction is termed “ambivalence.” This was somewhat evident in the cognitive dissonance that 
emerged when contrasting these split-ticket voters’ stated priorities with their support for many 
policies that would invariably lead to higher taxes. They were concerned about their own bottom 
line, increased taxes, and the economy. However, these split-ticket voters were also supportive of 
some of the most expensive and economy-affecting progressive policies like raising the 
minimum wage and Medicare for All unprompted. Therefore, ambivalence may have played a 
role in neutralizing the policy draws from both sides. That said, the pattern of down-ticket 
Democratic voting and singularly defecting from party line to vote for Governor Scott speaks to 
more than mere ambivalence across the board. These voters selected to split-ticket vote for 
Governor Scott specifically which points to more of an intentional Sincere Voting Model rather 
than ambivalence or ambivalence only within the context of the gubernatorial race.  
The split-ticket voting theory of voter Indifference also saw some support in the data, but 
it was less evident than the Sincere Voting Model. Almost two-in-ten split-ticket voters were 
unsure or could not remember why they had selected Governor Scott over Hallquist in the 2018 
election. While there is a possibility that this might be due to measurement error rather than an 
honest response, this high a level of “don’t know” responses may indicate that many split-ticket 
voters were indifferent about this particular election. A few voters even admitted to indifference 
when asked about why they had voted for Governor Scott. 
 
“Honestly nothing comes to mind. Name recognition. Perhaps he was Lieutenant 




Interestingly, split-ticket voting in Vermont, a state that is largely considered one of the 
most liberal in the country, is already partial evidence against the Partisan Sorting theory of split-
ticket voting. However, the fact that these split-ticket voters identified as moderates (40%) at a 
much higher rate than the total voters surveyed (29%) lends some credence to the idea that more 
moderate voters who are less extreme or partisan are more likely to split-ticket vote. Many also 
pointed to Governor Scott being a moderate as one of the reasons why they were favorable to 
him, why they had voted for him in 2018 and why they would likely vote for him in 2020. That 
said, as with the Ambivalence theory of split-ticket voting, this theory does not help explain why 
voters selectively chose to express their more moderate stances when voting for Governor Scott 
and not for a race with a far more liberal Democratic candidate like Senator Bernie Sanders or 
Lieutenant Governor David Zuckerman.  
 
“He generally takes moderate positions. Open to compromise, particularly since 
he was reelected and the composition of the legislature has change. He is not 
closed minded and is willing to change his view on issues when new information 
comes forward. He is a bit more conservative than I would like but he is moderate 
enough that I am generally satisfied.” – Male, 60-69, Democrat 
 
Finally, in the data, there was significant evidence of the power of Incumbency as an 
incentive to split-ticket vote. First and foremost, when asked why they were favorable towards 
Governor Scott, 45% included compliments of his character, mentioned they had “met him 
before,” and knew information about his activities out of work. (“I like that he is a race car 
driver.”) This demonstrated that Governor Scott has benefitted from being a more familiar face 
and having been in office and around Vermont communities. These split-ticket voters had been 
exposed to Governor Scott for a substantial period of time and this exposure has prompted 
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favorable opinions of Governor Scott, specifically in regards to his character, and that he “listens 
to all Vermonters.” 
These positive views and Governor Scott’s high name recognition lead these split-ticket 
voters to articulate that they have been and are willing to give Governor Scott the benefit of the 
doubt. Specific responses where the split-ticket voters talk about Governor Scott not being great, 
but also not shaking the boat too much firmly corroborates Feld and Grofman’s theory of 
“benefit of the doubt” that falls under the Incumbency Advantage theory. The fact that a 
significant number of these split-ticket voters see Governor Scott as a moderate or “not a real 
Republican” also aligns with the findings that the insulating effects of benefit of the doubt are 
magnified the closer the incumbent’s positions are to the “center” or median voter. The split-
ticket voters’ negative reactions to the Democratic candidate Hallquist also corroborated much of 
the academic work that finds that amateur, and therefore less appealing, candidates tend to run 
against strong incumbents. Christine Hallquist’s lack of any prior electoral experience, in 
addition to her poor performance in the debates and on the campaign trail closely fit this 
Incumbency Advantage theory. 
 
“He is doing alright. I like him. I don’t know how I would want him to change. 
Keep what he is doing.”- Female, 50-59, Democrat 
 
It is clear from the comparison between this research on Vermont split-ticket voters and 
the larger political theories on split-ticket voter motivation that elements of truth exist within 
most theories of split-ticket voting. There were a few split-ticket voters who fit each model, the 
Balancing Theory, the Ambivalence and Indifference theories, and the Partisan Sorting Theory. 
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However, these Vermont split-ticket voters show far more evidence of the Sincere Voting Model 
and Incumbency Advantage theories. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Split-ticket voting has declined in recent years. The 2018 midterms were no exception. 
However, this was not universally the case. In both 2018 and 2020, Vermont experienced 
significant split-ticket voting in the form of Democratic defection. In 2018, Vermont elected 
Democratic Socialist Senator Bernie Sanders, Democrat Representative Peter Welch, and 
Progressive Democrat Lieutenant Governor David Zuckerman, as well as a veto proof majority 
for Democrats and Progressives in the Vermont State Legislature. Last but not least, Vermonters 
also elected Republican Governor Phil Scott by a substantial margin. This grouping of elected 
officials has resulted in considerable cooperation, negotiation, and compromise between 
Vermont’s Republican governor, the Democratic legislature and federal delegation. The 
legislature’s stated goals were, in many cases, moderated, and Governor Scott has deviated from 
the Republican line in many instances. In other words, Vermont’s political environment reflects 
the type of situation that many people wish for across the country. This research into split ticket 
voting in Vermont, allows us to see what has driven this type of voting and therefore, how it 
could potentially happen in other areas across the country. 
A review of the prominent academic theories on split-ticket voting demonstrates a wide 
variety of possible split-ticket voting motivations. However, only a couple theories are strongly 
upheld by the results from interviews of Vermont split-ticket voters. These Vermont split-ticket 
voters are voting sincerely when they select more liberal members of Congress and their state 
legislature in addition to a Republican governor. They believe in many of the liberal ideas that 
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the federal and state legislature is considering. However, they are ultimately concerned about 
their own bottom line when it comes to the Vermont economy and their state taxes. In addition, 
despite Governor Scott’s being a Republican, these split-ticket voters were willing to give him 
the benefit of the doubt largely because they feel that they know him personally as a genuine and 
well-meaning individual. The voters are also able to compare Scott favorably (and more 
liberally) to other Republicans, which helps them separate his Republicanism from national 
Republicans like then-President Donald Trump and Senator Mitch McConnell.  
For individuals attempting to replicate this type of split ticket voting in other states and 
across the country steps could be taken to duplicate portions of the environment here in Vermont 
by creating more in-person connection with voters and creating space between gubernatorial or 
other in-state candidates other external national figures of the same party. 
This research on Vermont split-ticket voters allows us to determine which motivations 
played a larger role for Vermonters in this election, how a Republican governor was able to win 
Vermont, and it also gives us insight into how candidates and parties could encourage split ticket 
voting in other states.   
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CHAPTER 2: THE REALITY OF MULTIPARTY POLITICS IN 
AMERICA: THE VERMONT PROGRESSIVE PARTY AND ITS 
FORTY-YEARS OF SUCCESS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1981, Bernie Sanders became the mayor of Burlington Vermont by a margin of ten 
votes. His victory set into motion a political movement in Vermont that led to the emergence and 
continued presence of the most successful third party in the country: The Vermont Progressive 
Party. The Vermont Progressive Party website proudly states: “For nearly 40 years, an unbroken 
stream of Progressives have served on the Burlington City Council and Vermont legislature.”72 
Currently, nine members of the Vermont state legislature identify as Progressives first, another 
seven identify as Progressive second.73 The Progressive Party also currently holds a majority on 
the Burlington City Council.74 To give perspective to this success: currently, from members of 
congress to state legislatures across the country, there are 46 elected individuals who do not 
identify with a party, 33 of them are independents who range from liberal to conservative, 9 
members of the Vermont Progressive Party, and the remaining four identify with three different 
third parties.75 
                                                        
72 The Vermont Progressive Party, “Elected Progressives,” accessed February 18, 2021, 
https://www.progressiveparty.org/elected-progressives.  
73 Ibid; Due to the existence of fusion candidacies in Vermont, elected officials can elect to be a part of more than 
one party. The party an elected individual puts first is considered to be their “primary” party.  
74 The City of Burlington, “City Council,” accessed February 18, 2020, https://www.burlingtonvt.gov/CityCouncil.  
75 Ballotpedia, “Current independent and third-party federal and state officeholders,” Accessed May 3, 2021, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Current_independent_and_third-party_federal_and_state_officeholders. Officeholders from 
non-states were not included in this calculation.  
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Unlike the majority of other democracies around the world with multiparty systems, the 
United States has an entrenched two-party system. Scholarly work has laid out clear reasons why 
the political structure of our government encourages two major parties – and discourages third 
parties. It has also investigated various ways in which third parties can succeed, in many 
instances, using the Vermont Progressive Party as an example. However, no analysis has 
investigated the evolution of a single third party over an extensive period of success – what that 
party looks like over time, who is drawn to that party, and how a third party continues to be 
successful in the face of continued institutional barriers to success. 
Learning more about the Vermont Progressive Party allows us to learn more about third 
parties in our political party system and what could be the case around the country if more 
political party options were presented. For members of third parties across the country, the 
Vermont Progressive Party can also present some guidance, not only on how to overcome 
barriers to gain electoral success, but to maintain that success. Lastly, an investigation of the 
Vermont Progressive Party’s success enables us to ask the questions: How do we define third 
parties? Where does the line blur between being a part of a third party or a major party?   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Scholars have investigated the rise and fall of political parties in the United States of 
America from the framer’s conversations about emerging factions,76 to books published in 2020. 
A significant amount of energy is spent disabusing readers that the United States has only two 
                                                        
76 See: James Madison, “Federalist 10,” Congress.gov Resources, 1787, 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers#TheFederalistPapers-10; and George 




successful parties. The history of third parties in this country is frequently described.77  While 
third parties have rarely achieved electoral success, Hicks argues “What is of infinitely greater 
consequence is the final success of so many of the principles for which they have fought.”78  
In addition to uplifting third party success, much literature speaks to institutional factors 
that contribute to why the United States has an entrenched two-party system that disincentivizes 
third parties. 79 A consistent theme presents the fact that the two parties do not fully represent the 
political positions of the public80 and that many disapprove of their party options.81   
The largest institutional element in creating a two-party electoral system and, 
consequently, the largest hurdle to third parties is winner-take-all elections. Duverger’s Law 
contends that, “the simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system.”82 Scholars 
frequently reference this law in their work.83 They also contrast this winner-take-all form of 
elections with proportional elections in other democracies.84  
                                                        
77 See: David Gillespie, Challengers to Duopoly (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2012); and Eric 
Chester, True Mission: Socialists and the Labor Party Question in the U.S. (Sterling: Pluto Press, 2004). 
78 John Hicks, “The Third Party Tradition in American Politics,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 20(1) 
(1933): 3-28, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1902325; See also Jonathan Martin, Empowering Progressive Third 
Parties in the United States: Defeating Duopoly, Advancing Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2016), 5. 
79 See: Steven Rosenstone, Roy Behr, and Edward Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), p11; and Theresa Amato, Grand Illusion: The Myth of Voter Choice in a Two-Party 
Tyranny (New York: The New Press, 2009). 
80 Gerald Pomper, Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics (New York: Dodd, Mead & 
Company, 1968), 45; Lee Drutman, Breaking The Two Party Doom Loop (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2020), 150. 
81 Pomper, Elections in America, 5; Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of 
Liberation in America (New York: Vintage, 1967), 42; and John Bowden, “62 percent say third political party is 
needed in US,” The Hill, February 15, 2021, https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/538889-62-percent-
say-third-political-party-is-needed-in-
us?fbclid=IwAR2R40EU3pHgMw8CBOysr6HbZOzqTSdrugkw7pge6IIIBZCD8meobucXmzg. 
82 William Riker, “The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science,” The 
American Political Science Review, 76(4), (1982): 753-766. 
83 Paul Herrnson, “Two-Party Dominance and Minor-Party Forays in American Politics,” in eds. Paul Herrnson, and 
John Green, Multiparty Politics in America, 2nd ed. (Lantham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2002), 12. 
84 David Reynolds, Democracy Unbound: Progressive Challenges to the Two Party System (Boston: South End 
Press, 1997), 269. 
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Scholars argue that the winner-take-all system also creates the “spoiler effect” or 
“strategic voting.”85 Amato writes: “Spoiler logic is rooted in an insidious assumption – that the 
two major parties own the votes and voters.” She argues: “based on this assumption, including 
any third party or independent is invariable a zero-sum proposition. It is intruding on the major 
parties’ playing field, rather than expanding the electorate.”86  Thus, much literature that theories 
and explains how third parties could be successful considers how third parties and third-party 
candidates can avoid being seen as a spoiler.87 
Scholars also point to finances and institutional capacity as aspects of the United States 
electoral system that support only the two major parties. Schraufnagel argues: “third parties do 
not have the same financial resources as the two major political parties”88 and lack of resources 
invariably leads to failure.89 Institutional financial impediments also deter third party 
development. Bennett gives the example: “Under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, 
Republicans and Democrats… were eligible to receive a grant of $2 million to cover the costs of 
their quadrennial convention. Minor parties could receive a fraction of this amount.”90 
 Compounding on these hurdles, scholars point to media coverage as another institutional 
impediment.91 Gillespie describes, “the mainstream media’s flagrant neglect of third-party and 
independent campaigns and its clear preference for covering the two-party contest”92 hinders 
                                                        
85 Drutman, Breaking The Two Party Doom Loop, 259. 
86 Theresa Amato, “Beyond the ‘spoiler’ myth,” in Empowering Progressive Third Parties in the United States, ed. 
Martin, 117. 
87Terry Bouriches, Building Progressive Politics: The Vermont Story (Madison: Center for a New Democracy, 
1993), 39. 
88 Scot Schraufnagel, Third Party Blues: The Truth and Consequences of Two-Party Dominance (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 2. 
89 Ibid. 
90 James Bennet, Not Invited to the Party: How the Demopublicans Have Rigged the System and Left Independents 
Out in the Cold (New York: Springer, 2009), 133. 
91 See: Bernard Tamas, The Demise and Rebirth of American Third Parties (New York: Routledge, 2018), 146. 
92 David Gillespie, Challengers to Duopoly (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2012), 19. 
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third party growth. Lack of media coverage compounds: “the major criterion for most forms of 
media exposure is ‘electability’ which minor parties are hard-pressed to demonstrate. Of course, 
the electability standard can become a self-fulfilling prophesy, with lack of attention dooming 
minor parties to a poor finish”93  
Finally, many scholars point to some institutional rules implemented by the two major 
parties that create hurdles for third party development.94 Piven describes: “the major parties have 
colluded in the development of an array of additional legal obstructions to ward off pesky 
challengers.”95 These include raising qualifications for third parties,96 especially ballot access 
laws.97 Some scholarly work also investigates the adoption of the Australian ballot as an 
institutional impediment to third parties.98 
Scholars also investigate the role that third parties play in American politics.  For 
example, third parties are frequently mentioned around political realignment – the process by 
which parties shift and/or are replaced by third parties to accommodate changes in public opinion 
or the emergence of a new prominent issue. In these analyses, third parties are considered merely 
a part of the process that either ends with realignment or does not. For instance, the Minnesota 
Farmer-Labor Party is seen as “one of the most successful progressive third-party coalitions in 
                                                        
93 Diana Dwyre and Robin Kolodny, “Barriers to minor-party success and prospects for change,” in Multiparty 
Politics in America, eds. Herrnson and Green, 170; See also: Reynolds, Democracy Unbound, 54. 
94 See: David Gillespie, Politics at the Periphery: Third Parties in Two-Party America, (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1993); and Theodore Lowi, “Toward a More Responsible Three-Party System: Deregulating 
American Democracy,” in The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties, 4th ed., 
eds. John Green and Rick Farmer (Lantham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 354.  
95 Frances Piven, Challenging Authority: How Ordinary People Change America (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2006), 6. 
96 Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company Inc., 1970), 94. 
97 John Bibby and Sandy Maisel, Two Parties – or More?: The American Party System, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 2003), 70. 
98 See: James Bennet, Not Invited to the Party: How the Demopublicans Have Rigged the System and Left 
Independents Out in the Cold (New York: Springer, 2009), 3; and Schraufnagel, Third Party Blues, 33. 
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American history.”99 The party grew in influence and was successful at electing numerous 
candidates to political office, and twenty years after its inception, agreed to merge with the 
Democratic Party. Using this and others as examples. Sundquist believes that there is no 
realignment process in which a multiparty system emerges.100 Sundquist explains: “At no time in 
the history of this country has there been a sustained period of multiparty competition. Third 
Parties have come on the scene but only briefly; the new party has replaced an existing party as 
one of the major parties or it has been absorbed by an existing party or it has faded away.”101   
Third parties are also described as vehicles for voters to express their preferences and 
concern with the two major parties. Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus state: “Three motivations 
prompt people to vote for a third party. Citizens do so when they feel the major parties have 
deteriorated so much that they no longer function as they are supposed to, when an attractive 
third-party candidate runs, or when they have acquired an allegiance to a third party itself.”102 
Expanding on this idea, Chressanthis finds, “people who vote for third parties do so under 
similar motivations as people who vote for the major parties.”103 These are not wholly protest 
votes: “votes for third parties represent the transmission of individual preferences by people who 
believe that their vote is important and that in the aggregate their signal may be interpreted as a 
signal to alter the direction of current policies as run by the major parties”104 
                                                        
99 Tom O’Connell, “Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party, 1924-1944” Mnopedia, April 23, 2021, 
https://www.mnopedia.org/minnesota-farmer-labor-party-1924-1944.  
100 James Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United 
States, Revised Edition, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), 38. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 126-7 
103 George Chressanthis, “Third party voting and the rational voter model: Empirical evidence from recent 




 Some work also investigates the motivations of third party candidates. Looking 
specifically at presidential races, Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus argue that third party 
challengers “emerge when they perceive weakness in the two major parties. They run either 
when the major parties have disappointed a large minority faction, when the parties do not pay 
sufficient attention to the issues of concern to the voters, when there is an incumbent president 
on which to focus discontent, or when the previous election suggest that one major party may be 
too weak or too large to hold its supporters together.”105 To Rosenstone Behr, and Lazarus, third 
party affiliation for candidates is a political move that is initiated by the major parties’ failure. 
They argue: “A politician will not even contemplate a third party run until the major parties force 
him to.”106  
 In contrast, other scholars point to issue-based reasons for third-party affiliation. 
Gillespie argues, “Purists dominate the ranks of many minor parties, and even when leavened by 
the presence and influence of some pragmatists, a party may hold that its commitment to creed or 
devotion to defining issues is more important than winning elections.”107 Affiliation is not a 
political calculus, but is instead inflexible and electorally harmful: “Minor party candidates tend 
to hold firm ideological convictions. Most reject pragmatic strategies that might build broader 
support for their party”108 This analysis is derived from Lasswell’s Psychopathology and 
Politics: 
 
“Among political figures there are two distinct personality types: political agitators and 
political administrators. Political administrators are pragmatic, goal-centered people 
who are most successful, and gratified personally, in position of governmental leadership 
and influence. Political agitators are more rigid people who invest their psychic energies 
in a mission or cause. They frame their political appeals in emotion and exhortative 
                                                        
105 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 203. 
106 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 194. 
107 Gillespie, Challengers to Duopoly, 42. 
108 Herrnson and Green, eds. Multiparty Politics in America, 82. 
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language, and they vilify their adversaries as enemies of the good. Gratification for 
political agitators comes in the heat of the political contest, the struggle, rather than in 
the daily routine of governing.”109 
 
 There is a relative consensus that third parties are made up of “agitators” rather than 
“administrators” and that this works to the parties’ detriment. This is the basis for much advice 
given to third parties to help electoral success: “U.S. progressive third party movement is more 
likely to succeed if it channels its idealism and sense of urgency into an approach to gaining 
power that is pragmatic, yet is also farsighted and dynamic.”110  
The Vermont Progressive Party’s success is also mentioned as a third party that has been 
able to achieve success.111 These works mention the unique political environment including: the 
lack of a major party challenger to the incumbent Democratic mayor when Bernie decided to run, 
a media that covered Bernie as a legitimate challenger, and the small population of Burlington.  
There are also entire pieces of academic writing that wholly focus on the emergence of 
the Progressive Party in Vermont. Guma’s The People’s Republic focuses on Sanders, his 
campaigns, and his decisions as mayor of Burlington. Guma’s underlying analysis rests on the 
realignment theory. He describes the political environment that led to the unlikely Sanders 
victory and investigates the ensuing “revolution” to determine if this was a true realignment.112 
The book leaves this question open: “If Sanders is a historic inevitability will the Democrats be 
replaced one day by a Progressive Party or merely a permanent campaign machine? Are we 
seeing in Vermont the birth of a humanistic socialist movement, or a cult of the charismatic 
                                                        
109Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930). 
110 Jonathan Martin, “Introduction,” in Empowering Progressive Third Parties in the United States, ed. Martin, 6. 
111 See: Jonathan Martin, “Introduction” in Empowering Progressive Third Parties in the United States, ed. Martin, 
7; See also Gillespie, Challengers to Duopoly, 6 and 44. 




hero?”113 There is no discussion of what came to pass: The Progressive Party replacing the 
Republican party in Burlington while also growing to be a significant third party in state politics.  
Similarly,Bouriches’ Building Progressive Politics, focused on the emergence of the 
Progressive Coalition, was published in 1993 and Guma’s The People’s Republic in 1989. 
Neither book covers the subsequent decline and reemergence of the Progressive Party in 
Burlington, nor its sustained presence in the Vermont legislature for the past three decades. 
Bouriches wrote a more recent article entitled “Lessons of the Vermont Progressive Party.” 
However, this piece, like his earlier work, focuses on the emergence of the Progressive Party and 
the hurdles that hindered Bernie, the Progressive Coalition, and the Progressive Party, not the 
Party’s sustained success.114  
Senator Sanders’ books Outsider in the House and Our Revolution both describe how 
Bernie became involved in politics, his historic election as a “socialist” mayor in Burlington, and 
the rise of the Progressive Coalition and the Progressive Party. Sanders describes his motivations 
throughout the books: “I was to present Vermont voters with a political perspective from outside 
of the two-party system.”115 He also describes the hurdles that third-party candidates face in 
electoral politics in the United States: “the perpetual bane of American third parties. ‘I fully 
agree with what you’re saying, Bernie’ someone in the audience would invariably tell me after a 
debate. ‘but I don’t want to waste my vote on a third-party candidate.’”116 Sanders also uses the 
Progressives’ – and his own – success to intimate that third party politics is possible elsewhere: 
“If an independent progressive movement could win in America’s most rural state – and until 
                                                        
113 Guma, The People’s Republic, 183. 
114 Bouriches. Building Progressive Politics. 
115 Bernard Sanders, Outsider in the White House (New York: Verso, 2015), 19. 
116 Sanders, Outsider in the White House, 20-1. 
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most recently, one of America’s most Republican – then it might be possible for progressives to 
do likewise anywhere in the nation.”117  
 Ultimately, there is substantial scholarly work on third parties: how they do and can 
succeed, why they exist, and case studies on specific parties. The Vermont Progressive Party has 
been mentioned by a number of these academic works. However, this past research focuses on 
the beginnings of these parties – how they can begin to take hold, overcome obstacles, and 
specifically how the Progressive Party in Vermont was able to succeed initially. It has been four 
decades since Bernie Sanders won the mayor’s race in Burlington. His victory evolved into the 
Progressive Coalition, the Progressive Party, and now four generations of Progressives in 
Vermont. The following research investigates the Progressive Party as it is now, how the 
members see their past and current success, and what they see in the future of the party.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
The data for this paper has been collected from in-depth interviews with 18 individuals 
closely associated with the Vermont Progressive Party including Progressive elected officials, 
Progressive Party staff, academics, and other Progressive Party activists.  Interviews were 
conducted between November 6th, 2020 and December 15th, 2020. A full list of the Progressive 
Party activists interviewed, their association with the Progressive Party and the questions asked 
can be found in Appendix C. Interviews ranged from 30 minutes to over an hour. In addition, 
further research compiled from public opinion polls on Vermont Progressive Party can be found 
in Appendix D. 
 
                                                        




WHY ACTIVISTS SUPPORT THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY  
Much has been written about Senator Sanders during his time as mayor, but little research 
has looked at who Progressives are and what they care about. Thus, the first question in this 
research was: “Why are you a Progressive Party activist?” 
A number of key issues immediately emerged. The issues most consistently mentioned 
are: eschewing corporate contributions, being a party that works for “everyone,” and fighting for 
the drastic action needed for the climate crisis. The sections below break down these issues. 
 
A Party Free of Corporate Influence and Contributions 
One of the distinguishing features of the Progressive Party in Vermont is that any 
candidate must forgo corporate contributions. To Progressive Party activists, this ensures that 
their candidates are not beholden to corporate interests. Progressives also share the goal of 
expanding this stance to all political parties across Vermont and the country.118  
This is an issue frequently mentioned by the interviewed activists. Carter Neubiser said, 
“I can’t in good faith work for a candidate or a party that take corporate money. That was the 
first issue for why I supported Bernie... That’s the big differentiator.” Progressive activists see 
taking of corporate money as synonymous with corruption, or the potential of corruption. When 
describing how he became involved in politics, and with the Progressive Party specifically, City 
Councilor Jack Hansen described, “I was pretty jaded by American politics and conventional 
politics and the conventional system and the corporate power and the level of corruption.”  
                                                        
118 “We are the only major party that refuses the culture and practice of corporate contributions in politics; we 
understand that working people are not fully represented in a society that accepts corporate personhood” (The 




To these activists, government should be led by individuals who are beholden only to the 
people. Many call for campaign finance reform and publicly financed elections to ensure that 
corporations and wealthy individuals also do not hold outsized influence. Barbara Prine stated, 
“It’s important to have a Party that stands up for the needs of the people and the planet, not 
corporate interests.” This eschewing of corporate contributions is mentioned across the board by 
these Progressive Party activists.  
 
A Party That Works for Everyone 
Vermont Progressive Party is also supported because of its focus on the economic 
wellbeing of average and disadvantaged Vermonters. Activists mention a progressive economic 
approach that values workers through a number of issues. Some of the more modern economic 
issues included: raising the minimum wage to $15/hour and paid family leave. More long-term 
issues included: addressing wealth disparity, the dangers of capitalism, standing up for low 
income and disadvantaged people, raising taxes on the wealthy, and being against the economic 
“status quo.”  
Older Progressive activists were more likely to mention economic issues as a driving 
force. Martha Abbott said one of the issues that drew her to involvement with the Liberty Union 
Party and the Progressive Coalition and then the Progressive Party was economic priorities. In 
the midst of the Vietnam War, she asked herself: “If we weren’t spending all that money on the 
military and war, what could we be doing for the humans?” Similarly, Erhard Mahnke believes 
Vermont must put “people over profits... Our orientation as a capitalist society is really towards 
money and greed and power and corporations are ranked above individuals and we need to 
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reverse that.” In contrast, those in the second and third Progressive generations were more likely 
to see economics as secondary to other issues like climate policy.  
 
Addressing the Climate Crisis  
For younger generations, addressing the climate crisis with the urgency it deserves is one 
of the most prominent issues that connects them to the Progressive Party. City Councilor Hansen 
said: “If you look at the [Progressive] Party’s platform and what they stand for – for me, the 
most important issue is climate change.”  
Progressive Party activists in middle generations talk about climate urgency as part of a 
larger view of the platform. Senator Pearson said if he could only pick one issue, it would be 
climate change. However, he continued: “they are all wrapped together: climate change, income 
inequality, racial justice, Healthcare. All of the issues.” To Pearson, a focus on the economy also 
runs through each of these issues and Progressives have been true to that economic mission.  
For Progressive activists in older generations, climate activism can be an important 
additional issue or sometimes an afterthought. Martha Abbott, who had described the importance 
of economic issues in depth then added, “My mother was always an environmentalist. That 
became a real important issue to me too.” Her environmental activism working to close the 
Yankee Nuclear Power Plant was for supporting the health and safety of the workers in addition 
to environmental reasons.  
 
An Alternative to the Two-Party System 
Activists also mention their support for the Progressive Party in the context of fighting 
for an electoral system that has more than just two options. Megan Polyte’s immediate answer to 
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this question concerned the systemic change that the Progressive Party represents: “I came to the 
Progressive Party primarily because I am opposed to the two-party system. If you don’t have at 
least three choices it will be the least-worst choice. That is an antithesis to democracy itself.”  
Progressive Party elected officials especially spoke to this issue. Both Representatives 
Vyhovski and Colburn expressed: “I find the bipartisan system to be problematic.” Former 
Lieutenant Governor Zuckerman explained: “I am both attracted to the Progressive Party and the 
concept of more than two parties.”  
Progressive Party activists believe that the existence of a third party presents specific 
benefits to the legislative system: creating room for debate, discussion and movement, and 
allowing for legislators to create bi-partisan support for policy that negates the traditional 
oppositional model. Zuckerman spoke to both of these elements. First, he explained the space 
that a third party creates within the legislative process: “I think our political system with only 
two major parties gets polarized. But as soon as there gets more viable choices it broadens the 
discussion.” Zuckerman gave specific examples where Progressives’ more liberal stances opened 
opportunities for more left-leaning Democrats to move left. For example, his long-term advocacy 
around cannabis contributed to passing medical marijuana and paved the way for the legal 
market for recreational cannabis. Carter Neubiser also mentioned: “The fact that the Democrats 
are talking about $15 minimum wage, climate change, the global warming solutions act, paid 
family leave. That is all a result of our organizing from the 90s. We are moving the conversation 
in the public and on the ground but also within the Democratic establishment.” Neubiser also 
spoke in more combative terms arguing that, “There is a value in a small but significant block 
hitting this issue over and over again. It is something that we can use as a lever to push the 
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Democrats. There is also always something hanging over the Democrats – the accountability that 
we can find someone and run someone against the worst of them.”  
Zuckerman also spoke to the way that Progressives have been able to negate the 
traditional oppositional model between the two parties: “Those of us who understand the 
Progressive Party don’t see the political landscape as linear. [We see it as] even circular and 
scattershot.” He referenced both populism and economic issues that resonate across the 
traditional political spectrum that Progressives have made a mainstay in their messaging: 
 
“The Progressive message that I am a part of is one around economic justice, which 
often if one were to bend the line between two points and connect them, that is where I 
think there is common ground between the “right” and the “left.” … whether one is on 
the left or the right on social issues, many are being pushed to the bottom economically. 
… This is being exploited by the two [traditional] parties.” – Former Lt. Gov. Zuckerman 
 
Similarly, Representative Colburn told an anecdote about a Progressive candidate who 
“flipped” a Trump voter because they connected on economic issues and challenging the status 
quo. Colburn said that this stems from the Progressive “orientation around economic justice. 
[When you] bring people in through the economics there can be clarity and understanding.” 
Thus, the Progressive Party is attractive to these activists both because of the left-leaning 
issues that the Party represents in addition to the role that the Party plays in changing the 
political landscape to one that encourages collaboration rather than opposition. 
 
HOW ACTIVISTS DIFFERENTIATE THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY FROM THE 
PROGRESSIVE PARTY 
A significant amount of literature around third parties investigates third parties as 
separate entities from the two major parties. In Burlington, elected officials follow this 
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traditional pattern where elected officials hold only one party label. However, in the Vermont 
state legislature, all sixteen of the individuals who classify themselves as Progressive also carry 
the Democratic Party label. Considering this overlap at the state level, but the relative lack of 
scholarly research on such overlaps, this researcher wanted to delve into how members of the 
Progressive Party differentiate the two parties.  
Different Structures 
When asked what differentiates the Democratic and Progressive Parties many Progressive 
activists point out the structural differences: The Democratic Party is larger, with more 
resources, and more statewide and national support.  
In contrast, Progressive Party activists see the Progressive Party as more movement-
based and closer to the people. Senator Pollina described: “The commitment of grassroots 
organizing to electoral politics… That is important part of being a [Progressive] elected official.” 
To be closer to the people, Progressive Party activists argue that the Progressive Party uses in-
person organizing much more and much more effectively than the Democratic Party. This results 
in a difference in the perceived power base of each party. Wronski pointed out that “So often 
organizations try to keep tight control over their supporters. Instead, we said ‘this is your 
organization.’” In contrast, The Democratic Party is seen as being run with a far tighter fist by 
the party leadership.  
 
Different Priorities and Focus 
Progressive Party activists see the Progressive Party as being focused on the issues above 
any candidate and the Democratic Party as being focused on winning above the issues. Martha 
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Abbott described that the Progressive Party’s “primary focus is on issues and organizing around 
issues rather than getting specific people elected.”  
Progressive Party activists argue that because the Democratic Party is more focused on 
winning and being, becoming, or holding onto power, the Democratic Party is less likely to stand 
firmly on issues when there is an indication that being principled about that issue may lose them 
seats or make future elections more difficult. Mahnke argued, “the mainstream of the Democratic 
Party is often unwilling to stand by what I would say should be their principles.” Abbott 
explained that it is not that the individuals in the Democratic Party are not dedicated to issues, 
but that the focus of the larger party puts the issues on the back burner: “I know that many, most, 
people involved in the Democratic party believe in the issues. But I think the underlying 
structure creates a problem for people who are very well intentioned. Because the underlying 
structure is about the election more than it is about the policy.” Steve Hitgen argued that this 
focus on issues versus focus on winning makes the Progressive Party a party fighting for 
something, while the Democratic Party is a party fighting against something: “What you see in 
the Progressive Party you see a spectrum of people but the goal is not to be anti-Republican but 
to advance those principles. Otherwise they would just be Democrats.”   
Ultimately, Progressive activists believe that there is something fundamentally wrong 
with current the status quo and feel that the Progressive Party’s structure is able to “speak truth 
to power.” In contrast, they believe that the Democratic Party is committed to winning through 
the status quo which makes Democratic Party leadership less likely to make the changes that 
Progressives see as necessary. Throughout the interviews, many Progressives argued that this 
leads to a disconnect between the Democratic Party’s stated goals and their willingness to go the 
distance to implement those goals: 
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“The Democrats tend to be generally in agreement with [progressive values] but tepid in 
execution.” – Senator Chris Pearson 
 
“[The Democratic Party] doesn’t follow through with what is on their platform” – 
Representative Emma Mulvaney Stanak 
 
“Democrats don’t follow through with what they say they want” – Barb Prine 
 
“While [Democrats] may still espouse them, they do not implement them through 
policy.” – Erhard Mahnke 
 
Platform Differences 
Many Progressive activists feel that the platforms of the two parties overlap significantly 
– and are becoming more closely aligned. Emilie Krasnow explained that, “The platform of the 
Progressives has helped push and change the Platform of the Democratic party. Both platforms 
are pretty similar but it was not always like that.” Representative Vyhovski stated,“I firmly 
believe that the Dems and Progs agree on the same issues on the surface” and Representative 
Colburn pointed out, that it is “increasingly interesting that the platforms are aligning more and 
more not less.” Megan Polyte also articulated the similarities in the platform but argued that this 
similarity only disguises the differences in priorities and structure mentioned above: “The 
platform of the Democratic party is similar in its words. But it didn’t feel as authentic to me. 
Even the cleanliness felt exclusionary.”  
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That said, Progressive Party activists do feel that there are some specific issue differences 
between the platforms. The Progressive Party platform is seen as going farther and being bolder 
on progressive issues. Activists point to issues like climate change, cannabis legislation, and 
progressive economic issues as examples of where the Progressive Party takes the issues farther 
than the Democratic Party, and specifically the leadership of the party, is willing to go.  
Many Progressive activists, and especially those in older generations, argue that the 
parties diverge on economic policy. Progressives, they argue, are far closer to working class 
Vermonters. Senator Pearson stated that the Progressive Party is “doggedly focused on the 
economy and trying to reshape the economy in a way that works for working people and the 
middle class.” Erhard Mahnke stated “I wish [Democrats] would stay closer and truer to the roots 
of the party to the working class and moderate means… the Democratic party doesn’t seem to be 
able to articulate a basic economic message that resonates with working class voters.” In 
contrast, Mahnke argues that the Progressive Party is dedicated to continuing to connect with 
those working-class Vermonters.   
Representative Colburn also argued that the Progressive Party platform is much more 
antimilitaristic than the Democratic Party platform: “Our platform is different. It is more explicit 
about being anti-militarist.” 
Finally, the largest area of divergence is on campaign finance. Many Progressive activists 
believe that this is one of, if not the, defining difference between the parties. Prine explained that 
Democrats “have never been anti-corporate. They embrace corporations. Maybe they don’t really 
mean those principles [but] as long as they continue to embrace corporate money they will 
continue to give in.” Hitgen stated that the two parties differ because for the Progressive Party, 
“there is also the fundamental commitment to an anti-corporate Democracy.”  
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HOW ACTIVISTS GET INVOLVED IN THE VERMONT PROGRESSIVE PARTY  
 As intimated above, there are “generations” of activists who have different visions of the 
Progressive Party.  
1. The Founding Generation 
This group of individuals are those who were part of creating the Progressive Party or 
whose political involvement began far before the existence of the Party. Individuals in this 
generation include: Martha Abbott, Terry Bouriches, and Erhard Manhke.  
These activists center their commitment to the Party around economic issues. For 
instance, Erhard Mahnke has dedicated both his political and professional career to affordable 
housing. Mahnke explained that, “I am a Progressive because we are able to implement things 
and put forward ideas that may seem radical when they are first imposed but once implemented 
and successful they become part of the mainstream.” Mahnke stated, “[The Community Land 
Trust] is something that stared as a ‘crazy’ Progressive notion. We embraced it early on in 
Burlington and it has grown to become an international movement.” Mahnke believes that 
“housing is a basic human right and it should not be traded on and speculated on.” His stance on 
economic justice and housing drives his commitment to the Progressive Party.  
Similarly, Martha Abbott stated, “not long after the founding of Liberty Union Party, I 
started working with Bernie. We worked on telephone service rates and electrical service rates.” 
To Abbott, these economic issues were of utmost importance because they “made a real 
difference in people’s lives.” Abbot most cares about, “wages, benefits, healthcare, all the things 
that the system requires of people who are going to be productive members of society.”  
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Many of these “first generation” activists worked directly with Senator Sanders in the 
Liberty Union Party, his early campaigns, or when he was Mayor of Burlington. They speak of 
him as part of the movement toward progressive policy and as a colleague in that effort. 
2. The Inspired Generation(s)119  
These individuals came of age and into political life with Bernie Sanders as Mayor of 
Burlington or as Congressman. They include: Former Lt. Governor Zuckerman, Senator Pearson, 
and Representative Colburn.  
Zuckerman described that his first exposure to Progressive ideas: “I didn’t know about 
the Progressive Party when I first got involved. I learned about Bernie Sanders when I heard 
Bernie speak at UVM in 1992. It was through volunteering on his campaign that I met local 
folks, primarily in Burlington who were engaged in the Progressive Coalition.”  
A prominent characteristic of this generation is that, more than any other generation, they 
connect their Progressive vision with pragmatism.  These individuals have personal experience 
with how Progressive ideas can be implemented to help people, because they have seen it 
happen. Representative Colburn stated, “I was in High School when Bernie was Mayor. I 
benefitted directly from the Mayor’s youth office. That was my introduction.”  
This generation is more likely than the first generation to mention social and 
environmental issues. Learning about climate change was what first inspired Pearson to get 
involved politically. Colburn was involved in reproductive access work. However, permeating 
this generation’s approach, is a firm dedication to the people, in economic realities, and in a 
collaborative approach. Zuckerman stated, “What intrigued me about the Coalition was that there 
were people who had varying social and economic justice ideology that were working as a 
                                                        
119 Some Progressive activists separate this group into two generations. 
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coalition to help each other’s focus be amplified. One person might be interested in 
environmental justice, economic. They would each support each other in the coalition.” 
Many of these individuals credit Sanders as an inspiration and a mentor. To them, he has 
led the way on Progressive issues from inside of government, not just as an organizer outside the 
system. His work demonstrates how to take Progressive ideas and make them a reality.  
3. The New Generation 
The “new” generation of Progressives came to political life following the failure of 
Progressive Mayor Bob Kiss’ leadership in Burlington, and the subsequent the rise of 
progressive politics during Senator Bernie Sanders’ campaign for president. Their views on 
Progressive politics are more idealistic and tend to be broader-focused than the largely economic 
examples presented by the older generations. There is also a heavy emphasis on social issues and 
fighting climate change. While some mention a commitment to economic issues, they almost 
exclusively bring up the economy as a subsidiary argument.  Individuals in this generation 
include City Councilor Jack Hanson, the Executive Director of the Progressive Party Josh 
Wronski, and mayoral campaign manager and former Progressive candidate Carter Neubiser.  
Neubiser explained: “I’m from Connecticut so I did Bernie volunteering in my home 
state… Bernie was the first one where there was an existential need for him to win. I got a third 
job in my neighborhood to be able to donate $30 a week.” Or for Hansen, “[Bernie] was a 
politician but he was speaking to the issues... I had never heard a politician talk that way. It 
changed the way I viewed electoral politics. He made me realize that you can be a part of the 
system and still challenge it from the inside.”  
To this generation, Sanders is a fighter for justice and for progressive ideals. Many are 
inspired by his unwavering support for progressive issues in the face of an unfair system. This 
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generation’s unwavering fight for ideological justice stands in contrast to the economic focus and 
pragmatic implementation of the other two generations.  
It is important to note that there were individuals interviewed who did not necessarily fall 
clearly into these three generational categories.  
 
WHAT ACTIVISTS CREDIT WITH PROGRESSIVE PARTY SUCCESS  
A substantial amount of scholarly work on third parties in the United States investigates 
the institutional barriers to entry for third parties. In asking why Progressive activists believe the 
party has been able to be so successful, we can determine if – 40 years later – there is still 
consensus within the party around how and why the Party was able to overcome those barriers.  
Progressive Party activists firmly believe that the existence and growth of the Progressive 
Party is largely due to a confluence of a number of unique environmental aspects in Vermont and 
one unlikely historical event: Bernie Sanders’s election as mayor of Burlington. The most 



























Figure 9: Reasons for Progressive Party Success by Number of 




Bernie Sanders and Proving that Progressives Can Win 
The most frequent reason given by Progressive activists for the success of the Party is 
Sanders’ success. Jack Hansen states, “Bernie coming in and having that ‘miracle’ election was 
shocking. You have up-ended the Democratic machine in the largest city in the state.” Bernie ran 
a progressive, issue-focused campaign and governed Burlington with an eye towards those 
priorities. Abbot stated, “He raised the conversation on all those issues so effectively, that we 
were able to till that soil. We were able to continue those fights in-state while he was in 
Washington.” Zuckerman added that the Progressive Party has been successful “because [of] the 
original success of Bernie and other people running outside of the Democratic party and then 
operating government in a successful way. Once that success occurred that gave legitimacy to 
the idea that another party could exist.” Steve Hitgen said, “The practical achievement of being 
elected was a really important one.” In this way, Sanders established a “proof of concept” not 
unlike other charismatic third party leaders throughout history like founders of the Wisconsin 
Progressives Party Phillip and Robert La Follette.120  
Most Progressive Party activists believe that Bernie and other Progressives’ have 
demonstrated legitimacy that will continue. For example, Zuckerman described that, “There are 
now children and even grandchildren of original progressives that are involved…The fact that 
we have multi-generational engagement helps with the continuum.” Hitgen, however, believes 
that the success of the Party continues to rest with Senator Sanders’ success: “There is still, to 
this day, a ‘Bernie gets hit by a bus’ situation. Who is the unapologetically left leader in Vermont 
if that happens? There is no answer for that… Without him I don’t know what we do next.” 
                                                        
120 Ronald L. Feinman, "Philip La Follette: The Second Son," Reviews in American History 11, no. 3 (1983): 409-13. 
Accessed May 4, 2021, doi:10.2307/2702475. 
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Vermont’s Political Environment 
Progressive activists describe the political environment in Vermont as “unique” and 
believe that the Progressive Party’s success is linked to a number of these characteristics. 
Small Scale: Activists consistently link the “small scale” of Vermont politics to the 
Party’s success. Jack Hansen pointed this out immediately: “The smallness of Vermont is huge. 
The fact that the largest city in the state is 40,000 people opens it up.” This scale enables 
candidates to work hard knocking doors and connect with their communities. Senator Pearson 
explained: “When you run for the house you have a district of either 4,000 or 8,000 people. You 
can knock all of those doors and if you work hard enough, you can knock them twice.”  
Because of the logistical benefits of the small scale, money is less of an issue. Anthony 
Pollina stated: “Vermont is a small state which makes campaigning easier in terms of the money 
you need.” Wronski explained how this works in Burlington: “You can win a City Council 
election with 400 or 1200 people…Money doesn’t matter as much. Someone can raise $3-4000 
and still run a very effective campaign.” At the state level, Senator Pearson said, “If you spend 
$10,000 on a legislative race you would be setting records.” 
The Electorate: Mahnke and Jack Hansen both mentioned an influx of progressive-
minded individuals to Vermont during the 1960s and 1970s. Erhard stated “a lot of it starts with 
the back-to-the-land movement in the latter half of the 60s and 70s.” Similarly, Jack stated that 
the Party was boosted by the “Hippies that moved to Vermont.” 
Progressive activists also mention the community-based politics. Shannon Jackson said: 
“people can really talk with their neighbors and understand the problems that they face.” 
Similarly, Polyte said: “People were already more inclined to view things through the lens of the 
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person communicating it rather than through a party.” This unique attribute of the electorate 
helps voters vote for the person, not the party, and therefore benefits third-party candidates. 
Political Rules and Laws: Progressive activists also mention that many Vermont political 
laws have been beneficial or at least neutral to third-parties. For example, Vermont politics allow 
for the existence fusion candidates who run with more than one party label. This is also used by 
the Working Families Party in New York. This is when candidates run in the Democratic 
primaries, but also organize write-in campaigns for the Progressive nomination. This enables 
competition between Democrat and Progressive candidates to occur within the Democratic 
primary rather than the general election, and removes the “spoiler effect.”  
Progressive activists see both the positives and negatives in fusion candidates. To 
Pearson, fusion is not ideal but a necessity because “even a really strong Independent or 
Progressive probably cannot win in Chittenden county because of the nature of the ballot.” Most 
Progressive activists agree that the ability to “run fusion” helps Progressives get elected while 
they push for changes to the electoral system that would open up third party candidacies in the 
general election without introducing the spoiler problem – like ranked choice voting.   
Jack Hansen also pointed out that the political structure in Vermont which allows for 
candidates from different parties to serve as Lieutenant Governor and Governor allowed former 
Lt. Governor Zuckerman to serve as the highest-ranking Progressive Party official in the country. 
Hansen argues this would have been much less likely if Vermont laws required the Governor and 
Lt. Governor to run on the same ticket. Representative Mulvaney Stanak also pointed to the ease 
of getting on the ballot: “There is a structural reason [for Progressive Party success] – we have 
one of the easiest ways to gain ballot access. The threshold is to organize towns and counties. It 
is not easy but it is way easier than party structure in other states.”  
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Vermont Media: Finally, Progressive activists point to the structure of local, Vermont 
media as a relative benefit to the Party. Activists ascribe a portion of Bernie’s victory in 1981 to 
how the media covered the race. Bouriches stated, “[Bernie was] in all the TV and daily 
newspaper without having to pay. The existence of local news in a city where politics are small 
scale helped Progressives get a foothold of legitimacy in elections.” Burlington media has also 
helped Progressives gain legitimacy statewide. Wronski stated: “Burlington is the largest city in 
Vermont. [Progressive victories] became state news and even national [news.]”  
 
Progressive Party Strategy 
Progressive activists also point to Party strategy fundamental to their success. Three 
aspects of Progressive Party strategy rise to the top: starting local, on-the-ground organizing, and 
talking about issues that resonate. By starting with local elections, the Progressive Party and 
Progressive candidates gain legitimacy within their communities which they can build out to 
larger constituencies. Neubiser contrasted the Progressive Party’s success in starting locally with 
third parties, like the Green Party that have tried to start nationally: “The amount of influence we 
have is outsized because we started at the local level. When you look at the Green Party they 
don’t have a lot of infrastructure. You waste the resources on that one [national] candidate. What 
happens when he loses? That is not how you organize long term.”  
Similarly, Progressive activists pointed to the culture of grassroots organizing in the 
Party. Colburn sees Progressive “organizing continue to resonate with people and out-organize 
paid canvassers and glossy mailers…there is something about the grassroots model and the way 
the Party really seeded itself locally in a state where there were already some really ripe 
81 
 
conditions.” Similarly, Jackson noted that when candidates are familiar with their communities, 
“the Progressive Party’s solutions and organizing tactics really work in that situation.”  
Finally, Progressive activists point to how well Progressive issues resonate across party 
labels. Mahke argued: “When you have the right values that are people-oriented and toward 
people who feel left out and left behind, that resonates across ideological lines.”  
 
THE FUTURE OF THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY 
The Positives of 2020 
For the most part, Progressive activists do not think that the 2020 elections significantly 
altered the Party’s status in Vermont. While Progressives Lieutenant Governor Zuckerman and 
Senator Tim Ashe lost at the statewide level, there were new Progressive leaders elected to the 
Vermont State Legislature. Representative Mulvaney Stanak argued, “In Burlington, we are 
winning across the city.” Jackson also pointed out that at the state level, the newly elected 
Progressives “back filled” the positions lost by other Progressives.  
Progressives point to the 2020 political conditions as an extreme aberration from the 
norm. Prine argued that we have to “put aside” Zuckerman’s governor’s race because  “it was 
impossible to beat Phil Scott when he did and continues to do a good job on the pandemic.” 
Similarly, Representative Mulvaney Stanak commented, “There are a whole lot of reasons why 
up-ticket they lost. We are living through a pandemic with a psychotic racist, sexist and we have 
a Republican governor who looks pretty tame. It was a referendum on Scott not killing us during 
the pandemic.” However, despite this relatively positive reaction to the recent 2020 elections, 




A Deepening Rural and Urban Divide? 
Progressives have been strongest in Chittenden county where Burlington is located and 
where the Progressive Party began. However, the Party has historically made a concerted effort 
to expand to other areas of the state. Senator Pearson, pointed out, “We recruited and won three 
rural seats…And it really put Progressives in the map in Montpelier.” Many Progressive activists 
feel that, in recent years, the Party’s focus has migrated back to Burlington. Polyte stated, 
“Anthony Pollina’s connections with being a founder of NOFA and work with Bernie gave him 
credibility with rural Vermonters. I don’t see that as continuing for very much into the future. 
Those connections are getting weaker and weaker.” As a result, some activists, like 
Representative Vyhovski believe that, “one of the biggest decisions to be made is if we want to 
continue to funnel primarily into Burlington or if [we] truly wants to be a statewide party.”  
Senator Pearson sees this as an opportunity for the Party: “The Progressives could play a 
really important role. Rural Vermont and rural U.S. are more impacted by economic issues and 
that is our bread and butter. If we could build bridges there it could have great impact. It would 
prove that the left should not ignore rural districts and concerns.” Other Progressives, however, 
do not feel that a concentration in Burlington is necessarily a bad thing. Representative Colburn 
pointed out that Chittenden County “tends to be the more left leaning county in the state… 
[however] If you put your leader from a pretty purple district, you are forcing them to choose 
between pushing the Party position on platform and doing what is the right thing for their 
district.” To Colburn, Progressives should be led by someone from who has the freedom to 





What Issues Should The Progressive Party Focus On? 
Some Progressive activists argue that the Party has been and is moving too far to the left 
and is leaving behind the key economic argument that they believe cemented Bernie’s success. 
In contrast to the traditional economic focus, Prine argued, “issues number 1, 2, and 3 for 
younger folks is climate, climate, climate.” Mahnke is concerned that young Progressives are not 
considering the basic values of economic justice, instead “there is beginning to be this frame that 
the radical progressive party is going to lead Burlington back into trouble the way that Bob Kiss 
did. We spent years rebuilding the progressive brand in Burlington.” Prine suggested that 
Progressives “figure out a way to bridge the gap between the older and younger Progressives” 
and that “we are not even talking the same language in rural areas.” In contrast, Neubiser, who is 
part of the younger generation, argued: 
 
“Our motivation and our ideology is a pure one. I do think that we know these issues are 
the right thing to do in this point in history. These issues are the right solutions and I 
fundamentally believe that they are going to win the day.” – Carter Neubiser 
 
Challenging Democrats or Pulling Them Far Enough Left 
Two of the elected Progressives from the second generation, Zuckerman and Pearson 
both mentioned the possibility of the Democratic Party absorbing the Progressive Party if the 
Democratic Party were to fully adopt Progressive values. Zuckerman said, “Progressives are 
often accused of wanting to take down the Democratic party. I come back with, if the 
Democratic Party was more progressive we wouldn’t need to exist... It may be that the 
Progressive Party disappears when the electoral body passes progressive issues.” Similarly, 
Pearson argued if the Democratic party focused more on progressive issues, “there would be no 
need or appetite for the Progressive Party.” It is important to note that neither elected official 
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indicated that they believed that this would happen. Nonetheless, their mentioning it 
demonstrates that they would consider the merging of the parties.  
Other, younger, Progressive activists describe a much more adversarial future for the 
Progressive and Democratic Parties. Neubiser and Wronski both indicated that their goal would 
be for Progressives to be the most prominent alternative candidates to Democrats in the state. 
Neubiser envisions: “In the next 20 years [the Progressive Party] will challenge the Republicans 
as the second biggest party in the state.” Similarly, Wronski argued, “I can see how we could 
have 30-40 house seats [in the Vermont legislature] and could really be a player.”  
This represents a significant difference between these two groups of activists. This could 
stem from a generational divide. However, it could also stem from the fact that the two elected 
officials, Lt. Governor Zuckerman and Senator Pearson run as under both party labels. In 
contrast, Neubiser ran as a Progressive in Burlington and Wronski has not run for office.  
 
Who Will Lead The Party? 
With the 2020 losses for key Progressives: Lieutenant Governor Zuckerman in his 
campaign for governor, Senator Ashe in his campaign for lieutenant governor, and former party 
leader Representative Robin Chestnut Tangerman, some Progressive Party activists feel that 
there is a leadership vacuum in the Progressive Party. As Polyte bluntly said: “I don’t know who 
the next Progressive leader is going to be.” Progressive activists want to be deliberate in looking 
for that leadership but have different focuses. Hitgen argued, “You need people at the top as 
characters that people can latch on to.” Other activists pointed to the need for diversity. For 
instance, Colburn pointed out, “There is a real appetite for women leaders, for women of color.” 
Whereas Abbott wanted to continue the current leadership trend, she wanted the Progressive 
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Party to find leaders who can identify with rural voters like Lieutenant Governor Zuckerman, 
who is also a farmer, and Senator Bernie Sanders whose integrity and economic message 
resonates in rural areas.  
 
Celebrating and Pushing for More Diversity 
One segment of Progressive activists wants to celebrate the diversity already achieved by 
the Party. Another segment is concerned that not enough has been done. Jeremy Hansen 
celebrated the recent 2020 election of the Progressive Vermont “squad”: “The fact that we have 
this squad of freshman legislators coming in is significant. The fact that it is a majority LGBTQ 
is something to celebrate. To show that Progressives walk the talk.”Members of the Squad, 
however, are not as positive about the amount of diversity in the Progressive Party. Mulvaney 
Stanak argued the Party needs “to be putting BIPOC people in homes [in the Progressive Party] 
and not just unseen labor.” Similarly, Colburn stated the Progressive Party should “start to 
change the face of who the Progressive leadership is in ways that help us be true to our vision 
that the voices who have not been heard are at the table.” Finally, Vyhovski believes that the 
Progressive Party “needs to be really thoughtful about welcoming underrepresented voices and 
minority voices.”  
 
DISCUSSION 
Is the Progressive Party A Third Party? 
 The first and most important question that this research must address is the question: 
What is a third party? In literature about third parties, they are distinct entities from the two 
major parties. The reality for the Progressive Party in Vermont is more complicated.  
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Since Bernie’s election in 1981, Progressives have controlled the mayor’s office for 
almost three decades, Democrats controlled it for nine years, and Republicans for two. The 
makeup of the Burlington City Council similarly points to a Progressive vs. Democrat Party 
system in the city. It is clear that, at the local level in Burlington, a critical realignment has 
occurred. The Progressive Party is no longer a third party in Burlington, but has supplanted the 
Republicans as a major party.  
 In contrast to Burlington, the Progressive Party is almost inextricably linked to the 
Democratic party at the state level. While some individuals have been elected to the state 
legislature as pure Progressives, no current Progressive elected official is. In the Vermont 
legislature, the Progressive Party’s representation relies heavily on fusion candidate laws and the 
Democratic primary. Were it not for the Progressive Party’s prominence in Burlington, an 
argument could be made that the Progressive Party is not as much an independent third party but 
a subsidiary of the Democratic Party. This may become even more true if, as some Progressive 
activists predict, the Vermont Democratic party continues to adopt progressive issues. As we 
move forward with the study of third parties, it is important to recognize that the lines between 
parties as third parties emerge may not be as clear cut as scholarly work has typically laid out.  
 
Both Typical and Atypical Third Party Success 
 Traditionally, third parties have been successful by forcing major parties to adopt their 
positions. Progressives in Vermont have succeeded in this way around key progressive issues 
such as: raising the minimum wage, paid family leave, cannabis reform, and marriage equality. 
These victories demonstrate strong parallels third party successes throughout American history 
including, “the abolition of child labor, limitation of work hours, establishment of minimum 
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wages and graduated income taxes, broadening access to public education, expansion of suffrage 
to previously excluded groups, institution of direct election of U.S. senators, use of public 
referenda”121 and more. A key difference between the successes of other third parties and the 
Vermont Progressive Party is that issue-focused success has been in addition to and likely 
significantly aided by electoral victories.  
 
The Unlikely Path To Success 
Winner-Take-All Systems: Progressive activists believe that winner-take-all plurality 
elections continue to be a hurdle to the Party’s success. Many mentioned the dangers of being 
seen as a spoiler. They feel caught: if they run in the Democratic primary they are accused of 
hijacking the Democratic Party; if they run in the general they are labeled as “spoilers.” Many 
also speak with concern and regret of the very few times in recent elections when Progressives 
have “damaged” the party’s reputation by running as a third candidate in a general election that 
resulted in a Republican victory.122 Progressive activists feel that political conditions in Vermont 
help mitigate this spoiler effect and offer alternatives. For instance, they can run fusion and 
personally connect and build relationships with the voters in their communities outside of party 
labels. This is also true for the Working Families Party in New York and elsewhere.  
Legitimacy: Many activists feel that while Sanders helped the party with that initial 
boost, the Party has now developed legitimacy of its own. However, Hitgen is an outlier. He 
believes that Sanders’ success is still inextricably linked to the Party’s success. When Sanders 
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ends his tenure in office, an investigation of the path taken by the Progressive Party could 
resolve this question.   
Media: As local media disappears around the country,123 fewer third parties are able to 
demonstrate legitimacy through the media, receive earned media, or afford paid media.  
Progressive activists believe, as scholars have pointed out, that the local news environment in 
Vermont, and especially Burlington, has helped boost the Progressive Party. Progressives are 
frequently covered in local news. The Progressive mayoral candidate was substantially 
covered.124 Progressives at the statewide level are frequently mentioned in local news.125 It 
seems that the local news environment in Burlington has continued to aid the Progressive Party 
in establishing and maintaining legitimacy.  
Institutional Hurdles: Progressive activists acknowledge that there were and are fewer 
institutional hurdles present in Vermont. They point to the relative ease of ballot access and the 
ability to run as fusion candidates. However, Progressive activists are well aware of the 
continued institutional hurdles. A clear example is Polyte’s concern that, “in two years if the 
Progressives don’t find someone to run on the statewide ticket to get 5% that will be a problem” 
due to ballot laws. Similarly, many Progressive activists feel that fusion candidacies are an 
important stepping stone but also stop the party from being fully autonomous at the state level. It 
is clear that institutional hurdles still for third parties even once they establish legitimacy.  
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Who Are Progressives?  
 As mentioned in the literature review, there seems to be a relative consensus among 
scholars that third parties are made up of “agitators,” “idealists,” or even “purists” rather than 
“administrators” and that this makeup works to the third parties’ detriment. In this analysis of the 
Progressive Party, it is clear that the younger generation of Progressives fit far more closely into 
the “agitator” or “activist” category described by Lasswell.126 For example, statements by 
Neubiser and Wronski were more combative toward the Democratic Party. In contrast, those in 
the older generation were much more likely to fall into the “administrator” category.127 These 
older Progressives frequently mentioned the need for Progressives to be pragmatic and appeal to 
working class individuals. However, Sanders’ success is seen as being a combination of these 
two characteristics: “[Bernie’s] socialist ideology was still attractive to the true believers who did 
the nitty-gritty work, but the administration’s policies were often pure pragmatism.”128  
 In 2020 the Progressive Party held a primary for the mayor’s race between two prominent 
Progressives: City Council President Max Tracy, the ultimate winner, and City Councilor Brian 
Pine. The narrative in the primary described the contest as an “‘Ideologue’ vs. ‘bridge 
builder.’”129 In addition, following Tracy’s primary victory, former Progressive Mayor, Peter 
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Clavelle, endorsed the incumbent Democrat, rather than the Progressive.130 This may indicate an 
“agitator” versus “administrator” split within the Burlington Progressive Party.   
 If, as scholars suggest, the success of a third party is linked to pragmatism and a 
willingness to compromise on issue purity, the Vermont Progressive Party is a perfect point of 
analysis. Currently, Progressive activists describe a decision point about the focus of the Party: 
with older generations wanting to pull Progressive focus back to rural communities, economic 
issues, and pragmatism, and younger generations wanting a greater focus on climate and social 
justice issues. Future research may be able to look at a correlation between pragmatism and 
success for the Progressive Party as it evolves from this decision point. For the moment, 
however, the near-victory for the “ideologue” Burlington mayoral candidate, Max Tracy,131 the 
emergence and success of young Progressive activists on the Burlington City council and 
activists like Progressive Representative Taylor Small, the first openly transgender member of 
the Vermont Legislature, demonstrate that individuals in the Progressive Party that Lasswell 
would likely deem “agitators” are able to succeed electorally.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The Vermont Progressive Party has done something that no modern third party has been 
able to do: maintain four decades of success as a third party. Research on how the Party has 
achieved this success, the individuals that it has drawn to the party, and where the Progressive 
Party’s path will lead into the future allows us to learn more about the potential for other third 
parties across the country. The Progressive Party’s experience tells us where our current theories 
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are correct, where they fail to fully address the reality for the Vermont Progressive Party, and 
how other third parties across the country could potentially replicate this success.  
 The experience of the Vermont Progressive Party confirms a number of scholarly theories 
around third parties: specifically, both the hurdles and optimal environmental conditions for third 
party development and success. Strong local media, proof of concept and legitimacy sparked by 
Bernie’s election, low ballot requirements, small populations, and the availability of fusion 
candidacies have helped Vermont Progressives.  
 Scholarly work, however, usually treats third parties as either outside of the two-party 
system with little or no chance of substantial electoral success, or as part of a realignment where 
the third party will ultimately supplant or be taken over by one of the major parties. This research 
and the experience of the Vermont Progressive Party demonstrates that there is a lack of 
scholarly theories about a third option: limited but substantial sustained success. The Vermont 
Progressive party has achieved a realignment in Burlington, but has remained a consistent third 
party option at the state level.  
 Scholarly work has also largely categorized third parties as replete with ideologues and 
purists, pointing to this as one of the reasons for lack of electoral success. The interviews with 
Progressive activists demonstrate that there is a range of individuals attracted to the Vermont 
Progressive Party from pragmatists to idealists and that candidates from both sides of the party 
have been able to be successful. Therefore, in other states and nationally, ideological passion is 
not necessarily a damning attribute for members of third party. However, mimicking the 
Vermont Progressive Party’s combination of pragmatists and idealists could be a boon.  
 For members of third parties across the country, the Vermont Progressive Party also 
presents some guidance for a potential path towards and political environment that would allow 
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third parties to overcome barriers, gain electoral success, and maintain that success. For instance, 
institutional barriers should continue to be fought, local media should be supported, and fusion 
candidacies can be used as a stepping stone. Finally, the Vermont Progressive Party 
demonstrates that combining pragmatism with idealism could develop long-lasting third party 
legitimacy across the country.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE SUCCESSES, FAILURES, AND FUTURE OF 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND TOWN MEETINGS IN VERMONT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Every year, on the first Tuesday in March, Vermonters come together in their local 
municipalities for town meeting day, an opportunity to vote on all kinds of local- and state-wide 
issues. Whether it is a presidential election year, like 2020, or not, Vermont votes on local issues 
like the school budget, whether the town will buy a new ambulance, or which local officials will 
represent them in the year to come. Vermont’s version of the town meeting is distinct from other 
states, including those in other parts of New England that employ similar structures like 
representational town meetings. In many rural towns across the state, Vermonters physically 
come together at town meetings to debate, discuss, and vote on these issues.  
Direct democracy in the form of town meetings is generally considered one of the purest 
forms of democracy. In 1838, Alexis De Tocqueville described that in New England town 
meetings, “the principle of popular sovereignty is not, as in certain nations, hidden or sterile; it is 
recognized by mores, proclaimed by laws. It expands with freedom’s expansion and meets no 
obstacle on the way to its ultimate ends.”132 Modern New Englanders, Vermonters included, are 
still proud of this direct democracy.  
The town meeting has been a mainstay in the area’s politics before Vermont was a state. 
The Secretary of State’s “A Citizen’s Guide to Vermont Town Meeting” proudly describes that: 
“Vermont town meeting is a tradition dating back to before there was a Vermont. The 
first town meeting was held in Bennington in 1762, 15 years before Vermont was created. 
                                                        
132 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy In America, 62. 
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In the late 1700s, as today, town citizens in Vermont held meetings so that they could 
address the problems and issues they faced collectively. Popular matters of legislation in 
earlier town meetings included whether or not to let pigs run free or whether smallpox 
vaccinations should be allowed in the town (some thought vaccinations were dangerous). 
Voters also decided what goods or labor could be used as payment for taxes… Town 
meeting also served a social function (as it does today), bringing people together who 
might not otherwise know each other. This can strengthen social ties within a town and 
help people work together to tackle community problems.”133 
 
However, the history of Vermont town meetings has not been as straightforward as the 
Office of the Vermont Secretary of State suggests. While many rural towns maintain town 
meeting day in its original form, many others have transitioned towards hybrid systems that 
combine a town meeting or a town meeting-like informational meeting with government-
organized ballot voting (also called the Australian ballot), while other towns and the few cities in 
Vermont solely use Australian ballots. One town, Brattleboro, uses representative democracy in 
its town meetings.134 Other New England states have experienced similar changes, updates, and 
migrations away from the traditional in-person town meeting. Like Brattleboro, many towns in 
Massachusetts are now using a representative town meeting: In his book, Local Government in 
Rural America, published in 1957, Clyde Snider described that, “several of the more populous 
towns of Massachusetts and occasional towns in other states have found it expedient to abandon 
the town meeting in its traditional form in favor of the representative or limited meeting.”135 
The future of town meetings in Vermont and across New England is being questioned. As 
attendance falls and some towns grow, many are questioning whether town meetings—and direct 
democracy—have a future in America and Vermont. One book on the Vermont town meetings 
argued that, “This generation of Vermonters will choose whether to keep or to lose town 
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meeting. Will the democratic inheritance of our brave little state be passed on to the next 
generation intact? The decision is in our hands.”136 
This chapter specifically investigates town meetings in Vermont through the eyes of town 
clerks. These clerks are some of the individuals most intimately connected with town meetings. 
In 1930, John Fairfield described town clerks in his book, Town Government in Massachusetts 
1620-1930: “Every town has a clerk. In many respects he is the most important local official—if 
not in dignity, at least in general service.”137 This is still true today in Vermont where clerks post 
the town meeting warning,138 attend, and keep record of each town meeting throughout the state. 
They are intimately acquainted with the benefits as well as with the struggles and weaknesses of 
this form of democracy. This research seeks to investigate whether the current system still 
reflects the various aspects of town meetings though the centuries that scholars have both praised 
and criticized, what the future of town meetings in Vermont might hold, and, were they to 
disappear, what Vermonters could lose. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 Scholarly writing about town meetings in New England is extremely broad in historical 
scope, but also shallow in terms of more recent investigations into the various elements of town 
meetings. This is especially true for town meetings specifically in Vermont. Town meetings and 
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the notion of direct democracy have been mentioned in a number of sources throughout the 
history of this country, but few modern scholars have done extensive research on the subject.  
A broad amount of scholarly work on town meetings describes the function of town 
meetings in great detail but comes to few conclusions about the benefits, negatives, or even the 
future of town meetings. These descriptions generally start with how the warning is posted for 
the meeting, the roles of town clerks and moderators, and even what issues are generally 
discussed in town meetings. The best example of this sort of literature specifically related to 
Vermont is the Secretary of State’s “Citizen’s Guide to Vermont Town Meeting.”139 Similarly, 
Nuquist’s Town Government in Vermont explains the nuances and structure of town meetings in 
Vermont140 and All Those in Favor explains the Vermont town meeting in logistical depth even 
including guidance for town moderators in addition to advice about, “ten things you can do over 
time to improve your town meeting”141 Other work looks specifically looks at other states like 
Massachusetts: Town Government in Massachusetts (1620-1930) describes the development of 
the structure of town meetings in Massachusetts from the 1600s through to 1930.142 Additional 
scholarly works describe town meetings across all New England states. The New England Town 
Meeting: Democracy in Action is the best example of this broad-scope logistical outline of town 
meetings.143 It specifically includes the intricate logistics differences between town meetings in 
each of the New England states.144 While the more modern works like All Those in Favor and 
“Citizen’s Guide to Vermont Town meeting” give a relatively good picture of the current state of 
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town meeting logistics in Vermont, much of this work is dated with information that does not 
still apply to town meetings in the areas that it describes.  
Scholarly work is not limited to purely descriptive work, however. It also extends to 
scholarly work that comes to conclusions about town meeting days including work that is largely 
theory-focused. This theory-focused scholarly work largely falls into three categories: the notion 
of direct democracy as the “purest” form of democracy, the pride in participation that comes with 
being a part of this type of government, and the educational value of discussing issues in an open 
setting with peers. Many historical scholars were the first to use these theories when discussing 
town meetings, however, are not the only ones who use these arguments and theories today. 
Despite centuries between these historical scholars and today’s academic research, these themes 
continue to emerge in modern works praising the direct democracy of a town meeting.  
Some historical scholars, like Thomas Jefferson in 1782, describe direct democracy in 
town meetings as a “purer” entity that will best reflect the will and serve the needs of the people 
it represents: “Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people alone. The 
people themselves therefore are its only safe depositories.”145 In fact, Jefferson laments that the 
American governmental system is less perfect than he believes the American people deserve: 
“the people [of America] have less regular control over their agents, than their rights and their 
interests required.”146 Similarly, much of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s writings on town meetings fits 
into this same category. Emerson describes the town meeting with language that approximates 
adoration for facilitating the direct connection between government and the governed: “in this 
open democracy, every opinion had an utterance, every objection, every fact, every acre of land, 
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every bushel of rye, its entire weight.”147 Like both Emerson and Jefferson, Alexis De 
Tocqueville is highly impressed with the direct connection between the people and their 
government. De Tocqueville recognizes that there are some defects to the system, but he praises 
it for the strong connection between the people and the decisions being made in government: 
“Though the government is not without its defects, indeed, it is easy to point them out, they do 
not strike the eye, because the government really does emanate from the governed, and as long as 
it continues to struggle its way forward, it will be protected by a sort of paternal pride.”148  
Modern scholarly work also points to direct democracy in town meetings as an ideal form 
of government. In their book, All Those In Favor, Susan Clark and Frank Bryan reiterate the 
same argument that Jefferson used two centuries prior, that:  
 
“In town meeting governments, no elected representatives intervene between the citizen 
and what the government says or how it acts… In a Vermont town every citizen is a 
legislator. In a Vermont town the government truly is by and of the people… They are 
legislatures operated by ordinary citizens who don’t leave their lawmaking to someone 
else.”149  
 
Similarly, more modern scholars argue that, “the moral basis for [deliberative 
democracy] is common to many concepts of democracy. Persons should be treated not merely as 
objects of legislation as passive subjects to be rules, but as autonomous agents who take part in 
the governance of their own society, directly or through their representatives.”150 Thus, even 
centuries later, scholars continue to point to deliberative democracy and town meetings as one of 
the purest and best forms of democracy. In fact, Clark and Bryan take this argument one step 
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farther, arguing that, “Vermonters still practice (and practice most thoroughly) the planet’s single 
best example of the single best way to live in peace [- the town meeting.]”151 
The connection between the participants and the government is also a frequent argument 
put forth by scholars for the benefits of town meetings and direct democracy. The argument 
states that because citizens are able to participate, debate, and discuss issues that directly affect 
their government and their lives, they feel more strongly connected to the government and its 
decisions than they would otherwise. In Donald Robinson’s book Town Meeting: Practicing 
Democracy in Rural New England, Robinson describes that, “this book is about the practice of 
democracy. It focuses on Ashfield, Massachusetts, a rural town of about two thousand 
inhabitants in the foothills of the Berkshires, in western New England.” 152 While Robinson 
acknowledges that some of the decisions made by the town are not perfect, he argues that this 
form of direct democracy is eminently laudable for his community.153  
De Tocqueville specifically described this aspect of the town meeting in regards to New 
Englanders: “The New Englander is attached to his town because it is strong and independent; he 
takes an interest in it because he helps direct its affairs, he loves it because it gives him no reason 
to complain about his lot in life.”154 Similarly, Emerson describes that, “general contentment is 
the result [of town meetings.] And the people truly feel that they are lords of the soil.  In every 
winding road, in every stone fence, in the smokes of the poor-house chimney, in the clock on the 
church, they read their own power, and consider, at leisure, the wisdom and error of their 
judgement.”155  
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Some modern scholars also point to this consensus building as a benefit of town meetings 
and deliberative democracy. Rebecca Townsend’s article, “Town Meeting as a Communication 
Event: Democracy’s Act Sequence, Research on Language and Social Interaction” specifically 
investigates the ways in which norms and rules dictate how democracy functions within 
Amherst’s town hall and how that can benefit the community as a whole.156 In addition, Susan 
Clark and Frank Bryan praise this aspect of town meetings: they argue that town meetings 
increase community and comradeship because, “face to face participation teaches forbearance 
and tolerance. It teaches respect for others’ views. It teaches citizenship”157 and in addition to 
this comradeship, residents respect the town meeting decisions more because of the process: 
“[b]y allowing citizens actually to fashion the laws themselves, it creates a sense of “ownership” 
of the town’s business not present when decisions are made by others.”158 Similarly, Archon 
Fung, in his book Empowering Democracy, argues, “even when some participants disagree with 
group deliberations, they may be more easily reconciled to the outcomes because others have 
justified the bases of their positions in good faith.”159 Thus, for centuries, scholars have argued 
that the process of deliberative democracy facilitates acceptance and buy-in to the ultimate 
outcome.  
The final most prominent argument for the benefits of town meetings is the educational 
benefit. Many of the historical scholars also point to the process of deliberative democracy as an 
educational process. They argue that the people who attend and engage in town meetings have 
the opportunity to discuss, debate, and change minds. Jefferson and De Tocqueville both speak 
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to this in their descriptions of town meetings.160 In addition, a political observer in the 1890s, 
Lord James Bryce, described that, “the primary assembly is admittedly the best. It is the cheapest 
and most efficient; it is the most educative of the citizens who bear a part in it. The Town 
Meeting has been not only the source but the school of democracy.”161 Clark and Bryan argue 
that, “[t]own meetings allow citizens to hear ‘both sides of the story.’ It builds an appreciation 
for the complications often involved in the simplest policies”162 In his book, Archon also points 
to the fact that, “citizens themselves may become wiser and more understanding and accepting of 
different views and preferences after encountering them in discourse”163 Thus, these scholars – 
both historic and more modern – point to the educational benefits of direct democracy in the 
form of town meetings. 
While each of the characteristics listed above is valid and, obviously, long lasting 
arguments, they are also largely theoretical and observational rather than the result of 
methodological research. These scholars speak about the “ability” of everyone to participate in 
generalities. They rarely acknowledge that participation is not universal or address other 
criticisms of town meetings. 
Less favorable descriptions have emerged in scholarly work that focuses on specific 
tangibles and measurables in town meetings. Many scholars have described and investigated 
town meetings’ low attendance rates, the ability for factions to emerge, and the creation of a 
setting where some might feel more empowered than others to participate.  
The most pervasive concern raised by scholars about town meetings is low attendance.  
Even those who think very highly of town meetings acknowledge that this is an issue. In their 
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book, whose goal is to make a strong case for the benefits of town meetings, Clark and Bryan 
acknowledge that, “while it is doubtful that there was ever a ‘golden era’ of town meeting when 
nearly everyone turned out every year, attendance was much higher in the early days than today. 
Even well into the 20th century it was much higher than it is now.”164 In his book Town 
Government in Vermont, Andrew Nuquist speaks about how these low attendance rates call the 
future of town meetings into question: “It is the widespread nature of this abstinence from town 
affairs that causes many of the fears about the future of the town system of government.”165 
Similarly, in his book The New England Town Meeting: Democracy in Action, Joseph 
Zimmerman explains the results of low attendance, in that, “the relatively small percentage of 
registered voters who attend town meetings, with the exceptions of towns with very small 
populations, raises the question whether the participants are representative of the electorate at 
large.”166 Victor DeSantis and David Hill use a survey of Massachusetts registered voters to test 
theories of political participation in town meetings in their article “Citizen Participation in Local 
Politics: Evidence from New England Town Meetings” and ultimately confirm low attendance 
rates.167  Thus, these scholars describe and argue that while everyone has the “ability” to attend, 
universal attendance is far from the reality of town meetings and this can distort what would 
have or could have otherwise been a democratic outcome. 
A result of low attendance also leads to the capacity for certain self-selected factions or 
specific individuals to emerge and control the outcome of town meetings. Case studies and 
recent data have demonstrated this to be the case: Jenkins, Roscoe, and Borges’ article “Voters in 
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Representative Town Meetings” analyses the town meeting in Dartmouth, Massachusetts and its 
representativeness as compared to the larger population and find it to be less than perfect with 
more educated and elderly groups over-represented.168 James Madison was one of the first to 
criticize town meetings for this. In Federalist Number 58, he argues that in direct democracies 
like town meetings, “a single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with as 
complete a sway as if a scepter had been placed in his single hand.”169  
Almost two decades later, in the 1980s, Jane Mansbridge visited a small town in Vermont 
to put together a case study for how this specific town conducted its town meeting and how the 
townspeople participated and felt about this form of government. She found that, “[t]he poorer, 
less-educated townspeople not only participate less than the rich but also are significantly less 
likely to feel that they have any say in the town.”170 Mansbridge argues that the elite dominance 
at the town meeting disrupts the idea of a town meeting as a pure or perfect form of democracy: 
“The idea that participation created entitlement ignores the problem of representation. When 
interests differ, the underlying principles of adversary democracy require that the interest of the 
citizens be represented in proportion to their number”171  
In his book, Government in Rural America, Lancaster Lane describes that in some town 
meetings, “Factions multiply, minority groups become insistent, and meetings come to be 
tumultuous, unrepresentative and the sport of wire-pullers”172 In his book written in the 1950s,  
Local Government in Rural America, Clyde Snider blames specific groups for this factionalism: 
                                                        
168 Shannon Jenkins, Douglas Roscoe, and David Borges, “Voters in Representative Town Meetings,” New England 
Journal of Political Science, 9, no. 2, (September 2016): 134-163, https://c62a1cd8-e60b-4682-b2c5-
a937642d5637.filesusr.com/ugd/7d6421_32bc900557c046f88fc938aa571fdc79.pdf.  
169 James Madison, “Federalist 58,” Congress.gov Resources, 1788. 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers#TheFederalistPapers-58.  
170 Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1980), 109. 
171 Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy, 118. 
172 Lane Lancaster, Government in Rural America (Westport: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1952), 42. 
104 
 
“European immigration…has introduced population elements unaccustomed to democratic 
institution and especially in industrial communities, has fostered factionalism.”173 A more 
modern scholarly article found that specifically in Dartmouth, an elite and informed faction 
emerged: “the less engaged and informed fall off as elections provide less and less information, 
leaving the remaining group smaller but fairly engaged and informed.”174 However, these 
scholars also argued that this may not necessarily be a bad thing because bringing “in more 
voters to make the electorate broader is likely to bring in people with less information and 
engagement, which may potentially undermine representation of the public’s preferences even 
more,”175 they do acknowledge, however, that this does “not approach the democratic ideal.”176  
Thus, for as long as people have been praising town meetings because they allow 
everyone the “ability” to participate, critics have also pointed to some of the negative effects of 
the folks and factions who do participate.    
Some scholars also question whether the study of town meetings as a “pure” or the 
“purest” form of democracy is accurate because it is not scalable to larger groups of individuals. 
While town meetings can work well in New England, the specific town meeting form of 
government only works well in small autonomous towns. Even Jefferson questions the capacity 
for the New England town meeting to be expanded beyond the townships in which it was 
formed: “Such a government is evidently restrained to very narrow limits of space and 
population. I doubt if it would be practicable beyond the extent of a New England township.”177 
Similarly, although Nuquist is not favorable towards the Australian ballot, stating that, “it 
                                                        
173 Clyde Snider, Local Government in Rural America (Westport: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1957), 199. 
174 Shannon Jenkins, Douglas Roscoe, and David Borges, “Voters in Representative Town Meetings,” New England 




177 Padover ed., Democracy by Thomas Jefferson, 61. 
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destroys the chief characteristic of the gathering,”178 and that it “has resulted in less competent 
voting,”179 he does acknowledge that, “the old town meeting is not possible where towns have 
hundreds or even thousands of voters. There is no structure in many of these towns to 
accommodate all who might wish to come and the Australian ballot must be used.”180  
In addition, scholars have found that the less autonomy a town government has in a more 
complex governmental structure, the less interest townspeople have in the town meeting. In 
Government in Rural America, Lancaster describes that, “After a certain point has been passed in 
population growth and density—say 5,000 persons in the relatively limited area of an average 
town – questions of administration come to grow more difficult and such questions do not lend 
themselves to solution by general discussion.”181 In, Citizen Participation in Local Politics: 
Evidence from New England Town Meetings, Victor DeSantis and David Hill argue that rather 
than the simplicity of a town meeting, “more complex government structures that incorporate the 
notion of division of labor are necessary for modern democracy.”182 Mansbridge also explains 
that, “Since the eighteenth century, and at a more accelerated pace since reapportionment of the 
state legislature in 1965, Vermont towns have lost to the state government many of their 
traditional power over roads, schools, police welfare and zoning.”183 Ultimately, these critics 
argue that once a certain threshold has been reached, town meetings and other forms of direct 
democracy are not feasible. 
 The research in this chapter follows the path of much of the scholarly research done on 
town meetings by investigating each of the aspects of town meetings described above—both by 
                                                        
178 Nuquist. Town Government in Vermont, 161. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Nuquist. Town Government in Vermont, 162. 
181 Lancaster, Government in Rural America, 42. 
182 DeSantis and Hill, “Citizen Participation in Local Politics.” 
183 Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy, 43. 
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analyzing responses in terms of the more theoretical approaches like connection to the 
government as well as the more tangible characteristics like participation rates. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
After developing the goals of this research, a questionnaire was written to answer the key 
research questions. Meetings were then set up with two Vermont clerks to ensure that the 
questionnaire would fulfill its goal. Barre City Clerk, Carol Dawes, and Montpelier City Clerk 
John Odum were both interviewed. Each suggested some adjustments to the survey which were 
implemented. The clerks of Burlington and Essex Junction were also contacted but were not 
interviewed due to the Burlington clerks’ recent retirement and calendar conflicts.   
A list of all Vermont clerks, their town, and contact information was procured from the 
Vermont Secretary of State’s website.184  The emails from this list were used to disseminate the 
survey to all Vermont town clerks. The survey was sent to each of Vermont’s 248 clerks prior to 




I hope you are doing well and had a wonderful holiday season. 
  
My name is Colleen Jackson. I am currently getting my Master’s Degree in 
Government from Johns Hopkins University. My Master’s thesis is specifically about 
what makes Vermont – my home state – unique and different politically. 
  
I am reaching out to ask if you would be willing to take a survey about town 
meeting day. 
  
Please click on this link to take the survey: https://forms.gle/BXeVCEXyPASWkC8G9 
 
                                                        
184 Office of the Vermont Secretary of State. “Guide to Vermont’s Town Clerks, Treasurers & County Clerks,” last 
modified, March 22, 2021, https://sos.vermont.gov/media/8d88cbe434ced0e/2020townclerkguide.pdf.  
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Few people in political academia write about Vermont politics these days, but I 
believe that we have so much to offer and to teach them about a modern form of 
American democracy that has been a part of American politics for centuries. 
  
I am so excited and curious to hear what you have to think about town meeting day. 
  
My plan is to share the results in the aggregate with all town clerks once I have 
compiled all the findings. This way, you can all see the results but they will not be 
linked to any specific individual in the report. 
  
Thank you for your willingness to participate and please do not hesitate to reach out 
to me if you have any questions about this survey. My email is cjack109@jhu.edu and 
my phone number is (802) 735 4884. Alternatively, my advisor, Dr. Dorothea 






Fifty-five Vermont town clerks responded to the survey following this initial email. 
Three days later, on January 10, a reminder email was sent to the clerks who had not yet 
responded. The reminder email included the same information as the original email with an 
added first paragraph: 
“So far, 55 town clerks in Vermont have participated in this survey about town meeting 
day, would you be able to join them?” 
Following this reminder email, one hundred and six clerks in total had responded to the 
survey. On January 16, a final reminder was sent to the clerks who had not yet responded. Once 
again, the same information was included in the email but initial paragraph as adjusted to read: 
“The outpouring of support from the clerks of Vermont for this survey has been 
incredible! As of this morning, 106 clerks around Vermont have participated in this 
survey about town meeting day, would you be able to join them?” 
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The survey was ultimately completed by 127 town clerks in Vermont representing 52% 
of Vermont’s townships. The full survey topline can be found in Appendix E. The vast majority 
of these surveys were completed online while two clerks asked and were provide with the 
questions in a follow up email upon request. Unbeknownst to this researcher at the time, Clerk 
Carol Dawes, who was interviewed by this researcher about the questionnaire and who also 
serves in the Vermont Municipal Clerks & Treasurers Association, communicated about the 
legitimacy of research through the Vermont clerks list serve and encouraged the other Vermont 
clerks to complete the survey after it was first sent out. This likely resulted in the higher-than-
expect response rate for the survey.  
The results from the survey were then compiled and communicated to four clerks from a 
range of towns throughout the state with whom this researcher conducted in-depth interviews to 
ascertain more qualitative information about the findings and these clerks’ reactions to the 
survey results  in addition to a couple additional questions about the future of town meeting in 
light of the new rules and regulations put into place during the coronavirus pandemic (which 
began after the administration of the clerks survey.) Finally, the PowerPoint was sent to all 
Vermont town clerks with a note that comments and questions were encouraged to facilitate this 
researcher’s understanding of the results and answers. 
 
RESULTS  
One hundred and twenty-seven of Vermont town clerks responded to this survey.  
Together, they represent 52% of towns in Vermont and 57% of all Vermonters. The towns from 
which this researcher received a survey were:  
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Alburgh, Andover, Barnard, Barre City, Barre Town, Barton, Belvidere, Bennington, 
Berkshire, Bethel, Bolton, Braintree, Brandon, Bridgewater, Bristol, Brookline, Cabot, Calais, 
Cambridge, Canaan, Castleton, Chelsea, Corinth, Cornwall, Coventry, Danby, Dover, 
Dummerston, East Dorset, East Montpelier, Enosburg, Essex, Fair Haven, Fairfax, Fairfield, 
Fayston, Ferrisburgh, Georgia, Goshen, Grafton, Granby, Grand Isle, Granville, Guildhall, 
Guilford, Hardwick, Hartford, Hartland, Highgate, Hinesburg, Holland, Hubbardton, Huntington, 
Ira, Isle La Motte, Jay, Jericho, Lowell, Lyndon, Maidstone, Manchester, Marlboro, Marshfield, 
Milton, Monkton, Montgomery, Mount Holly, Mount Tabor, New Haven, Newfane, Northfield, 
Norton, Pawlet, Peacham, Peru, Pomfret, Proctor, Putney, Reading, Richford, Richmond, Ripton, 
Rutland City, Rutland Town, S Burlington, Salisbury, Searsburg, Sharon, Shoreham, 
Shrewsbury, South Hero, St Johnsbury, St. Albans Town, Stamford, Starksboro, Stowe, 
Strafford, Sudbury, Tinmouth, Topsham, Underhill, Vergennes, Vernon, Waitsfield, Walden, 
Wardsboro, Warren, Washington, Waterbury, Waterford, Waterville, Weathersfield, Wells, West 
Fairlee, Westfield, Westford, Westminster, Weybridge, Williamstown, Williston, Wilmington, 
Windham, Windsor, Winooski, Woodbury, Woodford, and Woodstock. 
The map in Figure 1, seen on the next page, highlights the towns from which each of the 
completed surveys originated and demonstrates that results originated from areas across the state 
in both rural (northern, eastern, and southern areas of Vermont) and urban areas (towns near 




Figure 10: Map of Survey Responses by Town 
 
 Not all town meetings in Vermont are the same. Specifically, town meetings in Vermont 
can vary significantly by voting system. The town clerks who responded to the survey 
represented a variety of these town meeting systems. Twenty percent of clerks who responded 
represented towns that solely held open town meetings where the only form of voting on the 
town meeting day warning agenda items is in-person. Sixty-one percent of clerks represented 
towns with hybrid voting systems that combined in person town meetings with Australian ballot 
voting. Finally, twenty percent of clerks represented towns with solely Australian ballot voting. 
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The clerk from Brattleboro, the only town meeting in Vermont that uses a representative voting 
system, did not respond to the survey. These numbers track well with the Vermont Secretary of 
State data that records that 20% of towns use only Australian ballots, 19% do not use Australian 
ballots at all, and 61% use a combination.185 This also tracks well with the number of 
Vermonters who live vote in each system in Vermont. Just over half of Vermonters live in towns 
with hybrid systems, over a third live in towns with Australian ballots, and just over one in ten 
live in towns with open town meetings only.186  
 
Town Clerks and The Town Meeting Experience 
Town clerks have been involved in town meetings for substantial time. Figure 11 shows 
the breakdown of how many years clerks have been involved as a voter in town meeting day. 
Sixty-nine percent of the clerks who responded to this survey have been involved as a voter in 
town meeting day for more than two decades. Only two percent have been involved for less than 
5 years. This corroborated the assumption made by this researcher that these clerks are a 
repository of knowledge about town meetings in their towns. Their time in office varies slightly 
by the type of voting system employed in the town on town meeting day. Australian ballot and 
hybrid system clerks have higher percentages of clerks (72% and 71% respectively) who have 
been involved as a voter in town meeting day for more than 20 years than clerks from towns with 
open town meetings (60%). 
                                                        
185 Vermont Secretary of State, “How Does Your Town Vote?” accessed December 10, 2019, 
http://storymaps.stone-env.net/howdoesyourtownvote/. 






The town clerks surveyed, on average, have spent over a decade (11.6 years) serving their 
towns as clerks. In a post-survey interview, a town clerk from a town with a hybrid voting 
system commented that she felt this demonstrated a dangerous precipice in the future of town 
meeting day organization. When her predecessor was ready to retire, she described that she had 
been at the office every day, ready and willing to take over the role. However, now that she 
herself is ready to retire after more than 20 years in the office, nobody has come to her to request 
the position or even to learn more about what it would be like. She is unsure of who will take the 
role of town clerk once she leaves and is concerned that there is no longer enthusiasm, 
willingness, or even ability to take on the role (especially with more drug use and abuse in her 
community, which she believes suppresses the pool of possible successors.) 
Tenures in office also differs slightly by the voting system. Clerks serving towns with 
hybrid systems (12.5) have, on average, served longer than town clerks for towns with only open 
town meetings (11.3) and only Australian Ballots (9.1). 
Less than 5 years, 2%
5 to 10 …
11 to 15 years, …
16 to 20 years, 9%More than 20 
years, 69%
Figure 11: Clerks’ Years as a Voter in Town Meetings
Q2. How many years have you personally been involved as a voter in town 
meeting day in Vermont?
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Thirty one percent of clerks have served under 6 years as a town clerk, while 69% have 
served 6 years or more. Throughout the rest of this analysis, clerks who have served less than six 
years will be referred to as clerks with “less experience” while those who have served six years 
or more will be referred to as clerks with “more experience.” This distinction was made by this 
researcher to specifically see if whether the conflict between the theoretical versus practical 
emerges between clerks who have had less experience with town meetings and thus might rely 
on theory and a more idealistic approach to town meetings and clerks who have had more 
experience with the practical realities of town meetings.  
A number of the questions in the survey were designed to get a better understanding of 
the average town meeting experience in Vermont. Good decorum at town meetings is frequently 
described in the literature. This survey asked clerks whether that was still something that rang 
true. Ultimately, no town clerk whose town holds open town meetings described the process as 
disorderly and Figure 12 shows the breakdown of the rest of the results. Eighty-four percent of 
clerks in towns with open town meetings (including only those with hybrid systems and those 
with just open town meetings) said that town meetings were very orderly and 16% said they were 
somewhat orderly. Clerks from towns with hybrid systems were more likely to describe the 





Figure 12: Orderliness of Open Town Meetings by System 
Q5. In the last 3-5 years, which of the following best describes attending an open town meeting 





Another element of open town meetings which is often praised by scholars is the idea that 
it is “democracy in process” and that individuals discuss, learn about and amend articles during 
the town meeting process. This survey tested this assertion by asking how frequently articles are 
amended at town meetings Figure 13 shows those results. Thirty-four percent of town clerks 
from towns with open town meetings reported that issues are frequently adjusted or amended by 



























with hybrid systems report a higher frequency of amendment (36%) than those with open town 
meetings only (28%). 
In contrast, sixty-six percent of town clerks report that articles are infrequently amended 
either very infrequently (45%) or somewhat infrequently (21%). Clerks with only open town 
meetings were more likely than those from towns with hybrid systems to say that articles were 
amended both somewhat or very infrequently. However, clerks from towns with hybrid systems 
were more likely than clerks with only open town meetings to say that articles were amended 
very infrequently.  
 
With the emergence of the Australian ballot and the hybrid town meeting system, some 
scholars have heralded the end of the town meeting system and “true democracy”: “the 
Australian ballot is worse than deadly [for open town meetings], because it doesn’t kill town 
meetings quickly… the reality is that it poisons it and lets it die slowly, parading the executioner 











All Clerks With Open Town
Meetings
Open Town Meeting Only Hybrid System
Figure 13: Frequency of Policy Amendment in Open Town 
Meetings 
Q6. When issues are brought up in open town meetings how 
frequently or infrequently are they adjusted or amended by the town 
meeting participants?
Very frequently Somewhat frequently Somewhat infrequently Very infrequently
116 
 
legislature nor a town meeting.”187 Others see the emergence of the Australian ballot as a way for 
more voters to be able to participate in towns where traditional town meetings are no longer 
logistically viable due to population size: “In a considerable number of towns, however, 
particularly among those in urban communities, use is now made of the Australian ballot.”188 
These two different perspectives demonstrate the two perspectives that pull town meetings in 
opposing directions: facilitating the participation rates as possible, versus facilitating negotiation 
and community engagement.  
Overall, when clerks were asked the importance of each of these two themes, there was 
very little difference between how all clerks rated the importance of achieving the highest 
participation rates as possible (an average of 8.5/10) and facilitating negotiation and community 
engagement (8.4/10).  
This result shifted when looking specifically at clerks from towns with the different town 
meeting systems, as shown in Table 8. Clerks from towns with Australian ballots had the most 
deviation between their rating the importance of achieving the highest participation rates (8.9) 
and facilitating negotiation and community engagement (7.8). However, there may be an element 
of subjectivity in these scores from towns with only Australian ballots. In an in-depth interview, 
a clerk from an Australian ballot only town acknowledged that clerks who preside over 
Australian ballot only towns may be more inclined to believe that participation is more important 
because that has been the goal of their own work on town meeting day.  
  
                                                        
187 Clark and Bryan, All Those In Favor, 36. 
188 Snider, Local Government in Rural America, 198. 
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Table 8: The Importance of Participation and Negotiation 
Q21. In your opinion, on a scale of 0-10 where 10 is extremely important and 0 is not 
important at all how would you rate the importance of the following:  a) Achieving the 
highest participation rates as possible on town meeting day, b) Facilitating negotiation 
and community engagement on town meeting day 






Achieving the highest 
participation rates as possible  8.5 8.8 8.9 8.3 
Facilitating negotiation and 
community engagement  8.4 9.0 7.8 8.5 
Difference 0.1 0.2 1.1 0.2 
 
When looking specifically at the differences between clerks who have spent longer and 
shorter times serving as clerks, clerks who have more experience rated achieving the highest 
participation rates as possible as slightly higher (8.5) than facilitating negotiation (8.3). In 
contrast, clerks with less experience rated facilitating negotiation (8.8) slightly higher than 
achieving the highest participation rates (8.6). This aligns with the thesis that clerks with more 
experience are more focused on the practical, rather than theoretical, aspects of town meetings. 
 
Town Meeting Turnout 
 Town meeting turnout, or lack of high-turnout, has been a constant theme for scholars. 
Even those who level significant praise on town meetings acknowledge that, “it is doubtful that 
there was ever a ‘golden era’ of town meeting when nearly everyone turned out every year.”189 
Thus, this survey investigated what the recent turnout has been at town meetings across 
Vermont. The clerks in this survey reported that the average number of people who participate in 
town meeting day across all categories is 352. However, this varies significantly by type of town 
meeting system.  
                                                        
189 Clark and Bryan, All Those In Favor, 27. 
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Clerks from towns with only open town meetings report average attendance of just 112 
people. This is both the lowest numeric turnout at the lowest percentage turnout (12%) when 
calculated based on town population. In contrast, clerks from towns with a hybrid system report 
almost double that numeric (222) but a similar percentage turnout based on town population 
(13%). Clerks from towns with only Australian ballots report almost ten times as many people 
participating (982) than towns with only open town meetings. In addition, clerks from Australian 
ballot only towns also report a higher percent turnout by town size (18%). This corroborates the 
idea that Australian ballots facilitate participation. However, the town clerks interviewed warn 
that simply looking at the numbers does not fully illustrate what happens and argue that methods 
of facilitating participation not only changes how many people but who participates. One clerk 
pointed to the fact that the Australian ballot allowed for more age diversity because parents with 
children at home or those who work at nights are able to quickly cast an Australian ballot but are 
not able to attend open town meetings that can take hours.  
In order to gain a full idea of the range of participation on town meeting day, this survey 
also asked clerks to give both the average highest and lowest turnouts in the last 3-5 years. Table 
9 shows the results from this question. Clerks from towns with only open town meetings reported 
135 as the average highest attendance and 89 as the average lowest attendance. Clerks from 
towns with hybrid systems reported 394 as the average highest attendance and 153 as the average 
lowest attendance. While clerks from towns with only Australian ballots reported 1,522 as the 
average highest attendance and 649 as the average lowest attendance. Ultimately, participation 
rate in towns with only open town meetings is much more consistent (5% variation in turnout) 




Table 9: Average, Highest and Lowest Turnout by Town Voting System 
Q11. Thinking about the last 3-5 years, what would you say is the average, the highest and the 
lowest numbers of people who have participated in town meeting day in your town? 






Open Town Meeting Only 135 (14%) 112 (12%) 89 (9%) 
Hybrid System 394 (21%) 222 (13%) 153 (10%) 
Australian Ballot Only 1,522 (28%) 982 (18%) 649 (12%) 
 
In addition to looking at the average, highest, and lowest turnout rates for each type of 
town meeting, this survey investigated the driving elements behind higher turnout. Tables 10, 
11, and 12 shows these results. Clerks from towns with only open town meetings report that 
education issues and funding (28%), especially school district consolidation and merging, and 
local elections (24%) have prompted the highest turnout on town meeting day.  
Table 10: Issues Prompting Highest Turnout in Open Town Meetings Only 
Q12. What specific issue or topic do you think has prompted the highest turnout on 
town meeting day?  
  Open Town Meetings 
Only 
Education issues and funding 28% 
Local elections 24% 
"Big ticket" purchases 12% 
Budget and bond issues 8% 
Infrastructure 8% 
ATVs and snowmobiles on town roads 8% 
None 8% 
Taxes 4% 
Don't know/Other 20% 
 
Twenty nine percent of clerks from towns with hybrid voting systems report that, like 
towns with only open town meetings, education issues and funding drive turnout. Over one in 




Table 11: Issues Prompting Highest Turnout in Towns with Hybrid System Only 
Q12. What specific issue or topic do you think has prompted the highest turnout on 
town meeting day?  
  Hybrid System Town 
Meetings 
Education issues and funding 29% 
Budget and bond issues 22% 
Presidential primary elections 17% 
"Big ticket" purchases 14% 




ATVs and snowmobiles on town roads 1% 
Don't know/Other 10% 
 
In contrast to towns with only open town meetings and hybrid systems, clerks from towns 
with only Australian ballots report that elections drive turnout.  Forty eight percent of these 
clerks mentioned that the presidential primary elections drive high turnout while 24% mentioned 
local elections. One in five mentioned education issues and funding. 
Table 12: Issues Prompting Highest Turnout in Towns with Australian Ballots 
Only 
Q12. What specific issue or topic do you think has prompted the highest turnout on 
town meeting day? 
  Australian Ballot Only Town Meetings 
Presidential primary elections 48% 
Local elections  24% 
Education issues and funding 20% 
Budget and bond issues 12% 
"Big ticket" purchases 8% 
Taxes 4% 
Don't know/Other 8% 
 
The Predictive Power of Town Meetings 
 Town meeting are hailed by many scholars as environments were citizens can freely 
express their concerns and their thoughts about their town. This gives us an opportunity to 
investigate whether issues and concerns begin within the local community and rise to the state 
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and national level, or not. If this is the case, losing in-person open town meetings could rob 
Vermont of an environment for the development of political ideas.   
 To investigate this question, each of the clerks from towns with open town meetings was 
asked, “What issues, if any, were being raised in open town meetings 5-10 years ago that have 
now become a bigger part of the issue debates in Vermont or national politics?” Ultimately, 
E\education issues, specifically around funding and taxes, and climate change and renewable 
energy were the two issues that clerks mentioned that had been raised 5 to 10 years ago in town 
meetings that have now become a bigger part of issue debates in Vermont and in national 
politics. However, there were also a significant number of clerks who indicated that there were 
no such issues.  
The clerks who mentioned education as an issue that was raised 5-10 years ago in town 
meetings that is now more prominent at the state and national level specifically mentioned the 
cost of education for their communities and the taxes that go with that school spending. Many 
also mentioned school mergers as a point of issue that has since gained momentum around 
Vermont.   
 
“The runaway train of education expenses is always discussed, and we always pass the 
budget but the State and Federal unfunded mandates make for very tricky budgeting.” – 
Hybrid System Town Clerk 
 
Many of the clerks who mentioned climate change and the environment as issues raised 
previously that have recently gained momentum simply mention “climate change” or “global 
warming” but others specifically reference town renewable energy or “green” projects like solar 
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arrays, energy conservation, and wind power. One clerk described a town policy on a potential 
pipeline and tar sands: 
 
“There was to be a natural gas pipeline running through [our town] that was discussed 
and voted on at town meeting. Voted on a resolution to ask the government to stop tar 
sands oil from coming through the State of Vermont.”  – Open Town Meeting Only Town 
Clerk 
 
Clerks from towns with only open town meetings were much more likely to mention 
climate change (28%) than those with hybrid systems (18%). While clerks with hybrid systems 
were more likely to mention taxation (20%) than those with open town meetings only (8%). 
It is important to also recognize that 22% of clerks mentioned that there were no issues 
that had been mentioned 3-5 years ago that had risen to state- or national-level politics. Some of 
the clerks interviewed were also hesitant to fully support the predictive power of town meetings. 
A clerk from a town with a hybrid system expanded on the difficulties in bringing issues that 
could rise to state- or national-level issues to town meetings. She described that a group in her 
own town were concerned about the effects of some local education policies that they wanted to 
rise to the state-level for consideration but had difficulty placing the issue on the warnings in 
towns in the area (due to legal issues around what can go on a town meeting warning) and were 
also hitting a road block with state-level laws that restricted the local town meeting from 
changing the policy even if the town voted to change it. Table 13 summarizes all of the issues 




Table 13: Issues Being Raised 5-10 Years Ago that Have Risen to State and 
National Politics 
Q7. What issues, if any, were being raised in open town meetings 5-10 years ago that 
have now become a bigger part of the issue debates in Vermont or national politics?   
*Only asked of towns with open town meeting only or hybrid system. 
  Clerks w/ Open 




(funding, taxes) 24% 24% 25% 
Climate change and 
renewable energy 21% 28% 18% 
None 22% 24% 22% 
Taxation 17% 8% 20% 
Infrastructure 10% 8% 11% 
Budgets and funding 
issues 8% 8% 8% 
Citizens United 6% 4% 6% 
Cost of living 
(housing and wages) 6% 0% 8% 
Healthcare and 
healthcare costs 5% 4% 5% 
Nuclear power 3% 0% 5% 
Other 10% 8% 11% 
  
To facilitate future research into the theory of the predictive power of town meetings, 
each of the clerks from towns with open town meetings was also asked: “What issues, if any, that 
have been brought up in recent open town meetings that you believe are likely to be raised up in 
Vermont- or national-level politics?” Ultimately, 29% of clerks with open town meetings said 
that they thought that climate change is an issue currently being raised in open town meetings 
that will likely become a larger part of Vermont and national politics. Clerks with only open 
town meetings were more likely to mention climate change (36%) than those with hybrid 
systems (26%).  
Interestingly, once again, the second most frequent answer overall was that no issues 
being raised at town meetings currently will become a larger part of state or national politics. 
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The third most frequent answer for clerks with open town meeting only was education issues 
(28%). Table 14 summarizes all of these results. 
 
When diving into the specific wording of the answers given by clerks, once again, the 
town clerks mentioned “climate change” and “global warming” in general terms. However, some 
spoke to some direct action that their towns have recently taken to formalizing the towns 
commitment to addressing the issue and to pressure the state government. 
 
“The voters discussed a non-binding resolution on encouraging the state to meet its 50% 
renewable energy promise by 2050.” – Open Town Meeting Only Clerk 
 
“We passed a voter petitioned renewable energy article two years ago with very detailed 
wording, but with an entirely volunteer taskforce, nothing has been done.”  - Hybrid 
System Town Clerk 
 
Table 14: Issues That Clerks Believe May Rise to State and National Politics in 
the Future 
Q8. What issues, if any, that have been brought up in recent open town meetings that 
you believe are likely to be raised up in Vermont- or national-level politics?   




Climate change 29% 36% 26% 
None 22% 24% 22% 
Education 21% 28% 18% 
Taxes  9% 4% 11% 
Infrastructure 9% 4% 11% 
Healthcare access and costs 7% 4% 8% 
Aging population 4% 0% 6% 
Cannabis marketplace 3% 4% 3% 
Cost of living 3% 4% 3% 
Budget Issues 3% 0% 5% 
Other 12% 4% 15% 
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While “None” was the second most given answer for a current issue with the potential for 
momentum, education was the third most prominent answer. Once again, the cost of education, 
taxes to fund schools, and issues with school consolidations were the most prominent issues 
related to education.  Some clerks also mentioned the decreasing school-aged population in 
Vermont. 
 Once again, the town clerks interviewed were hesitant to fully support the idea of the 
predictive power of town meetings. A couple pointed to the coronavirus as an example that it is 
sometimes difficult to predict what will emerge in future politics.  
 Taking all of this into account, the results about whether town meetings have the ability 
to predict future state- and national-level politics is mixed. The predictive power of town 
meetings seems to be limited to issues like climate change and education that are political issues 
both at the local and national level. Even then, some of the logistical aspects of what can go on a 
town meeting warning can hinder the ability of open town meetings to predict.  
 
The Future of Town Meetings 
 Much of the scholarly discussion around the future of town meetings has mentioned the 
participation rates in town meetings. Some observers have noted that, “commencing with 
Madison’s derision of direct democracy, however, town meeting government has been criticized 
primarily for low attendance by registered voters and the alleged domination of the meetings by 
special interest groups.”190 Since Madison’s criticisms, the future of open town meetings has 
become more and more linked with town meeting participation. The question emerges: Are town 
meetings still “direct democracy” or even an effective form of government if participation is low. 
                                                        
190 Zimmerman, The New England Town Meeting, 2-3. 
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This emerges in two ways. In towns where the population has increased, open town meetings are 
criticized for not allowing for enough individuals to participate in meaningful ways. 
Alternatively, in towns where participation is simply low, town meetings are criticized because 
non-elected individuals make decisions for the town as a whole. 
To first gain a broader picture of how town clerks experience the participation rates in 
their towns, all clerks were asked about the general trends they are experiencing around 
participation: “Thinking about the town you serve, compared to 3-5 years ago, would you say 
that the number of people participating in town meeting day (either physically attending town 
meetings or voting in the Australian ballot) is increasing, decreasing, or staying about the same?” 
As shown in Figure 14, sixty eight percent of town clerks reported that the number of 
people participating in town meeting day in their town was staying about the same. Twenty four 
percent indicated that the number was decreasing. While only 7% of clerks reported that the 










Figure 14: Change in Town Meeting Participation Rates 
Compared to 3-5 Years Ago
Q10. Thinking about the town you serve, compared to 3-5 years ago, 
would you say that the number of people participating in town 
meeting day (either physically attending town m
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How many clerks say a town’s town meeting day participation is increasing, decreasing, 
or staying the same varies by the type of town meeting system in place. Clerks from towns with 
open town meetings only report that participation in towns is either staying the same (84%) or 
decreasing (16%). In contrast, fewer clerks from towns with Australian ballots only and hybrid 
systems say that town meeting participation is staying the same (60% and 65% respectively). In 
these two systems, over a quarter of town clerks report that participation is decreasing (28% and 
26% respectively.) In addition, 12% of clerks in towns with Australian ballots only and 8% of 
clerks from towns with hybrid systems report that participation is increasing. These results are 
visualized in Figure 15.  
Figure 15: Change in Town Meeting Participation Rates By Town Meeting Voting System 
Q10. Thinking about the town you serve, compared to 3-5 years ago, would you say that the 
number of people participating in town meeting day (either physically attending town meetings 
and/or voting in the Australian ballot) is increasing, decreasing, or staying about the same? 
 
 In addition to participation rates, this survey also investigated the upper limits of town 
meeting participation. Each of the clerks from towns with systems that included open town 
meetings was asked, “What would you say is the maximum number of registered voters your 


































On average, clerks felt that a population of just under 4,000 registered voters would be the 
maximum number before it would be necessary to move to solely an Australian ballot.  
Town clerks with only open town meetings, on average, felt that the maximum number of 
registered voters for a town to move to solely an Australian ballot was 1,376 while than those 
with hybrid systems indicated that they felt that their town could reach just under 5,000 residents 
on average before needing to move to solely an Australian ballot. The exact numbers can be seen 
in Table 15. 
Table 15: Maximum Number of Registered Ballots Before Australian Ballots Are Needed 
by Town Meeting Voting System 
Q9. What would you say is the maximum number of registered voters your town could have 
before you think it would be necessary to move to solely an Australian ballot? 
All Clerks with Open Town 
Meetings 
Clerks with Open Town 
Meetings Only 
Hybrid System Clerks 
3,782 1,376 4,752 
 
In addition to the differences between types of voting system on this question, there was 
also difference in how clerks answered this question by experience level. Clerks with more 
experience felt that a population of just over 3,000 registered voters would be the maximum 
number before it would be necessary to move to solely an Australian ballot. This is in stark 
contrast to clerks with less experience who, on average, felt that a population of just over 5,000 
registered voters would be the maximum. This fits well with the idea that clerks with less 
experience may be more idealistic and theory-driven than those with more experience. However, 
some of the difference may be due to slightly more clerks from towns with open town meetings 
being included in clerks with more experience. Twenty two percent of clerks with more 
experience were from towns with open town meetings only in contrast to only 15% of clerks 
with less experience. Table 16 outlines these results. 
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Table 16: Maximum Number of Registered Ballots Before Australian Ballots Are Needed 
by Clerk Experience 
Q9. What would you say is the maximum number of registered voters your town could have 
before you think it would be necessary to move to solely an Australian ballot? 
All Clerks with Open Town 
Meetings 
Clerks with More 
Experience 
Clerks with Less 
Experience 
3,782 3,274 5,042 
 
 Maintaining the theme of participation and effective governance, clerks were also asked, 
“And in your opinion, is there a point at which there can be too many people for an open town 
meeting to be an effective form of government?” Ultimately, 64% of town clerks said that there 
cannot be a point at which there can be too many people participating in an open town meeting 
for it to be an effective form of government. Once again, this may be due to some subjectivity in 
that most of these clerks have dedicated significant portions of their lives to town meetings. Only 
thirteen percent of clerks said that there can be a point at which there can be too many people 
and twenty three percent of clerks said they do not know. Figure 16 shows these results.  
 
On average, the clerks who answered “yes” that there was a point when there could be 
too many people for an open town meeting to be an effective form of government said that just 
over 400 people would be the largest number of people who could attend an open town meeting 








Figure 16: Too Many Participants and Government 
Effectiveness
Q15. And in your opinion, is there a point at which there can be too 




As shown in Figure 17, clerks with more experience were slightly more likely to say 
there is not a point at which there can be too many people for an open town meeting to be an 
effective form of government (66%), than clerks with less experience (60%). 
 
Figure 17: Too Many Participants and Government Effectiveness by Clerk Experience 
Q15. And in your opinion, is there a point at which there can be too many people for an open 
town meeting to be an effective form of government? 
 
Conversely, in order to investigate the lower limits of town meeting participation, each of 
the clerks was asked “In your opinion, is there a point at which there can be too few people for 
an open town meeting to be an effective form of government?” The results, shown in Figure 18, 
were more even: forty three percent of town clerks say that there can be a point at which there 
can be too few people participating in an open town meeting for it to be an effective form of 
government. Thirty percent say that there cannot be too few participants, while 27% said they 
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Clerks from towns with only open town meetings were more likely to say that there could 
be too few people (52%) than those from towns with hybrid systems (42%) and Australian 
ballots (40%). On average, the clerks who answered yes said that 7% was the minimum 
percentage of registered voters who can attend an open town meeting and still have it be an 
effective form of government. 
Figure 19 demonstrates that clerks with more experience are much more likely to say 
that there is a point where there can be too few people for an open town meeting to be an 
effective form of government (49%) than those with less experience (30%). Clerks with less 








Figure 18: Too Few Participants and Government 
Effectiveness
Q13. In your opinion, is there a point at which there can be too 




Figure 19: Too Few Participants and Government Effectiveness by Clerk Experience 
Q13. In your opinion, is there a point at which there can be too few people for an open town 
meeting to be an effective form of government? 
 
 
The Strengths and Weaknesses of Town Meetings 
 Scholars from the earliest American government to modern scholarly work have 
discussed the strengths and weaknesses of town meetings. This survey investigated those 
strengths and weakness from the perspective of those who organize, attend, and participate in 
town meetings every year: town clerks.  
 To begin with, each clerk was asked, “Which best describes how you feel about the 
decision-making process in open town meetings on town meeting day?” Figure 20 shows these 
results. The majority of clerks from towns with some form of open town meeting, both the towns 
with only open town meetings (80%) and hybrid systems (75%) felt that open town meetings 
facilitate democratic decision making. In contrast, the plurality (44%) of clerks from towns with 
only Australian ballots did not know whether open town meetings facilitate or hinder democratic 
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Figure 20: The Decision-Making Process in Open Town Meetings by Town Voting System 
Q19. Which best describes how you feel about the decision-making process in open town 
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In order to get a better understanding of whether clerks agree with much of the scholarly 
conversation about town meetings helping to bring communities together, clerks were asked, “In 
general, how much do you think open town meetings improve or damage community 
relationships, if at all?”  These results are recorded in Figure 21. Ultimately, clerks from towns 
with only open town meetings (52%) and hybrid systems (56%) were more likely than clerks 
from towns with only Australian ballots (36%) to say that open town meetings either greatly or 
somewhat improve community relationships. There is likely an element of subjectivity in these 
answers, however, due to the system of which each type of clerk presides. Clerks from towns 
with Australian ballots were most likely to say they don’t know (36%).  
 
In contrast to the distinction between clerks from towns with the various voting systems, 
there was little difference on this question between clerks with more and less experience. 















Open Town Meeting Australian Ballot Hybrid System
Figure 21: Open Town Meetings and the Effect on Community 
Relationships by Town Voting System
Q20. In general, how much do you think open town meetings improve 
or damage community relationships, if at all?
Greatly improves Somewhat improves Neither Somewhat damages Greatly damages Don't know
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either greatly or somewhat improve community relationships (49%) than clerks with less 
experience (55%). Figure 22 shows these slight differences. 
 
 Finally, to truly distill clerks’ opinions on the strengths and weaknesses of the different 
forms of town meetings, each of the clerks were asked in an open-ended format the strengths and 
weaknesses of open town meetings and Australian ballots.  
 When answering the strengths of open town meetings, 39% of town clerks mention 
giving voters a “voice” and a chance to state an opinion as the greatest strength of open town 
meetings, followed by the discussion and debate that occurs about each element brought forward 
at the meeting (31%).   
Clerks whose towns hold only open town meetings (44%) and hybrid systems (43%) 
were more likely to give the answer – giving the voters a “voice” – than those with only 
Australian ballot (20%). Those with hybrid systems were much more likely to point to the ability 
to amend proposals (22%), bring the community together (19%), and inform voters (19%) as the 
greatest strengths of open town meetings compared to clerks from towns with other forms of 






More Experience Less Experience
Figure 22: Open Town Meetings and the Effect on Community 
Relationships by Clerk Experience
Q20. In general, how much do you think open town meetings improve 
or damage community relationships, if at all?
Greatly improves Somewhat improves Neither
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Table 17: Greatest Strengths of Open Town Meetings by Town Voting System 
Q17. What would you say are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the open town 
meetings as a form of government? 






A "voice" and a chance to state opinion 39% 44% 20% 43% 
Discussion and debate 31% 36% 32% 30% 
Reasoning and arguments presented 18% 20% 16% 18% 
Brings the community together civilly 17% 16% 12% 19% 
Creates informed voters 17% 12% 12% 19% 
Ability to amend 17% 4% 12% 22% 
Builds acceptance of outcome 3% 0% 8% 3% 
Other 8% 8% 16% 5% 
 
There were also significant differences based on experience, as seen in Table 18. Clerks 
with less experience were more likely to say that giving the voters a voice was the greatest 
strength (43%), discussion and debate (38%), and bringing the community together (23%) than 
clerks with more experience (37%, 29%, and 15% respectively). In contrast, clerks with more 
experience were more likely to say that the ability to present reasons and arguments for and 
against policies and town decisions (20%) was the greatest strength than clerks with less 
experience (15%). These results demonstrated differentiation between possible reliance on 
idealism as opposed to practicality. 
Table 18: Greatest Strengths of Open Town Meetings by Clerk Experience 
Q17. What would you say are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the open town 
meetings as a form of government? 
*Only Strengths All More Experience Less Experience 
A "voice" and a chance to state 
opinion 39% 37% 43% 
Discussion and debate 32% 29% 38% 
Reasoning and arguments presented 18% 20% 15% 
Brings the community together 
civilly 17% 15% 23% 
Creates informed voters 17% 16% 18% 
Ability to amend 17% 16% 18% 
Builds acceptance of outcome 3% 5% 3% 




 The survey also investigated clerks’ thoughts about the greatest weaknesses. Table 19 
shows that, when speaking about the greatest weaknesses of open town meetings, a quarter of 
town clerks pointed to low participation and low interest as open town meetings’ greatest 
weakness.  Clerks from towns with open town meetings only were much more likely to mention 
the fact a few people have an outsized say (20%) and peer pressure (20%) than clerks from 
towns with a hybrid system (14%, 6) or only Australian ballots (4%, 0%).  
Table 19: Weaknesses of Open Town Meetings by Town Meeting Voting System  
Q17. What would you say are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the open town 
meetings as a form of government? 





Low participation and low interest 25% 36% 24% 22% 
A few people have an outsized say 13% 20% 4% 14% 
Work schedules and inability to 
attend the meeting 13% 16% 8% 13% 
Peer pressure  8% 20% 0% 6% 
Less nuance and sometimes 
inaccurate information 6% 0% 4% 8% 
Disruption and disagreement 4% 4% 0% 5% 
Lack of efficiency 4% 4% 4% 4% 
None 2% 0% 4% 3% 
Other 2% 4% 4% 0% 
 
 There were also differences by experience. Clerks with more experience were more likely 
to say that lower participation rates and low interest were the greatest weakness of open town 
meetings as a form of government (29%) than clerks with less experience (18%). In contrast, 
clerks with less experience were more likely to say that peer pressure (13%) was the greatest 




Table 20: Weaknesses of Open Town Meetings by Clerk Experience 
Q17. What would you say are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the open town 
meetings as a form of government? 
 *Only Weaknesses All More Experience Less Experience 
Low participation and low interest 25% 29% 18% 
A few people have an outsized say 13% 14% 13% 
Work schedules and inability to 
attend the meeting 13% 11% 15% 
Peer pressure  8% 6% 13% 
Less nuance and sometimes 
inaccurate information 6% 7% 3% 
Disruption and disagreement 4% 6% 0% 
Lack of efficiency 4% 2% 8% 
None 2% 2% 3% 
Other 2% 2% 0% 
 
 Following the questions about open town meetings, each of the clerks was then asked 
about the strengths and weaknesses of the Australian ballot. When specifically speaking about 
the strengths of the Australian ballot, 39% of clerks pointed to a greater ability to participate as 
the greatest strength of the Australian ballot. A quarter (26%) of clerks also pointed to anonymity 
of the vote. Interestingly, clerks from systems that have either only open town meetings (44%) 
and only Australian ballot (44%) were more likely to point to this reason than those from towns 
with a hybrid system (35%).  
Clerks from towns with hybrid systems (25%) and Australian ballots only (24%) were 
more likely to say that higher participation rates and therefore more being represented as a 





Table 21: Strengths of the Australian Ballot by Town Voting System 
Q18. What would you say are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of an Australian Ballot 
as a form of government? 






Greater ability to participate  39% 44% 44% 35% 
Anonymity 26% 24% 28% 26% 
Higher participation & more people represented 22% 12% 24% 25% 
Logistically easier to manage 6% 8% 4% 6% 
Other 7% 12% 12% 4% 
 
There were also differences based on experience. Clerks with more experience were more 
likely to say that greater ability to participate was the greatest strength of an Australian ballot 
(40%) than clerks with less experience (35%). In contrast, clerks with less experience were 
slightly more likely to say anonymity (30%) and the ballots being easier to logistically manage 
(10%) than clerks with more experience (24% and 5%). 
Table 22: Strengths of the Australian Ballot by Clerk Experience 
Q18. What would you say are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of an Australian Ballot as 
a form of government? 
 *Only Strengths All More Experience Less Experience 
Greater ability to participate  39% 40% 35% 
Anonymity 26% 24% 30% 
Higher participation & more people represented 21% 22% 23% 
Logistically easier to manage 6% 5% 10% 
Other 7% 7% 8% 
 
 When speaking about the weaknesses of town meetings, lack of debate and discussion 
(28%) was the most cited weakness for Australian ballots. Forty percent of clerks from towns 
with Australian ballots mentioned this as a weakness. These clerks were more likely to mention 
lack of debate and discussion than clerks from towns with only open town meetings (32%) and 
hybrid systems (23%). In contrast, clerks from towns with only open town meetings (24%) and 
hybrid systems (22%) were more likely to mention less-informed voters as a weakness than 




In addition to differences by voting system, there were also differences by experience. 
Clerks with more experience were more likely to say that less informed voters are the greatest 
weakness of an Australian ballot form of government (22%) than clerks with less experience 
(10%). In contrast, clerks with less experience were more likely to mention lack of debate and 
discussion (35%) and no ability to amend or consider voter input (15%) as the greatest weakness 
of Australian ballots than clerks with more experience (25% and 7% respectively). These results 
are summarized in Table 24.  
 
Table 24: Weaknesses of the Australian Ballot by Town Voting System 
Q18. What would you say are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of an Australian Ballot 
as a form of government?  
*Only Weaknesses All More Experience Less Experience 
Lack of debate and discussion 28% 25% 35% 
Less informed voters 18% 22% 10% 
No ability to amend/ voter input 9% 7% 15% 
Less understanding of the results 5% 5% 5% 
Less community feel 4% 5% 3% 
None 4% 6% 0% 
Logistical challenges  3% 2% 5% 
Other 6% 7% 5% 
 
Table 23: Weaknesses of the Australian Ballot by Town Voting System 
Q18. What would you say are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of an Australian Ballot 
as a form of government?  






Lack of debate and discussion 28% 32% 40% 23% 
Less informed voters 18% 24% 0% 22% 
No ability to amend/ voter input 9% 8% 4% 12% 
Less understanding of the results 5% 8% 12% 1% 
Less community feel 4% 8% 0% 4% 
None 4% 0% 12% 3% 
Logistical challenges  3% 0% 0% 5% 
Other 6% 12% 4% 5% 
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 After establishing the current strengths and weakness of the various forms of town 
meetings, the clerks were then asked, “In what ways do you think town policy formation would 
be better or worse if open town meetings were eliminated.” A plurality of clerks from all three 
town meeting voting systems feel that town policy formation would be worse if open town 
meetings were eliminated.  
Clerks from towns with only open town meetings were the most likely to believe that 
town policy formation would be worse (60%), while clerks from towns with only Australian 
ballots were the most likely to believe that town policy formation would be better (12%) if open 
town meetings were eliminated. These results are shown in Figure 23. 
Figure 23: Better or Worse Policy Formation by Town Meeting Voting System 
Q23. In what ways do you think town policy formation would be better or worse if open 
town meetings were eliminated? 
 
 
There were also differences by experience. Clerks with less experience were much more 
likely to say that town policy formation would be worse if open town meetings were eliminated 
(68%) than clerks with more experience (44%). In contrast, clerks with more experience were 

































more likely to say that there would be no real change in town policy formation if town meetings 
were eliminated (18%) than clerks with less experience (8%). Figure 24 shows these results. 
 
Figure 24: Better or Worse Policy Formation by Clerk Experience 
Q23. In what ways do you think town policy formation would be better or worse if open 
town meetings were eliminated? 
 
 
 Each of the clerks was then asked, “In what ways do you think town policy formation 
would be better or worse if open town meetings were eliminated?” Thirty percent of clerks said 
that eliminating open town meetings would lead to less discussion and voter input in decisions if 
open town meetings were eliminated. Clerks from towns with only open town meetings were the 
most likely to mention this (36%).  
Clerks from towns with only Australian ballot were the most likely to say that eliminating 
open town meetings would lead to a less informed electorate (24%) than either open town 
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Table 25: Ways in Which Policy Formation Would Be Better or Worse if Open Town 
Meetings Were Eliminated by Town Meeting Voting System 
Q23. In what ways do you think town policy formation would be better or worse if open town 
meetings were eliminated? 





Less discussion and voter input into decisions 30% 36% 28% 29% 
Less accountability for elected officeholders 13% 16% 4% 16% 
Less informed electorate 9% 12% 24% 4% 
Loss of community engagement and 
participation 9% 16% 8% 5% 
Less democracy  5% 0% 0% 8% 
Don't know 15% 12% 12% 17% 
Other 10% 8% 16% 9% 
 
There were also differences based on experience. Clerks with less experience were more 
likely to say that policy formation would be worse because there would be less discussion and 
voter input into decisions (38%) and less accountability for elected officeholders (20%) than 
clerks with more experience (26% and 10% respectively). Clerks with more experience were 
more likely to be unsure (18%) than those with less experience (8%). Table 16 outlines these 
results and differences by experience.  
 
Table 26: Ways in Which Policy Formation Would Be Better or Worse if Open 
Town Meetings Were Eliminated by Clerk Experience 
Q23. In what ways do you think town policy formation would be better or worse if open 
town meetings were eliminated? 
  All More Experience 
Less 
Experience 
Less discussion and voter input into decisions 30% 26% 38% 
Less accountability for elected officeholders 13% 10% 20% 
Less informed electorate 9% 8% 13% 
Loss of community engagement and 
participation 9% 7% 13% 
Less democracy  5% 3% 8% 
Don't know 15% 18% 8% 
Other 11% 11% 8% 
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 Finally, the clerks were asked about some specific aspects of town meetings. Overall, the 
majority of town clerks felt that their town does a good job of handling all issues asked about in 
the survey. Some differences did emerge, however, when looking specifically at which issues 
clerks felt town meetings did a “very” good job at addressing. These differences are shown in 
Figure 25. Over half of town clerks felt that town meetings in their town do a very good job at 
addressing the following issues: voting on the town budget (67%), electing municipal officers 
(60%), and needing to raise taxes (50%).  
 
 
Clerks from towns with a hybrid system were more likely to say that town meetings do a 
very good job of addressing the town budget (70%) and needing to raise taxes (55%) than clerks 
from towns with only open town meetings (64% and 44% respectively) and clerks from towns 
with only Australian ballots (60% and 44% respectively.) Clerks from towns with an Australian 
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Voting on the town budget
Figure 25: Ability to Address Specific Aspects of Town Meetings
Q22. How good or bad of a job would you say the town meeting in the 





budget (44%) than clerks from towns with only open town meetings (24%) or hybrid (29%) 
systems. While clerks from towns with only open town meetings were the least likely to say that 
town meetings do a very good job addressing bond issues (8%) compared with clerks from towns 
with only Australian ballots (40%) and hybrid (35%) systems. These differences by system are 
shown in Table 27. 
 
There were also differences based on experience. Clerks with more experience were more 
likely to think that town meetings do a very good job electing municipal officers (64%), needing 
to raise taxes (52%), and addressing petitions brought by town members (48%) than clerks with 
less experience (50%, 48%, 40% respectively). In contrast, clerks with less experience were 
more likely to think that town meetings do a very good job addressing spending levels (45%) 
than clerks with more experience (39%). Table 28 outlines these differences based on 
experience.  
  
Table 27: Ability to Address Aspects of Town Meetings by Town Meeting Voting 
System 
Q22. How good or bad of a job would you say the town meeting in the town you 
represent does when addressing the following issues. 






Voting on the town budget 64% 60% 70% 
Electing municipal officers 52% 52% 65% 
Needing to raise taxes 44% 44% 55% 
Petitions brought by town members 40% 44% 48% 
Government staffing levels 40% 32% 38% 
Spending levels 36% 44% 42% 
Voting on the school budget 24% 44% 29% 
Education funding 20% 20% 23% 
Bond issues 8% 40% 35% 
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Table 28: Ability to Address Specific Aspects of Town Meetings by Clerk 
Experience 
Q22. How good or bad of a job would you say the town meeting in the town you 
represent does when addressing the following issues. 
Only “Very Good Job” More Experience Less Experience 
Voting on the town budget 67% 68% 
Electing municipal officers 64% 50% 
Needing to raise taxes 52% 48% 
Petitions brought by town members 48% 40% 
Government staffing levels 36% 40% 
Spending levels 39% 45% 
Voting on the school budget 32% 28% 
Education funding 24% 18% 
Bond issues 30% 33% 
 
DISCUSSION 
 The results of this survey corroborate both the praise and criticism of open town 
meetings. Elements and evidence of both can be found throughout the survey and even when 
asked about these contradictions, clerks are open to admitting that both are synonymously true. It 
turns out that those who are closest to town meetings in Vermont (with some slight bias and 
subjectivity towards the system that they directly preside over) see the various town meeting 
voting systems for both their qualities and deficiencies.    
 One of the most prominent theoretical descriptions of open town meetings is the notion of 
direct democracy as the “purest” form of democracy where all voters have a say and participate 
in the process. The results of this survey do seem to demonstrate that clerks agree with the fact 
that there is widespread ability to participate and that people ultimately do participate in 
meaningful ways during the open town meetings. When asked about how frequently articles are 
amended during town meetings, a third of clerks indicated that when issues are brought up in 
open town meetings they are either very or somewhat frequently amended. Similarly, when 
asked about how open town meetings and the democratic process, over three quarters of town 
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clerks from towns with open town meetings felt that open town meetings facilitated the 
democratic decision-making process.  
There is also ample evidence that people engage in constructive debate and discussion at 
open town meetings. Clerks from towns with only open town meetings were more likely to say 
that open town meetings are only somewhat orderly, indicating that a significant amount of 
heated debate and discussion can emerge, but when asked how much town meetings improve or 
damage community relationships, a majority of clerks from both towns with only open town 
meetings and hybrid systems say that open town meetings either greatly or somewhat improve 
community relationships. Town clerks also indicate that this direct democracy would be lacking 
under systems without open town meetings. When asked about the greatest weaknesses of the 
Australian ballot as a form of government, town clerks most mentioned “Lack of debate and 
discussion” as the greatest weakness. Those who are most intimately aware of the Australian 
ballot process were the most likely to mention this weakness.  
 The pride that many scholars point to in the participation that comes with being a part of 
this type of government is also clearly evident in these clerks’ descriptions of town meeting day. 
This emerged most clearly in the tone and tenor of the in-depth interviews conducted with clerks 
to gather more qualitative research on the data. However, it is also evident in the clerks’ long 
tenure in office which has consistently been a tenant of open town meetings in New England: in 
1952 Lane Lancaster wrote that, “[e]ven today there are numerous cases on record of clerks who 
have served twenty, thirty, or even forty years, and there are a few cases in which father and son 
between them have held the office for nearly a century.”191 This tenure in office speaks to the 
position and the participation in this form of democracy as more than just a job.  
                                                        
191 Lancaster, Government in Rural America, 39. 
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 Finally, the educational value of discussing issues in an open setting with peers also 
clearly emerges in the data. When asked about the strengths of open town meetings, the fact that 
reasoning and arguments are given an opportunity to be presented, and that it, “creates informed 
voters” were each mentioned unprompted by two-in-ten clerks. Many of these clerks also linked 
this educational value to the fact that these debates and the education that comes from 
understanding the other side, builds acceptance of the outcome. In addition, when asked about 
the weaknesses of the Australian ballot, clerks from both towns with only open town meetings 
and hybrid systems mentioned that using Australian ballots means less informed viewers. Some 
clerks also mentioned that this led to less understanding of the results on the part of the town 
leadership; for instance, one clerk from a town with only an Australian ballot stated that it is 
sometimes hard to know why something fails to pass under an Australian ballot system because 
they don’t know the context of why people voted no: “was it too much money? Was it too little 
money? What would the voters have liked instead?” 
 Some of the less favorable characteristics described by scholars are also evident in this 
survey research. First and foremost, low open town meeting participation is clearly evident. The 
lowest average, lowest highest, and lowest participation rates for town meeting day are reported 
by towns with only open town meetings. In fact, the average highest participation rate for towns 
with only open town meetings (14%) is only slightly higher than the average lowest participation 
rate for towns with Australian ballots only (12%). There are, however, some mixed results in 
terms of trends in participation. The vast majority of clerks from towns with only open town 
meetings report that the number of people participating on town meeting day is staying about the 
same and about one-in-six clerks from only open town meeting towns say that it is decreasing. In 
contrast, the answers from clerks from towns with only Australian ballots varies much more. 
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More of these clerks (28%) say that participation is decreasing, but more also say that 
participation is increasing (12%). The same is true for clerks from towns with hybrid voting 
systems. Thus, it seems that participation in towns with open town meetings is lower but more 
consistent, whereas participation in towns with Australian ballots or hybrid systems are higher 
but more volatile and changing.  
 The danger of the outsized say of factions was also evident in the data (although the term 
“faction” was not broadly used by clerks.) The fact that, “a few people have an outsized say” was 
the second most frequently mentioned weakness of open town meetings. In addition, clerks from 
towns with only open town meetings, who are most familiar with this system, were the most 
likely to mention this as a weakness, followed by clerks from towns with hybrid voting systems. 
In contrast, one of the greatest strengths mentioned in relation to Australian ballots was the fact 
that more people are represented in the voting process. Clerks from towns with Australian ballots 
only and hybrid systems were the most likely to point to this greater representation. When asked 
in in-depth interviews, clerks were both proud of but concerned about the fact that a dedicated 
group of townsfolk could successfully bring forward issues to be placed on the warning to be 
discussed at the open town meetings. 
 Similarly, the concern that open town meetings can create a setting where some might 
feel more empowered than others to participate also emerged in the survey question about the 
strengths and weaknesses of the two different systems.  One of the most mentioned weaknesses 
of open town meetings was that work schedules make it so that some have an inability to attend 
the meeting. In an in-depth interview, a clerk from a town with an Australian ballot only system 
described exactly how this empowers some over others because the time when town meetings are 
designated to be held affects who is able to come: when they are held in the middle of the day, 
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the elderly feel safer and more able to attend, whereas when they are held in the evenings, 
younger folk and those who work feel more able to come.  In addition, clerks also mentioned 
peer pressure in open town meetings as a weakness which aligns well with Jane Mansbridge’s 
findings that education level and membership in certain town “groups” are a driving factor in 
who believes their voice has a right to be heard.192 Clerks from towns with only open town 
meetings were the most likely to mention both of these weaknesses. 
 
The Predictive Power of Town Meetings 
 This survey also investigated something that few scholars have discussed over the years: 
the predictive power of town meetings. The results, as with the praise and criticisms of open 
town meetings, were relatively mixed. While some clerks did indicate that there were issues that 
were raised in town meetings 5-10 years ago that have now become a greater part of state and 
national level politics, a significant number of clerks felt that no such issues existed and the 
clerks who participated in the in-depth interviews were hesitant to commit to this theory. In order 
to gain a more definitive answer on this question, more research would need to be done into 
where and how the issues that clerks reported that rose from local to state- and national-level 
politics emerged. An investigation of town meeting minutes from 5-10 years ago on climate 
change might give us a better picture of this evolutionary process. Similarly, this research 
collected information on the issues brought up in town meetings today that many clerks think 
will become greater parts of state- and national-level politics. Further research in 5-10 years will 
be able to determine whether these clerks are accurate in their predictions.  
 
                                                        
192 Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy. 
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The Future of Town Meetings in Vermont 
 This research was originally designed to be able to analyze the potential future of open 
town meetings in Vermont based on the opinions of town clerks and the participation and 
changes in participation rates of the varying types of town meeting voting systems. Absent other 
considerations, the low participation rates in towns with only open town meetings, paired with 
rural exodus in Vermont193 already painted a shaky future for open town meetings in Vermont. 
While some politicians have spoken about the need to expand broadband to encourage growth in 
small rural towns,194 little has been successfully done at the state level and struggling small 
towns have been unsuccessful at drawing more young populations. In fact, the remaining factor 
driving the continuation of open town meetings in Vermont was largely described by clerks in 
the in-depth interviews to be Vermonters’ stubbornness about tradition rather than anything else.  
The population trends, lowering participation rates, and Vermont stubbornness, however, 
are not the only consideration now when analyzing the future of town meetings in Vermont. 
Between conducting this survey and the writing of this analysis, the COVID-19 pandemic has 
spread across the globe and impacted lives and politics here in Vermont. Following the 
pandemic’s appearance in the state, a bill was proposed in the Vermont House of 
Representatives, H.681, that “would allow Vermont towns and school districts to forgo floor 
meetings and instead adopt Australian ballot voting for 2020.”195 It was passed into law as Act 
92. With these options in place for the near future, it is unclear whether they will also will 
become the norm moving forward in Vermont for small towns or whether this will be merely a 
                                                        
193 Erin Petenko, “As Vermonters leave small towns, Burlington region grows,” VT Digger, October 3, 2019, 
https://vtdigger.org/2019/10/03/as-vermonters-leave-small-towns-they-flock-to-burlington-region/. 
194 Taylor Dobbs, “Another Vermont Pol Promises Broadband. Could It Work This Time?” Seven Days, July 25, 
2018, https://www.sevendaysvt.com/vermont/another-vermont-pol-promises-broadband-could-it-work-this-
time/Content?oid=18421305. 




passing deviation from traditional open town meetings in towns across the state. On the whole, 
the clerks interviewed by this researcher were unsure about this future, but the two clerks from 
towns with only Australian ballot voting systems were more sure of this being a critical and 




 Both praise and criticism have been consistently leveled at open town meetings in 
Vermont and across New England – from the writings of our founding fathers like Thomas 
Jefferson and scholars like Alexis De Tocqueville, to much more recent academic works on 
modern Vermont politics. This research finds that town clerks today offer examples of both the 
praise and criticisms and agree with the underlying sentiments in both. Clerks believe in the 
benefits of the direct democracy, negotiation, education, and community building that comes 
with open town meetings. However, they also acknowledge the detriments of low participation 
rates, factions, and peer pressure that can emerge in open town meetings.  
Ultimately, the findings in this research around participation rates at open town meetings 
combined with rural exodus demographic data and the more recent policies enacted during the 
coronavirus that are pulling towns away from in-person voting do not favor the continued strong 
existence of open town meetings in Vermont. The findings also indicate that expansion of direct 
democracy to other states would not come in the form of open town meetings. However, if direct 
democracy were tried in other forms in Vermont and across the country, this research on open 
town meetings indicates that positives would result from forms of direct democracy that includes 
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community input and buy-in, educational opportunities, and the public’s ability to amend or 
adjust the proposals.  
Direct democracy in the form of open town meetings is not likely to expand to other areas 
around the country. In fact, there is a real possibility of its disappearance in New England and 
Vermont. However, the benefits of this form of direct democracy in Vermont can give us insight 




 Vermont is consistently a “blue” state at the national level. Its delegation is led by 
Senator Leahy and Senator Bernie Sanders. Senator Leahy is the longest serving Democrat in the 
Senate, and Senator Sanders, while an Independent, is known for his unapologetically left 
political positions. On election night especially, and in many other instances, Vermont is not paid 
much attention. However, the paucity of Vermont’s electoral votes camouflages fascinating and 
unique aspects of the political environment in Vermont. 
   This thesis has investigated three separate unique aspects of Vermont’s political 
environment: the prevalence of split ticket voting, the existence of the most successful third party 
in the country, and town-meeting-style, direct democracy. By investigating Vermont, we are able 
to understand: Why Vermont has been able to foster these three attributes, whether they fit the 
theories and ideals put forward by academics, and how these attributes could be expanded to 
other states and the nation.  
  
Split Ticket Voting  
The first chapter in this thesis investigated the high rates of split ticket voting in the 2018 
Vermont election. Vermont’s high levels of split ticket voting stands in stark contrast to split-
ticket voting across the rest of the country.  
Nationally, split-ticket voting has declined significantly in recent years. The 2018 
midterms and 2020 elections were no exception to this trend.196 However, decreasing split ticket 
                                                        
196 Phillip Bump, “2020 Saw The Least Split Ticket House Voting In Decades,”; Note: there are many ways to 
define and investigate split ticket voting.  This article specifically investigates split ticket voting between the House 
races and the Presidential race, whereas the first chapter in this thesis specifically looks at split ticket voting between 
House and Senate races and statewide races in Vermont.  
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was not universally the case. In both 2018 and 2020, Vermont experienced significant split-ticket 
voting in the form of Democratic defection. In 2018 Vermont elected Independent, and self-
proclaimed Democratic Socialist, Senator Bernie Sanders, Democrat Representative Peter 
Welch, and Progressive Democrat Lieutenant Governor David Zuckerman, as well as a veto 
proof majority for Democrats and Progressives in the Vermont State Legislature. In 2020, 
Vermonters elected Democratic President Joe Biden, re-elected Democrat Representative Peter 
Welch, and a majority of Democrats and Progressives in the Vermont State Legislature. 
However, in both elections, Vermont voters also elected Republican Governor Phil Scott with 
substantial margins. In 2018, Governor Scott received 55.2% of the vote and in 2020, he 
received 68.5%.  
The first chapter of this thesis begins by investigating possible answers to the question: 
Why does split ticket voting happen? A review of academic theories on split-ticket voting 
demonstrates that scholars hold a wide variety of views concerning possible split-ticket voting 
motivations. However, only a few theories are strongly upheld by the results in this chapter. In 
interviewing Vermont split-ticket voters, it is clear that Vermont split-ticket voters are voting 
sincerely when they select more liberal members of Congress and down-ticket state legislature 
races in addition to a Republican governor. They agree with the vast majority of the more liberal-
leaning policies that the legislature was considering in 2018. However, they are also ultimately 
concerned about their own bottom line when it comes to the Vermont economy and their state 
taxes. In addition, despite Governor Scott’s being a Republican, these split-ticket voters felt 
connected to Governor Scott, they believed in him, they disassociated him with other national 
Republicans, and were willing to give him the benefit of the doubt.  
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The research in this chapter demonstrates that there is no one straightforward answer 
about why voters split their tickets. Instead, voters offer a number of different motivations. In 
Vermont, a substantial element of split-ticket voting is derived from the voters’ feelings that they 
know their elected representatives.  The Vermonters’ sense of community helps them overcome 
partisanship to vote across party lines when they think an elected individual is acting in a sincere 
and genuine way. This stands in stark contrast to how these split ticket voters spoke about 
Republicans, who they did not know personally, at the national level.  
Taking a broad analytic approach to what this research has demonstrated: Split ticket 
voting in Vermont is largely due to the personal relationships and the community feel that is 
prevalent in a state with under 650,000 residents. This allows voters to feel that they personally 
know the individuals representing them, and therefore allows them to put aside party label when 
voting. Therefore, to increase split ticket voting in other areas of the country, this research 
suggests creating smaller voting districts in which candidates could spend more time organizing 
door-to-door and getting to know their constituents.  
For candidates in districts that favor other parties, but who want to increase split ticket 
voting, this research indicates that creating and communicating some issue-based separation 
from national political figures could be a boon. Governor Scott has separated himself from 
national Republican figures and the national Republican party on certain issues which split ticket 
voters frequently point to. That being said, split ticket voters trust that he is honest about 
diverging from party line policies because they first feel that they know and like him. Thus, the 
first priority for candidates should be creating a sense of community and personal 
communication with voters on a personal level.  
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As this country grapples with more polarized partisanship and the villainizing of 
opposing parties, working toward solutions that encourage split ticket voting by using more one-
on-one personal communication and issue-based separation from the party line may have 
overarching and lasting positive effects nationwide.  
 
The Vermont Progressive Party  
The second chapter in this thesis investigated the success of the Vermont Progressive 
Party. This party has done something that no modern third party has been able to do: maintain 
success as a third party. For years, academics to activists have been calling for this type of 
successful third party across the country and within state and local governments. Many justify 
their reasoning by pointing to declining satisfaction rates with both of the two parties and 
growing numbers of voters who identify as Independents.197  
 The research in this chapter confirms a number of scholarly theories around third parties: 
specifically, both the hurdles and optimal environmental conditions for third parties. Strong local 
media, the legitimacy begun by then-Mayor Bernie Sanders’ election, low ballot requirements, 
small populations, and the availability of fusion candidacies have helped Vermont Progressives.  
 Academic work, however, usually treats third parties as either outside of the two-party 
system with little or no chance of substantial electoral success, or as part of a realignment where 
the third party will ultimately supplant or be taken over by one of the major parties. This research 
and the experience of the Vermont Progressive Party demonstrates that there is a lack of 
scholarly theories about a third option: limited success in terms of accessing major party status at 
the state level, but substantial success at the local level. The Vermont Progressive party has 
                                                        
197 Gallup, “Party Affiliation,” accessed March 23, 2021, https://news.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affiliation.aspx. 
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achieved a successful realignment in Burlington, but has remained a minor party at the state level 
for the last forty years.  
 Academic work to date has also largely categorized third parties as replete with 
ideologues and purists, pointing to this as one of the reasons for lack of electoral success. The 
interviews with Progressive activists demonstrate that there is a range of individuals attracted to 
the Vermont Progressive Party from pragmatists to idealists and that candidates who fit both of 
these characteristics have been able to be successful.  
For members of third parties across the country, the Vermont Progressive Party presents 
some clear guidance, on how to overcome barriers to gain electoral success and to maintain that 
success.  Like with split ticket voting, personal relationships, community-building, and on-the-
ground communication with voters help third party candidates break voters out of their 
traditional voting patterns, and even out of the binary major party choices. With third parties, 
however, there are some added logistical and legislative hurdles that should be addressed in 
states outside of Vermont to encourage third-party voting. First and foremost, parties must look 
to establish a “proof of concept.” In this political climate, getting small percentages in statewide 
or national races are not covered in the media as, or seen by voters as being proof of legitimacy. 
Instead, starting small in local districts where personal relationships can be made and then 
growing into more prominent political positions is a more plausible option for third party success 
outside of Vermont.  
To further help third-party legitimacy and name recognition expand, local media should 
be encouraged and supported. The Vermont Progressive Party has benefitted by substantial local 
media coverage that has legitimized the party in the eyes of many voters. This is something that 
other third parties around the country could benefit from as well. In addition, third parties can 
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benefit from low ballot access requirements, fusion candidate options, ranked choice voting, and 
potentially following the Vermont Progressive Party’s lead in combining both idealists and 
pragmatists within the party ranks. 
This research on the Vermont Progressive Party offers a roadmap for ambitious third 
parties around the country to emulate as they attempt to break into the two-party system. This 
research and the experience of the trail-blazing Vermont Progressive Party demonstrates that, 
with key legislation and political environments, a multiparty system is possible in America. As a 
result, more Independents may come to feel better represented, and better heard, and may be 
galvanized to participate by a party outside of our current two-party system.  
 
Town Meetings and Direct Democracy  
Direct democracy in the form of town meetings has existed in New England for longer 
than the United States of America has been a country. Throughout the last two hundred years, 
both substantial praise and criticism have been leveled at direct democracy in the form of open 
town meetings in Vermont and across New England. In many ways, this form of town-meeting 
democracy is upheld as an ideal form of government. The reality, however, is much more 
complicated. 
The research in the third chapter of this thesis investigates town meeting day in Vermont 
from the perspective of the individuals who operate and execute town meeting day: town clerks. 
The research finds that town clerks today offer examples of both the praise and criticisms and 
agree with the underlying sentiments in both. In their world, there is no theoretical ideal, but a 
need to deal with both the inevitable issues and benefits of this form of government. Town clerks 
believe in the benefits of the direct democracy negotiation, issue education, and community 
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building that come with open town meetings. However, they also acknowledge the detriments of 
low participation rates, factions, and peer pressure that can emerge. Clerks who preside over 
hybrid systems and Australian ballot systems feel similarly about their systems.  
Like split-ticket voting and third-party success, direct democracy’s success is linked to 
low populations: small towns mean small town meetings, and more opportunity for communal 
education, participation, and floor time. This research suggests that in order to maintain direct 
democracy in Vermont and even to expand it to other states, towns, districts, or any voting bloc 
would need to have under 500 in-person voters. This small population size would also be, as 
clerks and scholars have warned, potentially vulnerable to factions and low turnout. Therefore, 
while the creation of a sub-local government that could accommodate town-meeting style direct 
democracy in the United States is an interesting concept, this researcher believes it to be 
logistically infeasible. 
Unlike split ticket voting and third party success, this research indicates that there are few 
clear paths forward for expanding town-meeting style direct democracy to other states. The 
findings in this research around participation rates at open town meetings, combined with rural 
exodus demographic data, and the more recent policies enacted during the coronavirus that are 
pulling towns away from in-person voting do not favor the continued strong existence of open 
town meetings in Vermont. Similarly, while direct democracy in the form of town meetings has 
been lauded as one of the purest forms of democracy in the world, this research seems to indicate 
that there is no clear path towards a resurgence of town-meeting style direct democracy at the 
national level. 
That said, there are other potential avenues for increasing direct democracy including 
ballot initiatives. While these initiatives were not studied in this thesis, the research indicates that 
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proponents of these democratic avenues should take heed to encourage voter education and 
community buy-in when implementing direct democracy.    
 
Together, these three chapters delve into some of the unique aspects that set Vermont’s 
political system and democracy apart. These chapters produce key insights into three frequently 
lauded solutions to growing partisanship and political dissatisfaction.  
Each of these political attributes, or the underlying theories behind them, are pointed to 
by academics, pundits, and the general public as potential solutions to some of the most pressing 
political issues in our nation. For instance: split ticket voting is seen as a solution to hyper-
partisanship; third parties are viewed as a solution to the growing discontent with the two major 
parties; direct democracy is perceived as a better way to ensure that the average citizen’s wants 
and needs are heeded. This research allows those who want to work towards a better democracy 
across the country a spark of hope for the potential that could be. Vermont’s experience with 
split ticket voting, third parties, and direct democracies demonstrates that other states and the 
nation can take tangible steps outlined above to potentially help address some of the ills in our 
current system.  
It is important to note, however, that Vermont is not a perfect representation of the 
United States as a whole. Vermont is one of the smallest states, one of the most rural states, and 
one of the whitest states. Split ticket voting, direct democracy, and the success of the Progressive 
Party may be due, in party, to some of these features that separate Vermont from other states. 
The findings certainly indicate that small community-based politicking supports both split ticket 
voting and the Progressive Party indicates that Vermont’s small population size, at least, does 
contribute. One could argue that systemic racism in other states may add additional barriers to 
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third parties, against split ticket voting, or direct democracy in various instances. However, 
Vermont’s lack of demographic diversity and therefore this researchers inability to contrast and 
compare places this outside of the scope of this research.  
Research limitations aside, the implications for encouraging third parties and split ticket 
voting could shift the way that Americans view their participation in politics. Currently, most 
voters currently see their political options as a binary choice between two less-than ideal options. 
Creating an environment where a third party, or even a multiparty system can flourish, and 
where split ticket voting is more encouraged and prevalent, would shift the current political 
paradigm. Voters would no longer face the “spoiler effect” and instead be able to vote for 
candidates of various parties that fit with their political ideologies, rather than against one party 
or for the lesser of two bad choices. Voting, and splitting tickets, for different candidates and 
multiple parties could galvanize voting across the country and reverse the current trend of fewer 
people identifying with the parties. In implementing this vision, policies like ranked choice 
voting could encourage the idea that every vote matters and that every voter can vote for a party 
that voices their true vision for the country.  
Shifting from the current binary, hyper-partisan, approach to democracy could also have 
positive implications for our lawmakers. Rather than the current oppositional relationship that 
exists in our legislatures, splitting tickets and the prevalence of third parties would encourage 
cooperation and negotiation when putting together legislation. The goal for legislators could shift 
from impeding progress when the opposing party is in power, to finding commonalities with 
smaller parties to pass legislation where priorities overlap. Here in Vermont, Democrats and 
Progressives work together, Progressives and Republicans have even worked together, and in 
some instances, like trying to unseat Bernie as mayor of Burlington, Democrats and Republicans 
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have worked together. Rather than binary options between two parties and issues, encouraging 
third parties and split ticket voting could inspire greater coalition building and more negotiation 
in our democratic process.    
Vermont is not a perfect democracy. There are plenty of issues throughout the state and 
the country that have a grasp here. Neither is this research perfect.  However, there are elements 
of the system in Vermont that demonstrate that better representation and democracy could be 
possible here and across the country. As our nation grapples with growing partisanship, this 
research into three of Vermont’s unique political attributes has taught us more about the ideals 
that we strive for, their complexities, and what may be possible on a national level. Vermont 
could show us a path forward to a better democracy.  
164 
 
APPENDIX A: Vermont Split-Ticket Voter/Democratic Defector 
Survey Toplines 
 
Vermont Split-Ticket Voter/Democratic Defector IVR Survey Topline 
Interactive voice response survey 
Field Dates: Aug. 16 – Aug. 21, 2019 
Goal: To identify Democratic defecting, split-ticket voters in Vermont for further research 
 
Q1. To start... Did you happen to vote in the 2018 mid-term election? Or, did things come up that 
kept you from voting? 
 Total Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 503 207 
Yes, voted 100% 100% 
No, did not vote 0% 0% 
 
Q2. Would you say that Vermont is headed in the right direction or off on the wrong track? 
 Total Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 503 207 
Right direction 46% 61% 
Wrong track 42% 27% 
No opinion 12% 12% 
 
Q3. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a... 
 Total Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 503 207 
Republican 29% 0% 
Independent 34% 48% 
Democrat 28% 43% 




Q4. Would you say that you are an independent who leans Republican, an independent who leans 
Democrat, or a strong Independent? 
*Asked only of those who thought of themselves as “Independent” 
 Total Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 169 100 
Lean Democrat 35% 45% 
Strong Independent 39% 55% 
Lean Republican 26% 0% 
 
Q5. Would you say you are strong Democrat or a not so strong Democrat? 
*Asked only of those who thought of themselves as “Democrat” 
 Total Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 140 88 
Strong Democrat 69% 68% 
Not so strong Democrat 31% 32% 
Q6a. Have you heard of Bernie Sanders? 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters  
 Dems/Inds Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 315 207 
Yes 99% 100% 
No 1% *% 
 
Q6b. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Bernie Sanders? 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters and had heard of Bernie 
Sanders 
 Dems/Inds Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 312 206 
Favorable 76% 71% 
Unfavorable 19% 22% 





Q7a. Have you heard of Peter Welch? 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters  
 Dems/Inds Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 315 207 
Yes 96% 96% 
No 4% 4% 
 
Q7b.Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Peter Welch? 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters and had heard of Peter Welch 
 Dems/Inds Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 303 198 
Favorable 83% 82% 
Unfavorable 9% 11% 
No opinion 8% 8% 
 
Q8a. Have you heard of Patrick Leahy? 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters  
 Dems/Inds Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 315 207 
Yes 98% 97% 
No 2% 3% 
 
Q8b. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Patrick Leahy? 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters and had heard of Leahy  
 Dems/Inds Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 309 201 
Favorable 82% 78% 
Unfavorable 15% 20% 





Q9a. Have you heard of Phil Scott? 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters  
 Dems/Inds Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 315 207 
Yes 97% 98% 
No 3% 2% 
 
Q9b. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Phil Scott? 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters and had heard of Phil Scott 
 Dems/Inds Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 307 202 
Favorable 50% 77% 
Unfavorable 34% 12% 
No opinion 16% 11% 
 
Q10a. Have you heard of David Zuckerman? 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters  
 Dems/Inds Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 315 207 
Yes 85% 86% 
No 15% 14% 
 
Q10b. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of David Zuckerman? 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters and had heard of David 
Zuckerman 
 Dems/Inds Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 269 177 
Favorable 59% 49% 
Unfavorable 21% 28% 




Q11a. Have you heard of TJ Donovan? 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters  
 Dems/Inds Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 315 207 
Yes 74% 73% 
No 26% 27% 
 
Q11b. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of TJ Donovan? 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters and had heard of TJ Donovan 
 Dems/Inds Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 232 151 
Favorable 56% 61% 
Unfavorable 17% 17% 
No opinion 27% 22% 
 
Q12a. Have you heard of Rebecca Holcombe? 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters  
 Dems/Inds Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 315 207 
Yes 49% 46% 
No 51% 54% 
 
Q12b. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Rebecca Holcombe? 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters and had heard of Rebecca 
Holcombe 
 Dems/Inds Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 154 96 
Favorable 31% 30% 
Unfavorable 21% 25% 




DEMS/INDS: “Have you heard of…?” Summary Table(Q6a-12a) 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters  
N=315 Yes No 
Bernie Sanders 99% 1% 
Peter Welch 96% 4% 
Patrick Leahy  98% 2% 
Phil Scott  97% 3% 
David Zuckerman  85% 15% 
TJ Donovan  74% 26% 
Rebecca Holcombe  49% 51% 
 
SPLIT-TICKET VOTERS: “Have you heard of…?” Summary Table (Q6a-12a) 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters  
N=207 Yes No 
Bernie Sanders 100% 1% 
Peter Welch 96% 4% 
Patrick Leahy  97% 3% 
Phil Scott  98% 2% 
David Zuckerman  86% 14% 
TJ Donovan  73% 27% 
Rebecca Holcombe  46% 54% 
 
DEMS/INDS: “Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of…?” Summary Table (Q6b-
12b) 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters and had heard of the candidate 
 N= Favorable Unfavorable No opinion 
Bernie Sanders 312 76% 19% 5% 
Peter Welch 303 83% 9% 8% 
Patrick Leahy  309 82% 15% 3% 
Phil Scott  307 50% 34% 16% 
David Zuckerman  269 59% 21% 20% 
TJ Donovan  232 56% 17% 27% 




SPLIT-TICKET VOTERS: “Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of…?” Summary 
Table (Q6b-12b) 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters and had heard of the candidate 
 N= Favorable Unfavorable No opinion 
Bernie Sanders 206 71% 22% 7% 
Peter Welch 198 82% 11% 8% 
Patrick Leahy  201 78% 20% 2% 
Phil Scott  202 77% 12% 11% 
David Zuckerman  177 49% 28% 24% 
TJ Donovan  151 61% 17% 22% 
Rebecca Holcombe  96 30% 25% 45% 
 
Q13. As you may know, in 2018 Republican Phil Scott and Democrat Christine Hallquist were 
running for Governor of Vermont. Who did you vote for Governor? Phil Scott, Christine 
Hallquist, someone else, or did you not vote for Governor? 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters  
 Dems/Inds Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 315 207 
Phil Scott 46% 70% 
Christine Hallquist 41% 22% 
Someone else 8% 4% 
Did not vote for Governor 5% 4% 
 
Q14. As you may know, Phil Scott may be running for Governor again in the 2020 general 
election. How likely or unlikely would you say you are to vote for Phil Scott for Governor 2020? 
*Asked only of those who qualified as potential split-ticket voters  
 Dems/Inds Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 315 207 
Very likely 24% 36% 
Somewhat Likely 28% 43% 
Somewhat Unlikely 23% 15% 
Very Unlikely 23% 6% 
Do not plan to vote 2% *% 
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Q15. Now, some short demographic questions to make sure we are talking to a good cross 
section of people. Would you describe yourself as male, female, or would you describe yourself 
in some other way? 
 Total Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 503 207 
Male 47% 43% 
Female 51% 54% 
Other 2% 3% 
 
Q16. In political terms, do you consider yourself a progressive, liberal, moderate, conservative, 
or libertarian? 
 Total Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 503 207 
Progressive 15% 14% 
Liberal 24% 33% 
Moderate 29% 40% 
Conservative 27% 9% 
Libertarian 4% 4% 
 
Q17. May I ask your age? Are you... 
 Total Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 503 207 
Under 30 years of age 4% 2% 
30-39 years old 5% 4% 
40-49 years old 10% 8% 
50-59 years old 20% 19% 
60-69 years old 24% 29% 
70 years old or older 38% 38% 
 
Q18. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
 Total Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 503 207 
Some High School 2% 1% 
Graduated High School 17% 16% 
Some college/university 19% 21% 
Graduated college/university 33% 29% 
Post-graduate degree 29% 32% 
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Q19. What is your work status? 
 Total Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 503 207 
Full Time 33% 30% 
Part Time 7% 10% 
Self-employed 11% 11% 
Looking for work/unemployed 3% 3% 
Stay at home parent 2% 1% 
Student 1% 1% 
Retired 44% 43% 
 
Q20. How would you describe your economic circumstances? Are you poor, working class, 
middle class, upper middle class, or well-to-do? 
 Total Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 503 207 
Poor 8% 7% 
Working class 28% 27% 
Middle class 44% 43% 
Upper middle class 15% 17% 
Well-to-do 4% 5% 
 
 
Q21. Are you married, widowed, separated, divorced, single and never been married, or are you 
unmarried and living with a partner? 
 Total Split-Ticket Voters 
N= 503 207 
Married 61% 61% 
Widowed 15% 16% 
Separated 2% 1% 
Divorced 11% 11% 
Never been married 7% 6% 





Vermont Split-Ticket Voter/Democratic Defector Follow-up Interviews Topline 
Individual Phone Interviews 
Field Dates: Aug. 26 - Sept. 17, 2019 
Goal: To collect both qualitative and quantitative data on democratic defecting split-ticket voters in 
Vermont. (Note: qualitative information only briefly summarized in this topline) 
 
Q1. To make sure I am talking to the right person, generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a…? 





No preference 9% 
 
First, let’s talk about how you voted in 2018. 
 
Q2. As you may know, in 2018 Independent Bernie Sanders and Republican Lawrence Zupan 
were running for one of Vermont’s U.S. Senate seats. Who did you vote for U.S. Senate? Bernie 
Sanders, Lawrence Zupan, someone else, or did you not vote for U.S. Senate? 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Bernie Sanders 86% 
Lawrence Zupan 9% 
Someone else 3% 





Q3. As you may know, in 2018 Democrat Peter Welch and Republican Anya Tynio were 
running for Vermont’s U.S. House of Representatives seat. Who did you vote for U.S. House 
Representative? Peter Welch, Anya Tynio, someone else, or did you not vote for U.S. House of 
Representatives? 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Peter Welch 91% 
Anya Tynio 5% 
Someone else 0% 
Did not vote 4% 
 
QIVR. As you may know, in 2018 Republican Phil Scott and Democrat Christine Hallquist were 
running for Governor of Vermont. Who did you vote for Governor? Phil Scott, Christine 
Hallquist, someone else, or did you not vote for Governor? 
*This question was asked in the IVR survey but results for only the 78 respondents shown below. 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Phil Scott 72% 
Christine Hallquist 26% 
Someone else 0% 
Did not vote 0% 
 
Q4. As you may know, in 2018 Progressive Democrat David Zuckerman and Republican Don 
Turner Jr. were running for Lieutenant Governor of Vermont. Who did you vote for Lieutenant 
Governor? David Zuckerman, Don Turner Jr., someone else, or did you not vote for Lieutenant 
Governor? 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
David Zuckerman 77% 
Don Turner Jr. 15% 
Someone else 1% 
Did not vote 6% 
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Q5. As you may know, in 2018 Democrat TJ Donovan and Republican Janssen Willhoit were 
running for Attorney General of Vermont. Who did you vote for Attorney General? TJ Donovan, 
Janssen Willhoit, someone else, or did you not vote for Attorney General? 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
TJ Donovan 83% 
Janssen Willhoit 4% 
Someone else 6% 
Did not vote 6% 
 
Q6. In general, how satisfied or unsatisfied are you with the way things are going in the United 
States at this time? 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Very satisfied 12% 
Somewhat satisfied 3% 
Somewhat unsatisfied 14% 
Very unsatisfied 72% 
Don’t know 0% 
 
Q7. And in general, how satisfied or unsatisfied are you with the way things are going in 
Vermont at this time? 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Very satisfied 24% 
Somewhat satisfied 49% 
Somewhat unsatisfied 13% 
Very unsatisfied 13% 





Q8. What would you say your top political priorities are for Vermont? [OPEN END] 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
The economy, high taxation, and the need for jobs 59% 
Healthcare and better access to healthcare 29% 
The environment, climate change, and cleaning up Lake 
Champlain 
15% 
Gun control 12% 
Education 9% 
Women’s issues 4% 
Other 9% 
Don’t know 6% 
 
Q9. I’m going to list a number of proposals that may be or are being considered by the 
Vermont State Legislature. Please let me know how much you support or oppose these issues. 
Q9a. Ensuring that the government does not raise taxes 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 54% 
Strongly support 33% 
Somewhat support 21% 
Somewhat oppose 26% 
Strongly oppose 15% 
Total oppose 41% 
Don’t know 5% 
 
Q9b. Implementing an education voucher program in Vermont 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 46% 
Strongly support 26% 
Somewhat support 21% 
Somewhat oppose 12% 
Strongly oppose 21% 
Total oppose 32% 





Q9c. Raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 82% 
Strongly support 59% 
Somewhat support 23% 
Somewhat oppose 8% 
Strongly oppose 9% 
Total oppose 17% 
Don’t know 1% 
 
Q9d. Passing paid family leave 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 77% 
Strongly support 55% 
Somewhat support 22% 
Somewhat oppose 6% 
Strongly oppose 9% 
Total oppose 15% 
Don’t know 6% 
 
Q9e. Legalizing the sale of a small amount of marijuana for personal use 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 71% 
Strongly support 50% 
Somewhat support 21% 
Somewhat oppose 6% 
Strongly oppose 15% 
Total oppose 22% 
Don’t know 8% 
 
Q9f. Increasing access to broadband throughout Vermont 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 91% 
Strongly support 74% 
Somewhat support 17% 
Somewhat oppose 3% 
Strongly oppose 3% 
Total oppose 3% 




Q9g. Investing in renewable energy 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 91% 
Strongly support 74% 
Somewhat support 17% 
Somewhat oppose 3% 
Strongly oppose 3% 
Total oppose 5% 
Don’t know 4% 
 
Q9h. Improving water quality in Lake Champlain 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 94% 
Strongly support 81% 
Somewhat support 13% 
Somewhat oppose 1% 
Strongly oppose 3% 
Total oppose 4% 
Don’t know 3% 
 
Q9i. Providing financial incentives to workers who move to Vermont 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 40% 
Strongly support 8% 
Somewhat support 32% 
Somewhat oppose 29% 
Strongly oppose 17% 
Total oppose 46% 
Don’t know 14% 
 
Q9j. Passing a 24-hour waiting period for handgun purchases 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 88% 
Strongly support 83% 
Somewhat support 5% 
Somewhat oppose 0% 
Strongly oppose 8% 
Total oppose 8% 




Q9k. Reducing the state’s prison inmate population 
 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 78% 
Strongly support 45% 
Somewhat support 33% 
Somewhat oppose 4% 
Strongly oppose 5% 
Total oppose 9% 
Don’t know 13% 
 
Q9l. Providing free tuition at Vermont State Colleges and Universities 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 73% 
Strongly support 51% 
Somewhat support 22% 
Somewhat oppose 10% 
Strongly oppose 15% 
Total oppose 26% 
Don’t know 1% 
 
Q9m. Addressing the opioid crisis 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 88% 
Strongly support 77% 
Somewhat support 12% 
Somewhat oppose 0% 
Strongly oppose 4% 
Total oppose 4% 
Don’t know 8% 
 
Q9n. Adding abortion rights to the Vermont Constitution 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 74% 
Strongly support 62% 
Somewhat support 13% 
Somewhat oppose 5% 
Strongly oppose 14% 
Total oppose 19% 
Don’t know 6% 
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Q9o. Passing a four-year term for governor 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 76% 
Strongly support 47% 
Somewhat support 28% 
Somewhat oppose 8% 
Strongly oppose 6% 
Total oppose 14% 
Don’t know 10% 
 
Q9p. Implementing a fuel or gas tax to fund projects to decrease energy consumption 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 44% 
Strongly support 22% 
Somewhat support 22% 
Somewhat oppose 18% 
Strongly oppose 29% 
Total oppose 47% 
Don’t know 9% 
 
Q9q. Expanding access to healthcare 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 90% 
Strongly support 76% 
Somewhat support 14% 
Somewhat oppose 0% 
Strongly oppose 4% 
Total oppose 4% 
Don’t know 6% 
 
Q9r. Appointing a Vermont director for LGBTQ equity 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Total support 60% 
Strongly support 32% 
Somewhat support 28% 
Somewhat oppose 8% 
Strongly oppose 18% 
Total oppose 26% 




SUMMARY TABLE: Legislative proposals  
Continued on next page 
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Q10. Which of the following statements best describes how you generally support candidates in 
Vermont. Would you say… 
 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
I support candidates who focus on progressive values and 
economic justice 
26% 
I lean towards supporting candidates who focus on 
progressive values and economic justice 
21% 
I lean towards supporting candidates who focus on issues 
like the economy and balancing the state budget 
14% 
I support candidates who focus on issues like the 
economy and balancing the state budget 
24% 






Q11. Do you want the candidates that are elected to office to make compromises to gain 
consensus on legislation, or stick to their campaign positions even if that means no consensus on 
legislation? 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Make compromises to gain consensus on legislation 77% 
Stick to their campaign positions even if that means no 
consensus on legislation 
15% 
It depends [VOL] 4% 
Don’t know 4% 
 
Q12. In thinking about how the Governor candidates in 2020 approach issues like economic 
opportunity, health care, climate change, and college affordability, which of the following comes 
closer to describing the candidate you prefer… 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Someone who proposes larger scale policies that cost more 
and might be harder to pass into law, but could bring 
major change on these issues 
26% 
Someone who proposes smaller scale policies that cost less 
and might be easier to pass into law, but will bring less 
change on these issues. 
65% 
It depends [VOL] 5% 





Q13. During our other phone survey, you said that you were favorable to Phil Scott. Could you 
please tell me some of the specific reasons why you are favorable to him?  
N = 60 Split-Ticket Voters 
Good demeanor, intelligent, hardworking, true to his 
word 
45% 
Supported Democratic positions/ Not a real Republican 33% 
Willing to compromise 27% 
He is doing a “good job” 23% 
Cares about Vermont and all Vermonters 20% 
His position on budget and taxation 12% 
Needed change from Democratic Governor, Need to 
balance government 
12% 
Is a moderate 10% 
He is a businessman and understands blue collar workers 7% 
No good Democratic candidates 3% 
Don’t know 7% 
 
 
Q14. During our other phone survey, you said that you voted for Phil Scott in 2018. Could you 
please tell me some of the specific reasons why you voted for him?  
N = 57 Split-Ticket Voters 
Specific policy agreement  33% 
Budget and taxation policy  18% 
Christine Hallquist was not a good candidate 25% 
Incumbency benefits: name recognition, solid 
performance, no big bad changes 
16% 
He is a good guy 14% 
Willing to compromise 5% 
Able to balance the Democrats in the legislature 4% 





Q15. During our other phone survey, you said that you would vote for Phil Scott in 2020. Could 
you please tell me some of the specific reasons why you would vote for him?  
N = 58 Split-Ticket Voters 
Depends on who is running against Scott 28% 
Specific policy agreement 26% 
Budget and taxation policies 9% 
He has done a good job so far in the office 24% 
Compromises and works with Democrats 9% 
He has a good character 7% 
Don’t know 14% 
 
Q16. As you may know, a number of Vermont Democrats, Independents, and Progressives voted 
for Phil Scott in the 2018 election. If you were giving anonymous advice to a Democratic 
candidate running for governor in 2020, what would advise them to say or do to appeal to those 
people who voted for Phil Scott? 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Focus on the economy, employment, and lowering taxes 26% 
Focus on specific policies (environment/climate change, healthcare, 
education, raising the minimum wage, gun control, the opioid crisis) 
24% 
Be more moderate, realistic, and avoid “fringe issues” 21% 
Be truthful and honest 18% 
Listen to “every day” Vermonters  17% 
Compromise and work with the legislature ot accomplish something 13% 
They need a good track record and experience 9% 
Nothing; I am voting for Phil Scott 9% 
Don’t know  10% 
 
Q17. Thinking about the primary for Vermont Governor next year. Would you vote in the 
Democratic primary, the Republican Primary, or would you wait to vote in the General Election? 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Democratic Primary 46% 
Republican Primary 4% 
Wait until the general election 27% 




Q18. As you may know, there are a number of Progressive and Democratic politicians in 
Vermont who may run for the Democratic nomination for Governor in 2020. Which candidate 
would you be most likely to vote for in the primary? 
N = 38 Split-Ticket Voters 
David Zuckerman 26% 
TJ Donovan 24% 
Rebecca Holcombe 18% 
Brenda Siegel 3% 
Don’t know 29% 
 
Q19. How frequently would you say you pay attention to politics in Vermont, if at all? 
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Every day 46% 
At least once a week 31% 
Once every couple weeks 13% 
Once every couple months 3% 
Only during elections 3% 
I do not pay much attention to politics 5% 
 
Q20.Where do you primarily get your information about Vermont politics?  
N = 78 Split-Ticket Voters 
Local newspapers 62% 
Local television 59% 
Local Radio 33% 
Family and friends 6% 
Social media 4% 
 
Q21. This is the end of our survey. Would you be willing to be contacted once or twice more 
about the 2020 election for us to listen and learn more about what you think about the 2020 
election? 






APPENDIX B: Precinct Calculation Steps 
Precinct Calculation Steps 
Performed using Vermont Secretary of State Data on 2018 voting. 
First, the absolute difference in precinct vote totals for Sanders, Zuckerman and Welch were 
calculated. Appendix B - Table 1 shows Vermont precincts ranked by lowest absolute 
difference for each candidate’s vote totals as compared to Scott’s vote totals. 
Appendix B - Table 1 
  SANDERS  SCOTT     ZUCKERMAN SCOTT     WELCH SCOTT  
Sudbury 60.70% 60.70% 0% Tinmouth 54.32% 54.32% 0% Sudbury 60.70% 60.70% 0% 
Saint 
Johnsbury 
59.51% 59.63% 0% Roxbury 54.68% 54.68% 0% Northfield 64.37% 64.43% 0% 
Burke 60.88% 60.59% 0% Cabot 54.96% 54.96% 0% Sailsbury 65.57% 65.15% 0% 
Brookfield 61.20% 61.50% 0% Whitingham 51.67% 51.47% 0% Ludlow 56.92% 57.36% 0% 
Panton 61.39% 61.06% 0% Rutland City 49.71% 49.46% 0% Hancock 61.70% 60.99% 1% 
Saint George 62.26% 61.64% 1% Bethel 57.62% 57.95% 0% Braintree 62.59% 61.84% 1% 
Barnet 58.92% 58.18% 1% Monkton 58.32% 57.96% 0% Corinth 58.93% 59.90% 1% 
Braintree 61.09% 61.84% 1% Morristown 58.07% 57.70% 0% Panton 62.05% 61.06% 1% 
Wheelock 56.46% 57.36% 1% Sandgate 51.55% 51.03% 1% Burke 59.46% 60.59% 1% 
Bridgewater 61.25% 60.32% 1% Reading 58.82% 57.98% 1% Poultney 58.98% 57.85% 1% 
Glover 60.15% 61.09% 1% Dover 52.84% 54.18% 1% Cavendish 56.19% 54.81% 1% 
Poultney 56.88% 57.85% 1% Georgia 34.13% 35.83% 2% North Hero 61.63% 63.19% 2% 
Walden 58.89% 57.78% 1% Stockbridge 59.08% 60.81% 2% Fairfield 65.24% 66.93% 2% 
Albany 60.40% 61.65% 1% Tunbridge 54.06% 55.94% 2% Killington 62.78% 64.52% 2% 
Shrewsbury 58.79% 57.51% 1% Wolcott 56.73% 54.68% 2% Brandon 61.00% 59.09% 2% 
Shoreham 61.92% 60.55% 1% Springfield 53.06% 55.33% 2% Saint Johnsbury 61.60% 59.63% 2% 
Shaftsbury 51.37% 49.85% 2% Woodbury 54.14% 56.48% 2% Kirby 61.54% 59.51% 2% 
Corinth 58.28% 59.90% 2% Chester 53.94% 56.32% 2% Bridgewater 62.41% 60.32% 2% 
Ferrisburgh 63.54% 61.80% 2% West Windsor 60.62% 57.96% 3% Wheelock 55.26% 57.36% 2% 
Sailsbury 63.09% 65.15% 2% Dorset 60.24% 57.33% 3% Grand Isle  64.05% 66.17% 2% 
Ludlow 59.43% 57.36% 2% Middletown 
Springs 
52.61% 55.65% 3% Shrewsbury 59.89% 57.51% 2% 
Pawlet 58.86% 56.57% 2% Duxbury 55.88% 58.93% 3% Brookfield 63.91% 61.50% 2% 
Readsboro 48.87% 46.28% 3% Bristol 57.82% 54.76% 3% Searsburg 45.00% 47.50% 3% 
Colchester 64.61% 62.02% 3% Johnson 56.41% 53.21% 3% West Haven 62.61% 65.22% 3% 
New Haven 63.87% 61.11% 3% Readsboro 49.51% 46.28% 3% Springfield 58.39% 55.33% 3% 
Springfield 58.23% 55.33% 3% Newbury 53.42% 56.66% 3% Walden 60.89% 57.78% 3% 
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Cavendish 57.90% 54.81% 3% Pownal 50.90% 47.60% 3% Middletown 
Springs 
58.91% 55.65% 3% 
Whitingham 54.62% 51.47% 3% Rupert 52.97% 56.37% 3% Pawlet 60.00% 56.57% 3% 
Kirby 56.28% 59.51% 3% Jericho 59.38% 55.85% 4% Pittsfield 60.31% 63.74% 3% 
North Hero 59.90% 63.19% 3% Cambridge 57.45% 53.82% 4% Proctor 61.27% 64.74% 3% 
Waltham 62.36% 59.04% 3% Londonderry 59.00% 55.23% 4% Athens 54.55% 51.05% 4% 
Killington 60.87% 64.52% 4% Barnard 57.58% 53.79% 4% Danville 61.45% 65% 4% 
Tinmouth 58.02% 54.32% 4% Grafton 60.26% 56.41% 4% Shoreham 64.15% 60.55% 4% 
Newark 54.86% 58.75% 4% Pawlet 52.71% 56.57% 4% Glover 64.85% 61.09% 4% 
Newbury 60.60% 56.66% 4% Manchester 56.61% 52.63% 4% Ferrisburgh 65.76% 61.80% 4% 
Hardwick 62.56% 58.52% 4% Bradford 54.56% 58.75% 4% Albany 57.64% 61.65% 4% 
Northfield 60.24% 64.43% 4% Hancock 56.74% 60.99% 4% Fair Haven 54.23% 58.56% 4% 
Fletcher 62.48% 58.24% 4% Shaftsbury 54.24% 49.85% 4% New Haven 65.51% 61.11% 4% 
Grand Isle  61.65% 66.17% 5% Walden 53.33% 57.78% 4% Saint George 66.04% 61.64% 4% 
Pittsfield 59.16% 63.74% 5% Williston 56.52% 61.02% 4% Wallingford 55.70% 60.26% 5% 
Strafford 41.12% 36.48% 5% Cavendish 50.17% 54.81% 5% Newbury 61.30% 56.66% 5% 
Bakersfield 66.03% 61.29% 5% Barnet 53.51% 58.18% 5% Newark 54.09% 58.75% 5% 
Fair Haven 53.61% 58.56% 5% Shrewsbury 52.56% 57.51% 5% Randolph 64.37% 59.62% 5% 
West Haven 60% 65.22% 5% Searsburg 42.50% 47.50% 5% Readsboro 51.13% 46.28% 5% 
Randolph 64.95% 59.62% 5% Randolph 54.48% 59.62% 5% Stratton 58.54% 63.41% 5% 
Williston 66.71% 61.02% 6% Royalton 57.29% 52.12% 5% Barnet 63.10% 58.18% 5% 
Bradford 64.45% 58.75% 6% Plymouth 59.02% 53.76% 5% Bakersfield 66.22% 61.29% 5% 
Westfield 56.54% 62.31% 6% Sudbury 55.09% 60.70% 6% Westfield 57.31% 62.31% 5% 
Woodbury 62.63% 56.48% 6% Pomfret 59.39% 53.70% 6% Chester 61.42% 56.32% 5% 
Weathersfield 55.56% 61.84% 6% Orwell 38.25% 32.54% 6% Stamford 49.87% 55.15% 5% 
Saint Albans 
City 
66.21% 59.86% 6% West Fairlee 60.56% 54.80% 6% Whitingham 56.78% 51.47% 5% 
Stratton 56.91% 63.41% 6% Underhill 60.21% 54.43% 6% Hardwick 63.86% 58.52% 5% 
Sandgate 57.73% 51.03% 7% Bridgewater 54.52% 60.32% 6% Plymouth 59.11% 53.76% 5% 
Reading 64.71% 57.98% 7% Hyde Park 54.05% 60.15% 6% Hubbardton 56.73% 62.18% 5% 
Dover 61.04% 54.18% 7% Windham 63.51% 57.35% 6% Westmore 55.87% 61.45% 6% 
Westford 66.49% 59.60% 7% Vergennes 60.54% 54.36% 6% Sandgate 56.70% 51.03% 6% 
Stockbridge 67.72% 60.81% 7% Weston 61.43% 55.10% 6% Dover 59.85% 54.18% 6% 
Wallingford 53.31% 60.26% 7% Brandon 52.68% 59.09% 6% Tinmouth 60.08% 54.32% 6% 
Vernon 53.27% 60.24% 7% Stowe 61.36% 54.95% 6% Colchester 67.95% 62.02% 6% 
Athens 58.04% 51.05% 7% Wardsboro 56.48% 50.00% 6% Weathersfield 55.72% 61.84% 6% 
Londonderry 62.29% 55.23% 7% Ludlow 50.71% 57.36% 7% Fletcher 64.60% 58.24% 6% 
Rupert 63.46% 56.37% 7% Panton 54.13% 61.06% 7% Barton 60.22% 66.85% 7% 
Stamford 48.02% 55.15% 7% Corinth 52.76% 59.90% 7% Whiting 65.36% 72.07% 7% 
Westmore 54.19% 61.45% 7% Arlington 57.61% 50.46% 7% Grafton 63.14% 56.41% 7% 
Whiting 64.80% 72.07% 7% Poultney 50.65% 57.85% 7% Reading 64.71% 57.98% 7% 
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Isle La Motte 58.39% 65.73% 7% Marshfield 58.12% 50.89% 7% Andover 55.23% 62.09% 7% 
Pownal 54.95% 47.60% 7% Hardwick 51.03% 58.52% 7% Stockbridge 67.72% 60.81% 7% 
Proctor 57.37% 64.74% 7% South Hero 52.31% 59.96% 8% Waterville 57.71% 64.63% 7% 
South Hero 67.34% 59.96% 7% Sunderland 58.72% 51.06% 8% Vernon 53.27% 60.24% 7% 
Rutland City 56.84% 49.46% 7% Landgrove 64.42% 56.73% 8% Woodbury 63.48% 56.48% 7% 
Andover 54.58% 62.09% 8% Burke 52.82% 60.59% 8% Bradford 65.78% 58.75% 7% 
Fairfield 59.37% 66.93% 8% Westford 51.54% 59.60% 8% Waltham 66.42% 59.04% 7% 
Hubbardton 54.49% 62.18% 8% Moretown 62.07% 53.99% 8% Tunbridge 63.48% 55.94% 8% 
Hancock 68.79% 60.99% 8% Wheelock 49.25% 57.36% 8% Enosburgh 61.06% 68.65% 8% 
Hyde Park 68.25% 60.15% 8% Waltham 50.55% 59.04% 8% Richford 57.48% 65.11% 8% 
Tunbridge 64.06% 55.94% 8% Windhall 60.44% 51.87% 9% Saint Albans 
City 
67.58% 59.86% 8% 
Jay 55.98% 64.11% 8% Montgomery 56.81% 48.17% 9% Chelsea 57.73% 65.46% 8% 
Plymouth 62.03% 53.76% 8% Fletcher 49.59% 58.24% 9% Hyde Park 68.03% 60.15% 8% 
Bethel 66.59% 57.95% 9% Shelburne 63.35% 54.67% 9% Castleton 55.24% 63.13% 8% 
Danville 56.35% 65% 9% Fairfax 41.33% 32.56% 9% Chittenden 55.43% 63.35% 8% 
Waterville 55.85% 64.63% 9% Ferrisburgh 52.82% 61.80% 9% Rupert 64.31% 56.37% 8% 
Arlington 59.54% 50.46% 9% Saint Albans 
City 
50.76% 59.86% 9% Westford 68.30% 59.60% 9% 
Dorset 66.54% 57.33% 9% Saint George 52.52% 61.64% 9% Williston 70.10% 61.02% 9% 
Enosburgh 59.41% 68.65% 9% Waterbury 63.77% 54.58% 9% Isle La Motte 56.64% 65.73% 9% 
Manchester 61.87% 52.63% 9% Saint Johnsbury 50.16% 59.63% 9% Cabot 64.17% 54.96% 9% 
Barton 57.35% 66.85% 10% Colchester 52.48% 62.02% 10% Canaan 55.40% 64.69% 9% 
Grafton 66.03% 56.41% 10% Braintree 52.26% 61.84% 10% Duxbury 68.51% 58.93% 10% 
Chelsea 55.67% 65.46% 10% Shoreham 50.94% 60.55% 10% Saint Albans 
Town 
60.46% 70.23% 10% 
Brownington 53.07% 62.88% 10% Hartland 62.55% 52.92% 10% Pownal 57.42% 47.60% 10% 
Cabot 64.89% 54.96% 10% Bolton 62.36% 52.44% 10% Bethel 67.89% 57.95% 10% 
Searsburg 37.50% 47.50% 10% Kirby 49.39% 59.51% 10% Leicester 58.08% 68.18% 10% 
Canaan 54.60% 64.69% 10% New Haven 50.56% 61.11% 11% Londonderry 65.45% 55.23% 10% 
Castleton 52.83% 63.13% 10% Starksboro 61.31% 50.73% 11% Wardsboro 60.49% 50.00% 10% 
West 
Windsor 
68.29% 57.96% 10% Windsor 61.57% 50.66% 11% Jay 53.59% 64.11% 11% 
Chittenden 52.95% 63.35% 10% Vershire 62.80% 51.79% 11% Franklin 55.99% 66.73% 11% 
Richford 54.67% 65.11% 10% East Montpelier 62.97% 51.88% 11% Sheffield 56.57% 67.33% 11% 
Duxbury 69.38% 58.93% 10% Westfield 51.15% 62.31% 11% South Hero 70.76% 59.96% 11% 
Monkton 68.44% 57.96% 10% Athens 62.24% 51.05% 11% Mendon 55.50% 66.31% 11% 
Danby 48.86% 59.89% 11% Sharon 63.01% 51.75% 11% Eden 57.07% 68.05% 11% 
Belvidere 53.73% 64.93% 11% Wallingford 48.97% 60.26% 11% Washington 55.51% 66.52% 11% 
Eden 56.83% 68.05% 11% Wilmington 58.21% 46.86% 11% Danby 48.86% 59.89% 11% 
Sunderland 62.34% 51.06% 11% Elmore 63.16% 51.46% 12% Monkton 69.53% 57.96% 12% 
Sheffield 55.38% 67.33% 12% Killington 52.70% 64.52% 12% Rutland Town 57.46% 69.13% 12% 
Roxbury 66.67% 54.68% 12% Weathersfield 50.00% 61.84% 12% Rutland City 61.24% 49.46% 12% 
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Washington 54.43% 66.52% 12% Brookfield 49.47% 61.50% 12% West Windsor 69.76% 57.96% 12% 
Jericho 68.14% 55.85% 12% Andover 50% 62.09% 12% Shaftsbury 61.68% 49.85% 12% 
Charleston 53.75% 66.15% 12% Hubbardton 50% 62.18% 12% Brownington 50.92% 62.88% 12% 
Morristown 70.32% 57.70% 13% Glover 48.68% 61.09% 12% Roxbury 66.67% 54.68% 12% 
Wardsboro 62.65% 50.00% 13% Fairlee 64.03% 51.61% 12% Ryegate 58.90% 71% 12% 
Johnson 65.87% 53.21% 13% Fayston 65.61% 53.17% 12% Marshfield 63.03% 50.89% 12% 
Bristol 67.63% 54.76% 13% Bakersfield 48.77% 61.29% 13% Johnson 65.54% 53.21% 12% 
Marshfield 63.85% 50.89% 13% Albany 49.12% 61.65% 13% Pittsford 54.00% 66.43% 12% 
Leicester 55.05% 68.18% 13% Hinesburg 64.66% 52.09% 13% Windham 70.14% 57.35% 13% 
Troy 53.38% 66.54% 13% Berlin 46.99% 34.29% 13% Alburgh 57.38% 70.48% 13% 
Woodford 59.72% 46.53% 13% Rochester 64.86% 51.89% 13% Morristown 70.80% 57.70% 13% 
Weston 68.32% 55.10% 13% Pittsfield 50.76% 63.74% 13% Jericho 68.96% 55.85% 13% 
Mendon 52.48% 66.31% 14% Stratton 50.41% 63.41% 13% Vershire 65.18% 51.79% 13% 
Ryegate 56.85% 71% 14% Halifax 57.50% 44.44% 13% Bristol 68.21% 54.76% 13% 
Windhall 66.15% 51.87% 14% Stamford 41.95% 55.15% 13% Dorset 70.86% 57.33% 14% 
Barnard 68.18% 53.79% 14% Charlotte 65.16% 51.93% 13% Troy 53.01% 66.54% 14% 
Saint Albans 
Town 
55.71% 70.23% 15% Woodstock 64.08% 50.62% 13% Windhall 65.71% 51.87% 14% 
Baltimore 49.51% 64.08% 15% Newark 45.14% 58.75% 14% Brighton 52.28% 66.16% 14% 
West Fairlee 69.72% 54.80% 15% Fair Haven 44.74% 58.56% 14% Wolcott 68.86% 54.68% 14% 
Windham 72.51% 57.35% 15% Westmore 46.93% 61.45% 15% Lyndon 54.30% 68.50% 14% 
Brighton 50.98% 66.16% 15% Peacham 62.82% 48.27% 15% Charleston 51.94% 66.15% 14% 
Hartland 68.20% 52.92% 15% Sailsbury 50.52% 65.15% 15% Benson 50.83% 65.25% 14% 
Coventry 50.74% 66.26% 16% Richmond 64.67% 50.04% 15% Underhill 69.29% 54.43% 15% 
Alburgh 54.90% 70.48% 16% Essex 56.21% 41.37% 15% Arlington 65.50% 50.46% 15% 
Stowe 70.59% 54.95% 16% Bennington 58.83% 43.75% 15% Royalton 67.20% 52.12% 15% 
Royalton 67.97% 52.12% 16% South 
Burlington 
65.65% 50.45% 15% Montgomery 63.46% 48.17% 15% 
Orwell 48.41% 32.54% 16% Newport City 47.53% 32.21% 15% Coventry 50.74% 66.26% 16% 
Vergennes 70.30% 54.36% 16% Hartford 64.24% 48.52% 16% Sunderland 66.60% 51.06% 16% 
Derby 52.35% 68.36% 16% Waitsfield 66.80% 51.06% 16% Manchester 68.29% 52.63% 16% 
Cambridge 69.83% 53.82% 16% Danby 44.11% 59.89% 16% Derby 52.62% 68.36% 16% 
Windsor 34.46% 50.66% 16% Northfield 48.17% 64.43% 16% Barnard 69.70% 53.79% 16% 
West Rutland 49.88% 66.11% 16% North Hero 46.70% 63.19% 16% Cambridge 69.77% 53.82% 16% 
Georgia 52.13% 35.83% 16% Peru 66.83% 50.24% 17% Weston 71.07% 55.10% 16% 
Shelburne 70.97% 54.67% 16% Vernon 43.63% 60.24% 17% Starksboro 66.79% 50.73% 16% 
Wolcott 71.05% 54.68% 16% Greensboro 65.28% 48.61% 17% Vergennes 70.64% 54.36% 16% 
Underhill 70.83% 54.43% 16% Goshen 62.50% 45.54% 17% West Rutland 49.76% 66.11% 16% 
Rutland 
Town 
52.67% 69.13% 16% Middlesex 65.73% 48.75% 17% Sheldon 59.91% 76.30% 16% 
Pittsford 49.81% 66.43% 17% Castleton 46.09% 63.13% 17% Milton 55.36% 71.85% 16% 
Benson 48.46% 65.25% 17% Proctor 47.69% 64.74% 17% West Fairlee 71.31% 54.80% 17% 
191 
 
Rochester 69.13% 51.89% 17% Danville 47.80% 65% 17% Bridport 56.29% 72.96% 17% 
Bennington 61.01% 43.75% 17% Jay 46.89% 64.11% 17% Addison 54.48% 71.76% 17% 
Lyndon 51.20% 68.50% 17% Barton 48.73% 66.85% 18% Swanton 56.24% 73.57% 17% 
Starksboro 33.39% 50.73% 17% Chittenden 45.19% 63.35% 18% Newport Town 51.37% 69.10% 18% 
Bolton 69.92% 52.44% 17% Jamaica 60.82% 42.53% 18% Wilmington 64.86% 46.86% 18% 
Wilmington 64.49% 46.86% 18% Brownington 44.48% 62.88% 18% Hartland 71.09% 52.92% 18% 
Vershire 69.64% 51.79% 18% Woodford 65.28% 46.53% 19% Bolton 70.87% 52.44% 18% 
Halifax 62.78% 44.44% 18% Mendon 46.99% 66.31% 19% Baltimore 45.63% 64.08% 18% 
Sharon 70.17% 51.75% 18% Barre City 51.17% 31.26% 20% Sutton 53.85% 72.36% 19% 
Peacham 66.74% 48.27% 18% Leicester 48.23% 68.18% 20% Topsham 50.11% 68.62% 19% 
Wells 50.10% 68.66% 19% Troy 46.24% 66.54% 20% Mount Tabor 48.57% 67.14% 19% 
Hinesburg 70.81% 52.09% 19% Chelsea 44.85% 65.46% 21% Sharon 70.32% 51.75% 19% 
Milton 52.96% 71.85% 19% Whiting 51.40% 72.07% 21% Halifax 63.06% 44.44% 19% 
Montgomery 67.11% 48.17% 19% Mount Holly 49.40% 28.46% 21% Belvidere 46.27% 64.93% 19% 
Landgrove 75.96% 56.73% 19% Grand Isle  45.19% 66.17% 21% Brunswick 58.33% 77.08% 19% 
Franklin 47.41% 66.73% 19% Craftsbury 65.05% 43.43% 22% East Haven 49.55% 68.47% 19% 
Newport 
Town 
49.73% 69.10% 19% Eden 46.10% 68.05% 22% Stowe 74.01% 54.95% 19% 
Fairlee 71.95% 51.61% 20% Charleston 44.19% 66.15% 22% Groton 50.61% 69.98% 19% 
Moretown 74.68% 53.99% 21% Waterville 42.55% 64.63% 22% Wells 49.10% 68.66% 20% 
Bridport 52.21% 72.96% 21% Worcester 68.27% 45.96% 22% Windsor 70.23% 50.66% 20% 
Sutton 51.57% 72.36% 21% Baltimore 41.75% 64.08% 22% Orwell 52.38% 32.54% 20% 
Waterbury 75.37% 54.58% 21% Lincoln 67.23% 44.39% 23% Rochester 71.76% 51.89% 20% 
Groton 49.15% 69.98% 21% Bloomfield 41.89% 64.86% 23% Waterford 51.09% 71.02% 20% 
Addison 50.93% 71.76% 21% Pittsford 43.20% 66.43% 23% Fairlee 71.73% 51.61% 20% 
Swanton 52.67% 73.57% 21% West Haven 41.74% 65.22% 23% Georgia 56.01% 35.83% 20% 
Charlotte 73.26% 51.93% 21% Washington 42.98% 66.52% 24% Berkshire 54.10% 74.80% 21% 
Goshen 66.96% 45.54% 21% Warren 70.10% 46.54% 24% Moretown 75.00% 53.99% 21% 
Bloomfield 43.24% 64.86% 22% Weybridge 69.04% 45.40% 24% Hinesburg 73.24% 52.09% 21% 
East 
Montpelier 
74.20% 51.88% 22% Canaan 40.95% 64.69% 24% Ira 51.31% 72.77% 21% 
Sheldon 53.95% 76.30% 22% Huntington 69.62% 45.84% 24% Bloomfield 43.24% 64.86% 22% 
Pomfret 76.09% 53.70% 22% Sheffield 43.43% 67.33% 24% Waterbury 76.29% 54.58% 22% 
Peru 72.68% 50.24% 22% Isle La Motte 41.61% 65.73% 24% Peru 72.20% 50.24% 22% 
Fayston 75.79% 53.17% 23% Rockingham 65.71% 41.49% 24% Bennington 65.83% 43.75% 22% 
South 
Burlington 
73.11% 50.45% 23% Richford 40.81% 65.11% 24% Landgrove 78.85% 56.73% 22% 
Hartford 71.45% 48.52% 23% Coventry 41.87% 66.26% 24% Barre Town 54.02% 76.14% 22% 
Elmore 74.46% 51.46% 23% West Rutland 41.71% 66.11% 24% Williamstown 53.37% 75.65% 22% 
Waterford 47.91% 71.02% 23% Fairfield 42.21% 66.93% 25% Shelburne 77.18% 54.67% 23% 
Berkshire 51.56% 74.80% 23% Ryegate 45.89% 71% 25% Peacham 70.90% 48.27% 23% 
Ira 49.21% 72.77% 24% Brookline 68.14% 42.92% 25% Concord 47.02% 69.93% 23% 
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Guildhall 45.37% 69.44% 24% Derby 43.11% 68.36% 25% Brookline 65.93% 42.92% 23% 
Fairfax 56.71% 32.56% 24% Topsham 43.12% 68.62% 26% Guildhall 46.30% 69.44% 23% 
Mount Tabor 42.86% 67.14% 24% Brighton 40.35% 66.16% 26% East Montpelier 75.22% 51.88% 23% 
Lemington 53.66% 78.05% 24% Rutland Town 43.10% 69.13% 26% Pomfret 77.99% 53.70% 24% 
Richmond 74.53% 50.04% 24% Lyndon 42.43% 68.50% 26% Grandby 51.35% 75.68% 24% 
Berlin 59.10% 34.29% 25% Wells 42.12% 68.66% 27% Fayston 77.51% 53.17% 24% 
Woodstock 75.46% 50.62% 25% Mount Tabor 40.00% 67.14% 27% Newport City 56.58% 32.21% 24% 
Waitsfield 75.97% 51.06% 25% Townshend 66.89% 39.70% 27% Goshen 70.54% 45.54% 25% 
Newport City 57.34% 32.21% 25% Calais 69.34% 42.04% 27% Woodford 71.53% 46.53% 25% 
Brookline 68.14% 42.92% 25% Belvidere 37.31% 64.93% 28% Elmore 76.61% 51.46% 25% 
Barre Town 50.77% 76.14% 25% Enosburgh 40.95% 68.65% 28% Hartford 73.70% 48.52% 25% 
Chester 30.95% 56.32% 25% Benson 36.88% 65.25% 28% Charlotte 77.12% 51.93% 25% 
Middletown 
Springs 
30.22% 55.65% 25% Guildhall 39.81% 69.44% 30% Fairfax 57.76% 32.56% 25% 
Mount Holly 54.52% 28.46% 26% East Haven 38.74% 68.47% 30% Maidstone 50.00% 75.49% 25% 
Lowell 44.14% 70.22% 26% Waterford 41.04% 71.02% 30% Clarendon 46.10% 72.03% 26% 
Essex 67.47% 41.37% 26% Alburgh 40.41% 70.48% 30% Lunenburg 44.44% 70.62% 26% 
Williamstown 49.41% 75.65% 26% Granville 73.68% 43.61% 30% Woodstock 76.82% 50.62% 26% 
Middlesex 75.02% 48.75% 26% Middlebury 71.22% 40.88% 30% Richmond 76.28% 50.04% 26% 
Greensboro 75% 48.61% 26% Saint Albans 
Town 
39.82% 70.23% 30% Waitsfield 77.31% 51.06% 26% 
Maidstone 49.02% 75.49% 26% Sutton 41.88% 72.36% 30% South 
Burlington 
76.90% 50.45% 26% 
Irasburg 44.75% 71.73% 27% Newport Town 38.57% 69.10% 31% Irasburg 45.18% 71.73% 27% 
East Haven 41.44% 68.47% 27% Thetford 72.81% 42.01% 31% Berlin 60.88% 34.29% 27% 
Grandby 48.65% 75.68% 27% Plainfield 70.23% 39.38% 31% Highgate 48.82% 75.42% 27% 
Jamaica 69.59% 42.53% 27% Bridport 42.01% 72.96% 31% Mount Holly 55.27% 28.46% 27% 
Brunswick 50% 77.08% 27% Groton 38.74% 69.98% 31% Greensboro 75.56% 48.61% 27% 
Lunenburg 43.46% 70.62% 27% Concord 38.19% 69.93% 32% Middlesex 76.22% 48.75% 27% 
Concord 42.48% 69.93% 27% Ira 40.31% 72.77% 32% Worcester 73.65% 45.96% 28% 
Lincoln 72.85% 44.39% 28% Franklin 33.09% 66.73% 34% Jamaica 71.13% 42.53% 29% 
Brandon 30.07% 59.09% 29% Addison 37.81% 71.76% 34% Craftsbury 72.32% 43.43% 29% 
Highgate 46.28% 75.42% 29% Lemington 43.90% 78.05% 34% Rockingham 70.48% 41.49% 29% 
Clarendon 42.88% 72.03% 29% Winooski 71.38% 37.07% 34% Essex 70.37% 41.37% 29% 
Barre City 61.21% 31.26% 30% Grandby 40.54% 75.68% 35% Orange 49.28% 78.37% 29% 
Craftsbury 73.70% 43.43% 30% Clarendon 36.65% 72.03% 35% Lowell 40.44% 70.22% 30% 
Rockingham 71.85% 41.49% 30% Lunenburg 34.81% 70.62% 36% Lincoln 74.54% 44.39% 30% 
Worcester 76.73% 45.96% 31% Williamstown 38.70% 75.65% 37% Warren 77.31% 46.54% 31% 
Warren 77.88% 46.54% 31% Irasburg 34.69% 71.73% 37% Townshend 70.68% 39.70% 31% 
Huntington 77.48% 45.84% 32% Swanton 35.76% 73.57% 38% Huntington 76.85% 45.84% 31% 
Weybridge 77.76% 45.40% 32% Newfane 73.21% 35.10% 38% Barre City 63.78% 31.26% 33% 




Next, the average absolute difference between Scott and each of the other candidates was 
calculated per precinct. Appendix B - Table 2 shows the absolute difference between Scott and 
each of the candidates by prescinct in addition to the average absolute difference. 
 
  
Townshend 73.15% 39.70% 33% Barre Town 36.79% 76.14% 39% Holland 37.50% 71.97% 34% 
Morgan 41.78% 75.68% 34% Holland 32.58% 71.97% 39% Morgan 39.73% 75.68% 36% 
Orange 43.27% 78.37% 35% Guilford 73.01% 33.59% 39% Calais 78.22% 42.04% 36% 
Calais 78.22% 42.04% 36% Lowell 30.72% 70.22% 40% Weybridge 81.61% 45.40% 36% 
Norton 42.25% 78.87% 37% Berkshire 34.96% 74.80% 40% Lemington 41.46% 78.05% 37% 
Plainfield 76.12% 39.38% 37% Strafford 76.57% 36.48% 40% Plainfield 75.97% 39.38% 37% 
Thetford 79.33% 42.01% 37% Sheldon 34.72% 76.30% 42% Granville 80.45% 43.61% 37% 
Middlebury 78.70% 40.88% 38% Montpelier 76.79% 35.08% 42% Thetford 79.13% 42.01% 37% 
Granville 81.95% 43.61% 38% Dummerston 74.42% 32.40% 42% Middlebury 81.01% 40.88% 40% 
Newfane 76.21% 35.10% 41% Westminster 73.19% 30.80% 42% Newfane 76.10% 35.10% 41% 
Winooski 78.60% 37.07% 42% Morgan 32.88% 75.68% 43% Winooski 78.57% 37.07% 42% 
Topsham 25.28% 68.62% 43% Milton 29.03% 71.85% 43% Stannard 76.09% 32.61% 43% 
Guilford 79.14% 33.59% 46% Stannard 76.09% 32.61% 43% Guilford 77.51% 33.59% 44% 
Westminster 78.14% 30.80% 47% Brunswick 33.33% 77.08% 44% Westminster 75.18% 30.80% 44% 
Dummerston 80% 32.40% 48% Ripton 78.62% 34.54% 44% Ripton 80.59% 34.54% 46% 
Ripton 82.89% 34.54% 48% Highgate 31.23% 75.42% 44% Dummerston 79.52% 32.40% 47% 
Stannard 81.52% 32.61% 49% Cornwall 69.22% 24.54% 45% Strafford 84.75% 36.48% 48% 
Montpelier 84.24% 35.08% 49% Orange 33.65% 78.37% 45% Montpelier 85.14% 35.08% 50% 
Cornwall 77.02% 24.54% 52% Burlington 77.90% 30.81% 47% Victory 34.69% 85.71% 51% 
Burlington 83.58% 30.81% 53% Norwich 81.70% 34.52% 47% Burlington 83.17% 30.81% 52% 
Norwich 87.67% 34.52% 53% Norton 30.99% 78.87% 48% Cornwall 77.87% 24.54% 53% 
Victory 30.61% 85.71% 55% Brattleboro 77.85% 27.21% 51% Brattleboro 81.50% 27.21% 54% 
Brattleboro 82.80% 27.21% 56% Putney 79.95% 23.01% 57% Norwich 89.62% 34.52% 55% 
Marlboro 83.39% 21.22% 62% Victory 26.53% 85.71% 59% Putney 83.81% 23.01% 61% 
Putney 85.70% 23.01% 63% Marlboro 80.81% 21.22% 60% Marlboro 83.76% 21.22% 63% 
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Appendix B - Table 2 












  Average 
Absolute 
Difference 
Addison 20.83% Addison 33.95% Addison 17.28% Addison 24.02% 
Albany 1.25% Albany 12.53% Albany 4.01% Albany 5.93% 
Alburgh 15.58% Alburgh 30.07% Alburgh 13.10% Alburgh 19.58% 
Andover 7.51% Andover 12.09% Andover 6.86% Andover 8.82% 
Arlington 9.08% Arlington 7.15% Arlington 15.04% Arlington 10.42% 
Athens 6.99% Athens 11.19% Athens 3.50% Athens 7.23% 
Bakersfield 4.74% Bakersfield 12.52% Bakersfield 4.93% Bakersfield 7.40% 
Baltimore 14.57% Baltimore 22.33% Baltimore 18.45% Baltimore 18.45% 
Barnard 14.39% Barnard 3.79% Barnard 15.91% Barnard 11.36% 
Barnet 0.74% Barnet 4.67% Barnet 4.92% Barnet 3.44% 
Barre City 29.95% Barre City 19.91% Barre City 32.52% Barre City 27.46% 
Barre Town 25.37% Barre Town 39.35% Barre Town 22.12% Barre Town 28.95% 
Barton 9.50% Barton 18.12% Barton 6.63% Barton 11.42% 
Belvidere 11.20% Belvidere 27.62% Belvidere 18.66% Belvidere 19.16% 
Bennington 17.26% Bennington 15.08% Bennington 22.08% Bennington 18.14% 
Benson 16.79% Benson 28.37% Benson 14.42% Benson 19.86% 
Berkshire 23.24% Berkshire 39.84% Berkshire 20.70% Berkshire 27.93% 
Berlin 24.81% Berlin 12.70% Berlin 26.59% Berlin 21.37% 
Bethel 8.64% Bethel 0.33% Bethel 9.94% Bethel 6.30% 
Bloomfield 21.62% Bloomfield 22.97% Bloomfield 21.62% Bloomfield 22.07% 
Bolton 17.48% Bolton 9.92% Bolton 18.43% Bolton 15.28% 
Bradford 5.70% Bradford 4.19% Bradford 7.03% Bradford 5.64% 
Braintree 0.75% Braintree 9.58% Braintree 0.75% Braintree 3.69% 
Brandon 29.02% Brandon 6.41% Brandon 1.91% Brandon 12.45% 
Brattleboro 55.59% Brattleboro 50.64% Brattleboro 54.29% Brattleboro 53.51% 
Bridgewater 0.93% Bridgewater 5.80% Bridgewater 2.09% Bridgewater 2.94% 
Bridport 20.75% Bridport 30.95% Bridport 16.67% Bridport 22.79% 
Brighton 15.18% Brighton 25.81% Brighton 13.88% Brighton 18.29% 
Bristol 12.87% Bristol 3.06% Bristol 13.45% Bristol 9.79% 
Brookfield 0.30% Brookfield 12.03% Brookfield 2.41% Brookfield 4.91% 
Brookline 25.22% Brookline 25.22% Brookline 23.01% Brookline 24.48% 
Brownington 9.81% Brownington 18.40% Brownington 11.96% Brownington 13.39% 
Brunswick 27.08% Brunswick 43.75% Brunswick 18.75% Brunswick 29.86% 
Burke 0.29% Burke 7.77% Burke 1.13% Burke 3.06% 
Burlington 52.77% Burlington 47.09% Burlington 52.36% Burlington 50.74% 
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Cabot 9.93% Cabot 0.00% Cabot 9.21% Cabot 6.38% 
Calais 36.18% Calais 27.30% Calais 36.18% Calais 33.22% 
Cambridge 16.01% Cambridge 3.63% Cambridge 15.95% Cambridge 11.86% 
Canaan 10.09% Canaan 23.74% Canaan 9.29% Canaan 14.37% 
Castleton 10.30% Castleton 17.04% Castleton 7.89% Castleton 11.74% 
Cavendish 3.09% Cavendish 4.64% Cavendish 1.38% Cavendish 3.04% 
Charleston 12.40% Charleston 21.96% Charleston 14.21% Charleston 16.19% 
Charlotte 21.33% Charlotte 13.23% Charlotte 25.19% Charlotte 19.92% 
Chelsea 9.79% Chelsea 20.61% Chelsea 7.73% Chelsea 12.71% 
Chester 25.37% Chester 2.38% Chester 5.10% Chester 10.95% 
Chittenden 10.40% Chittenden 18.16% Chittenden 7.92% Chittenden 12.16% 
Clarendon 29.15% Clarendon 35.38% Clarendon 25.93% Clarendon 30.15% 
Colchester 2.59% Colchester 9.54% Colchester 5.93% Colchester 6.02% 
Concord 27.45% Concord 31.74% Concord 22.91% Concord 27.37% 
Corinth 1.62% Corinth 7.14% Corinth 0.97% Corinth 3.24% 
Cornwall 52.48% Cornwall 44.68% Cornwall 53.33% Cornwall 50.16% 
Coventry 15.52% Coventry 24.39% Coventry 15.52% Coventry 18.48% 
Craftsbury 30.27% Craftsbury 21.62% Craftsbury 28.89% Craftsbury 26.93% 
Danby 11.03% Danby 15.78% Danby 11.03% Danby 12.61% 
Danville 8.65% Danville 17.20% Danville 3.55% Danville 9.80% 
Derby 16.01% Derby 25.25% Derby 15.74% Derby 19.00% 
Dorset 9.21% Dorset 2.91% Dorset 13.53% Dorset 8.55% 
Dover 6.86% Dover 1.34% Dover 5.67% Dover 4.62% 
Dummerston 47.60% Dummerston 42.02% Dummerston 47.12% Dummerston 45.58% 
Duxbury 10.45% Duxbury 3.05% Duxbury 9.58% Duxbury 7.69% 










Eden 11.22% Eden 21.95% Eden 10.98% Eden 14.72% 
Elmore 23.00% Elmore 11.70% Elmore 25.15% Elmore 19.95% 
Enosburgh 9.24% Enosburgh 27.70% Enosburgh 7.59% Enosburgh 14.84% 
Essex 26.10% Essex 14.84% Essex 29.00% Essex 23.31% 
Fair Haven 4.95% Fair Haven 13.82% Fair Haven 4.33% Fair Haven 7.70% 
Fairfax 24.15% Fairfax 8.77% Fairfax 25.20% Fairfax 19.37% 
Fairfield 7.56% Fairfield 24.72% Fairfield 1.69% Fairfield 11.32% 
Fairlee 20.34% Fairlee 12.42% Fairlee 20.12% Fairlee 17.63% 
Fayston 22.62% Fayston 12.44% Fayston 24.34% Fayston 19.80% 
Ferrisburgh 1.74% Ferrisburgh 8.98% Ferrisburgh 3.96% Ferrisburgh 4.89% 
Fletcher 4.24% Fletcher 8.65% Fletcher 6.36% Fletcher 6.42% 
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Franklin 19.32% Franklin 33.64% Franklin 10.74% Franklin 21.23% 
Georgia 16.30% Georgia 1.70% Georgia 20.18% Georgia 12.73% 
Glover 0.94% Glover 12.41% Glover 3.76% Glover 5.70% 
Goshen 21.42% Goshen 16.96% Goshen 25.00% Goshen 21.13% 
Grafton 9.62% Grafton 3.85% Grafton 6.73% Grafton 6.73% 
Grand Isle  4.52% Grand Isle  20.98% Grand Isle  2.12% Grand Isle  9.21% 
Grandby 27.03% Grandby 35.14% Grandby 24.33% Grandby 28.83% 
Granville 38.34% Granville 30.07% Granville 36.84% Granville 35.08% 
Greensboro 26.39% Greensboro 16.67% Greensboro 26.95% Greensboro 23.34% 
Groton 20.83% Groton 31.24% Groton 19.37% Groton 23.81% 
Guildhall 24.07% Guildhall 29.63% Guildhall 23.14% Guildhall 25.61% 
Guilford 45.55% Guilford 39.42% Guilford 43.92% Guilford 42.96% 
Halifax 18.34% Halifax 13.06% Halifax 18.62% Halifax 16.67% 
Hancock 7.80% Hancock 4.25% Hancock 0.71% Hancock 4.25% 
Hardwick 4.04% Hardwick 7.49% Hardwick 5.34% Hardwick 5.62% 
Hartford 22.93% Hartford 15.72% Hartford 25.18% Hartford 21.28% 
Hartland 15.28% Hartland 9.63% Hartland 18.17% Hartland 14.36% 
Highgate 29.14% Highgate 44.19% Highgate 26.60% Highgate 33.31% 
Hinesburg 18.72% Hinesburg 12.57% Hinesburg 21.15% Hinesburg 17.48% 
Holland 32.58% Holland 39.39% Holland 34.47% Holland 35.48% 
Hubbardton 7.69% Hubbardton 12.18% Hubbardton 5.45% Hubbardton 8.44% 
Huntington 31.64% Huntington 23.78% Huntington 31.01% Huntington 28.81% 
Hyde Park 8.10% Hyde Park 6.10% Hyde Park 7.88% Hyde Park 7.36% 
Ira 23.56% Ira 32.46% Ira 21.46% Ira 25.83% 
Irasburg 26.98% Irasburg 37.04% Irasburg 26.55% Irasburg 30.19% 
Isle La Motte 7.34% Isle La Motte 24.12% Isle La Motte 9.09% Isle La Motte 13.52% 
Jamaica 27.06% Jamaica 18.29% Jamaica 28.60% Jamaica 24.65% 
Jay 8.13% Jay 17.22% Jay 10.52% Jay 11.96% 
Jericho 12.29% Jericho 3.53% Jericho 13.11% Jericho 9.64% 
Johnson 12.66% Johnson 3.20% Johnson 12.33% Johnson 9.40% 
Killington 3.65% Killington 11.82% Killington 1.74% Killington 5.74% 
Kirby 3.23% Kirby 10.12% Kirby 2.03% Kirby 5.13% 
Landgrove 19.23% Landgrove 7.69% Landgrove 22.12% Landgrove 16.35% 
Leicester 13.13% Leicester 19.95% Leicester 10.10% Leicester 14.39% 
Lemington 24.39% Lemington 34.15% Lemington 36.59% Lemington 31.71% 
Lincoln 28.46% Lincoln 22.84% Lincoln 30.15% Lincoln 27.15% 
Londonderry 7.06% Londonderry 3.77% Londonderry 10.22% Londonderry 7.02% 
Lowell 26.08% Lowell 39.50% Lowell 29.78% Lowell 31.79% 
Ludlow 2.07% Ludlow 6.65% Ludlow 0.44% Ludlow 3.05% 
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Lunenburg 27.16% Lunenburg 35.81% Lunenburg 26.18% Lunenburg 29.72% 
Lyndon 17.30% Lyndon 26.07% Lyndon 14.20% Lyndon 19.19% 
Maidstone 26.47% Maidstone 38.24% Maidstone 25.49% Maidstone 30.07% 
Manchester 9.24% Manchester 3.98% Manchester 15.66% Manchester 9.63% 
Marlboro 62.17% Marlboro 59.59% Marlboro 62.54% Marlboro 61.43% 
Marshfield 12.96% Marshfield 7.23% Marshfield 12.14% Marshfield 10.78% 
Mendon 13.83% Mendon 19.32% Mendon 10.81% Mendon 14.65% 
Middlebury 37.82% Middlebury 30.34% Middlebury 40.13% Middlebury 36.10% 










Milton 18.89% Milton 42.82% Milton 16.49% Milton 26.07% 
Monkton 10.48% Monkton 0.36% Monkton 11.57% Monkton 7.47% 
Montgomery 18.94% Montgomery 8.64% Montgomery 15.29% Montgomery 14.29% 
Montpelier 49.16% Montpelier 41.71% Montpelier 50.06% Montpelier 46.98% 
Moretown 20.69% Moretown 8.08% Moretown 21.01% Moretown 16.59% 
Morgan 33.90% Morgan 42.80% Morgan 35.95% Morgan 37.55% 
Morristown 12.62% Morristown 0.37% Morristown 13.10% Morristown 8.70% 
Mount Holly 26.06% Mount Holly 20.94% Mount Holly 26.81% Mount Holly 24.60% 
Mount Tabor 24.28% Mount Tabor 27.14% Mount Tabor 18.57% Mount Tabor 23.33% 
New Haven 2.76% New Haven 10.55% New Haven 4.40% New Haven 5.90% 
Newark 3.89% Newark 13.61% Newark 4.66% Newark 7.39% 
Newbury 3.94% Newbury 3.24% Newbury 4.64% Newbury 3.94% 
Newfane 41.11% Newfane 38.11% Newfane 41.00% Newfane 40.07% 










North Hero 3.29% North Hero 16.49% North Hero 1.56% North Hero 7.11% 
Northfield 4.19% Northfield 16.26% Northfield 0.06% Northfield 6.84% 
Norton 36.62% Norton 47.88% Norton 33.80% Norton 39.43% 
Norwich 53.15% Norwich 47.18% Norwich 55.10% Norwich 51.81% 
Orange 35.10% Orange 44.72% Orange 29.09% Orange 36.30% 
Orwell 15.87% Orwell 5.71% Orwell 19.84% Orwell 13.81% 
Panton 0.33% Panton 6.93% Panton 0.99% Panton 2.75% 
Pawlet 2.29% Pawlet 3.86% Pawlet 3.43% Pawlet 3.19% 
Peacham 18.47% Peacham 14.55% Peacham 22.63% Peacham 18.55% 
Peru 22.44% Peru 16.59% Peru 21.96% Peru 20.33% 
Pittsfield 4.58% Pittsfield 12.98% Pittsfield 3.43% Pittsfield 7.00% 
Pittsford 16.62% Pittsford 23.23% Pittsford 12.43% Pittsford 17.43% 
Plainfield 36.74% Plainfield 30.85% Plainfield 36.59% Plainfield 34.73% 
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Plymouth 8.27% Plymouth 5.26% Plymouth 5.35% Plymouth 6.29% 
Pomfret 22.39% Pomfret 5.69% Pomfret 24.29% Pomfret 17.46% 
Poultney 0.97% Poultney 7.20% Poultney 1.13% Poultney 3.10% 
Pownal 7.35% Pownal 3.30% Pownal 9.82% Pownal 6.82% 
Proctor 7.37% Proctor 17.05% Proctor 3.47% Proctor 9.30% 
Putney 62.69% Putney 56.94% Putney 60.80% Putney 60.14% 
Randolph 5.33% Randolph 5.14% Randolph 4.75% Randolph 5.07% 
Reading 6.73% Reading 0.84% Reading 6.73% Reading 4.77% 
Readsboro 2.59% Readsboro 3.23% Readsboro 4.85% Readsboro 3.56% 
Richford 10.44% Richford 24.30% Richford 7.63% Richford 14.12% 
Richmond 24.49% Richmond 14.63% Richmond 26.24% Richmond 21.79% 
Ripton 48.35% Ripton 44.08% Ripton 46.05% Ripton 46.16% 
Rochester 17.24% Rochester 12.97% Rochester 19.87% Rochester 16.69% 
Rockingham 30.36% Rockingham 24.22% Rockingham 28.99% Rockingham 27.86% 
Roxbury 11.99% Roxbury 0.00% Roxbury 11.99% Roxbury 7.99% 
Royalton 15.85% Royalton 5.17% Royalton 15.08% Royalton 12.03% 
Rupert 7.09% Rupert 3.40% Rupert 7.94% Rupert 6.14% 










Ryegate 14.15% Ryegate 25.11% Ryegate 12.10% Ryegate 17.12% 
Sailsbury 2.06% Sailsbury 14.63% Sailsbury 0.42% Sailsbury 5.70% 
Saint Albans 
City 
6.35% Saint Albans 
City 
9.10% Saint Albans 
City 





14.52% Saint Albans 
Town 
30.41% Saint Albans 
Town 
9.77% Saint Albans 
Town 
18.23% 










Sandgate 6.70% Sandgate 0.52% Sandgate 5.67% Sandgate 4.30% 
Searsburg 10.00% Searsburg 5.00% Searsburg 2.50% Searsburg 5.83% 
Shaftsbury 1.52% Shaftsbury 4.39% Shaftsbury 11.83% Shaftsbury 5.91% 
Sharon 18.42% Sharon 11.26% Sharon 18.57% Sharon 16.08% 
Sheffield 11.95% Sheffield 23.90% Sheffield 10.76% Sheffield 15.54% 
Shelburne 16.30% Shelburne 8.68% Shelburne 22.51% Shelburne 15.83% 
Sheldon 22.35% Sheldon 41.58% Sheldon 16.39% Sheldon 26.77% 
Shoreham 1.37% Shoreham 9.61% Shoreham 3.60% Shoreham 4.86% 










South Hero 7.38% South Hero 7.65% South Hero 10.80% South Hero 8.61% 
Springfield 2.90% Springfield 2.27% Springfield 3.06% Springfield 2.74% 
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Stamford 7.13% Stamford 13.20% Stamford 5.28% Stamford 8.54% 
Stannard 48.91% Stannard 43.48% Stannard 43.48% Stannard 45.29% 
Starksboro 17.34% Starksboro 10.58% Starksboro 16.06% Starksboro 14.66% 
Stockbridge 6.91% Stockbridge 1.73% Stockbridge 6.91% Stockbridge 5.18% 
Stowe 15.64% Stowe 6.41% Stowe 19.06% Stowe 13.70% 
Strafford 4.64% Strafford 40.09% Strafford 48.27% Strafford 31.00% 
Stratton 6.50% Stratton 13.00% Stratton 4.87% Stratton 8.12% 
Sudbury 0.00% Sudbury 5.61% Sudbury 0.00% Sudbury 1.87% 
Sunderland 11.28% Sunderland 7.66% Sunderland 15.54% Sunderland 11.49% 
Sutton 20.79% Sutton 30.48% Sutton 18.51% Sutton 23.26% 
Swanton 20.90% Swanton 37.81% Swanton 17.33% Swanton 25.35% 
Thetford 37.32% Thetford 30.80% Thetford 37.12% Thetford 35.08% 
Tinmouth 3.70% Tinmouth 0.00% Tinmouth 5.76% Tinmouth 3.15% 
Topsham 43.34% Topsham 25.50% Topsham 18.51% Topsham 29.12% 
Townshend 33.45% Townshend 27.19% Townshend 30.98% Townshend 30.54% 
Troy 13.16% Troy 20.30% Troy 13.53% Troy 15.66% 
Tunbridge 8.12% Tunbridge 1.88% Tunbridge 7.54% Tunbridge 5.85% 
Underhill 16.40% Underhill 5.78% Underhill 14.86% Underhill 12.35% 
Vergennes 15.94% Vergennes 6.18% Vergennes 16.28% Vergennes 12.80% 
Vernon 6.97% Vernon 16.61% Vernon 6.97% Vernon 10.18% 
Vershire 17.85% Vershire 11.01% Vershire 13.39% Vershire 14.08% 
Victory 55.10% Victory 59.18% Victory 51.02% Victory 55.10% 
Waitsfield 24.91% Waitsfield 15.74% Waitsfield 26.25% Waitsfield 22.30% 
Walden 1.11% Walden 4.45% Walden 3.11% Walden 2.89% 
Wallingford 6.95% Wallingford 11.29% Wallingford 4.56% Wallingford 7.60% 
Waltham 3.32% Waltham 8.49% Waltham 7.38% Waltham 6.40% 
Wardsboro 12.65% Wardsboro 6.48% Wardsboro 10.49% Wardsboro 9.87% 
Warren 31.34% Warren 23.56% Warren 30.77% Warren 28.56% 
Washington 12.09% Washington 23.54% Washington 11.01% Washington 15.55% 
Waterbury 20.79% Waterbury 9.19% Waterbury 21.71% Waterbury 17.23% 
Waterford 23.11% Waterford 29.98% Waterford 19.93% Waterford 24.34% 
Waterville 8.78% Waterville 22.08% Waterville 6.92% Waterville 12.59% 
Weathersfield 6.28% Weathersfield 11.84% Weathersfield 6.12% Weathersfield 8.08% 
Wells 18.56% Wells 26.54% Wells 19.56% Wells 21.55% 
West Fairlee 14.92% West Fairlee 5.76% West Fairlee 16.51% West Fairlee 12.40% 
West Haven 5.22% West Haven 23.48% West Haven 2.61% West Haven 10.44% 












Westfield 5.77% Westfield 11.16% Westfield 5.00% Westfield 7.31% 
Westford 6.89% Westford 8.06% Westford 8.70% Westford 7.88% 
Westminster 47.34% Westminster 42.39% Westminster 44.38% Westminster 44.70% 
Westmore 7.26% Westmore 14.52% Westmore 5.58% Westmore 9.12% 
Weston 13.22% Weston 6.33% Weston 15.97% Weston 11.84% 
Weybridge 32.36% Weybridge 23.64% Weybridge 36.21% Weybridge 30.74% 
Wheelock 0.90% Wheelock 8.11% Wheelock 2.10% Wheelock 3.70% 
Whiting 7.27% Whiting 20.67% Whiting 6.71% Whiting 11.55% 
Whitingham 3.15% Whitingham 0.20% Whitingham 5.31% Whitingham 2.89% 
Williamstown 26.24% Williamstown 36.95% Williamstown 22.28% Williamstown 28.49% 
Williston 5.69% Williston 4.50% Williston 9.08% Williston 6.42% 
Wilmington 17.63% Wilmington 11.35% Wilmington 18.00% Wilmington 15.66% 
Windhall 14.28% Windhall 8.57% Windhall 13.84% Windhall 12.23% 
Windham 15.16% Windham 6.16% Windham 12.79% Windham 11.37% 
Windsor 16.20% Windsor 10.91% Windsor 19.57% Windsor 15.56% 
Winooski 41.53% Winooski 34.31% Winooski 41.50% Winooski 39.11% 
Wolcott 16.37% Wolcott 2.05% Wolcott 14.18% Wolcott 10.87% 
Woodbury 6.15% Woodbury 2.34% Woodbury 7.00% Woodbury 5.16% 
Woodford 13.19% Woodford 18.75% Woodford 25.00% Woodford 18.98% 
Woodstock 24.84% Woodstock 13.46% Woodstock 26.20% Woodstock 21.50% 
Worcester 30.77% Worcester 22.31% Worcester 27.69% Worcester 26.92% 
 
Finally, the Vermont precincts were ranked by the average absolute difference between Scott and 




Appendix B – Table 3 shows the ranked precincts by average absolute difference. 
Appendix B – Table 3 




























































North Hero 7.11% 
Athens 7.23% 
Westfield 7.31% 








































































































East Montpelier 18.92% 
Woodford 18.98% 















South Burlington 21.44% 
Woodstock 21.50% 
Wells 21.55% 















Mount Holly 24.60% 
Jamaica 24.65% 



























































APPENDIX C: Progressive Activists and In-Depth Interview 
Questions 
 Below is the list of Progressive Activists interviewed by this researcher in addition to 
their association(s) with the Vermont Progressive Party. 
1. Martha Abbott, Progressive State Assistant Treasurer and Progressive State Committee 
Member, Former Progressive gubernatorial candidate and campaign employee 
2. Terry Bouricius, Former Progressive Vermont State Representative, Former Citizen’s 
Party City Councilor and Co-Founder of the Progressive Party 
3. Representative Selene Colburn, Progressive/Democrat Vermont State Representative 
4. Representative Emma Mulvaney Stanak, Progressive/Democrat Vermont State 
Representative, Former Progressive Burlington City Councilor, and Former Chair of the 
Vermont Progressive Party.  
5. City Councilor Jack Hanson, Progressive Burlington City Councilor 
6. Jeremy Hansen, Former Progressive Party Candidate and Academic at Norwich 
University who has conducted research on the Progressive Party 
7. Steve Hitgen, Former Progressive State Representative and Former Progressive 
Candidate for Lieutenant Governor  
8. Shannon Jackson, Former Progressive Mayoral Campaign Manager, Former Vermont 
State Director for Senator Bernie Sanders, and former Senate Campaign Manager for 
Senator Bernie Sanders 
9. Emilie Krasnow, Former Progressive Chair for Chittenden County, Former employee for 
the Progressive caucus, Progressive Elected Officials, and Progressive Candidates  
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10. Erhard Mahnke, Progressive State Committee Member and Former Progressive State 
Senate Candidate 
11. Carter Neubieser, Co-Campaign Manager for Progressive Party Mayoral Campaign, 
Former Progressive Burlington City Council Candidate 
12. Senator Chris Pearson, Progressive/Democrat State Senator, Former Progressive Party 
Employee, and Former Progressive Campaign Manager 
13. Senator Anthony Pollina, Progressive/Democrat Vermont State Senator and Former 
Progressive Candidate for Governor 
14. Megan Polyte, Former Progressive Party Gubernatorial Campaign Manager, Former 
State Vice Chair for the Progressive Party 
15. Barbara Prine, Progressive State Committee Member and Progressive Party Activist 
16. Joshua Wronski, Executive Director of The Progressive Party 
17. Representative Tanya Vyhovski, Progressive/Democrat Vermont State Representative, 
and Progressive State Committee Member 
18. Former Lieutenant Governor David Zuckerman, Progressive/Democrat Vermont 
Lieutenant Governor, Former Progressive/Democrat State Senator and Former 
Progressive Member of the Vermont House of Representatives 
 
Each of the interviewees was asked the following series of questions: 
1. Why are you a Progressive party activist? What makes you so supportive of the 
Progressive Party? What makes the Progressive Party special? What are some things 
you feel best about how the Progressive Party has contributed to life in Vermont? 
2. Tell me some of the reasons you first got involved with the Vermont Progressive Party?  
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3. What makes it different from the Vermont Democratic Party?  
4. One of the reasons I am doing this research is that the Vermont Progressive Party is the 
most successful third party in the country. Why do you think that is true? Why do you 
think this party is more successful than other third parties around the country? 
5. What do you think the future of the Progressive Party looks like? What are some key 
decisions that the Party will make in the next number of years? 
6. In your opinion, are Fusion candidates good for the Progressive Party or do they dilute 
the Progressive Party? Do you think the Progressive Party can truly be seen as distinct 
outside of Burlington in light of fusion candidates? 
7. Is there anything you would like to share about yourself and the Progressive Party? What 
did I miss with my questions? What would you like to make sure I understand and know 
before we end the interview? 
Follow up questions were asked if interviewees were unclear or if the researcher wanted more 





APPENDIX D: Public Opinion Survey Findings on Progressives 
To complement the in-depth interviews, survey data from two Vermont sources was 
collected and analyzed for similarities with the qualitative data described in the chapter above. 
Through connections with the Vermont Democratic Party and with the 2020 Zuckerman 
for VT campaign, this researcher was able to acquire two public opinion polls that give some 
insight into the Vermont Progressive Party’s members, voters, and the Vermont public’s opinion 
of the party relative to the Democratic and Republican Parties.  
The first poll was funded by the Vermont Democratic Party and fielded in May of 
2019. The survey was conducted online with 795 Vermont Voters. The second poll was 
conducted online by the Zuckerman for VT campaign of 1009 likely Vermont voters in 
October of 2020.  Below is an analysis of the two surveys’ findings of Vermont voters’ feelings 
toward the Progressive Party and their party identification. Relevant demographic trends are 
identified. 
 
Issue Priorities Matches Party Identification  
Public opinion polling done on voters in Vermont reinforces the activists’ stated 
attraction to the Progressive Party. In the public opinion poll conducted by the Zuckerman 
campaign, the poll asked voters to select issues that were the most important issues for them. The 
results demonstrated Progressive voters feel attracted to the same issues that had been mentioned 
by the Progressive Party activists.  
Specifically, similar to the Progressive activists’ support for climate activism, 
Progressives across Vermont are much more likely than those who identify with other parties to 
say that climate change is one of their top issues. Three quarters of Progressives say climate 
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change is their top issue, compared to 53% of Democrats, 24% of Independents, and 3% of 
Republicans.  
Progressives across Vermont are also much more likely to think that issues around social 
justice and healthcare are important: Progressives are more likely to say healthcare is one of their 
top issues (60%) than Democrats (53%). Progressives are also slightly more likely to say that 
reproductive rights are one of their top issues (28%) than Democrats (23%).  
Unfortunately, the Zuckerman for Vermont campaign did not ask any specific questions 
that were able to directly test the economic arguments that the Progressive activists mentioned – 
like corporate contributions or the wealth gap. The economic issues asked by the survey 
included: taxes, unemployment/jobs, and the stock market. However, we can look at the 
importance of taxation as tangentially related to comfort with the wealth gap and see that the 
results support the Progressive argument against an economic system that favors the wealthy: 
Progressives were much less likely to say that taxes (6%) were an important issue than 
Democrats (15%), Independents (29%), and Republicans (49%).  
This researcher hypothesizes that if there had been options on the survey that specifically 
mentioned corporate contributions or corporate influence on elections, the wealth gap, labor 
rights, or the political status quo that benefits the wealthy over the working class, we would have 





Interestingly, Progressives are half as likely (21%) to say that COVID-19 is one of their 
top issues than Democrats (42%). 
Table 29: Issue importance by Party Identification 
Q. Which of the following are the most important issues for you? Choose up to three. 
Issue All Progressives Democrats Republicans Independents 
Healthcare 43 60 53 18 48 
Climate Change/ 
Environment 37 75 53 3 24 
Taxes 26 6 15 49 29 
Coronavirus/COVID-
19 26 21 42 6 24 
Gun Rights 19 3 0 49 27 
Reproductive Rights 16 28 23 2 13 
Unemployment/Jobs 13 10 10 18 13 
Corrupt Republicans 13 18 17 2 17 
Corrupt Democrats 13 1 0 34 16 
Public Education 11 14 15 6 8 
Mental Health and 
Addiction 10 8 12 7 12 
Gun Control 8 7 13 5 3 
Police Brutality 8 13 11 1 9 
Election Fraud 7 3 3 17 2 
Public Safety 7 5 5 10 8 
Broadband 
Expansion 6 10 7 4 7 
Election Security 5 5 5 7 2 
Fuel/Oil Prices 5 1 1 9 9 
Protecting the 
Unborn 4 0 0 13 3 
Corrupt Progressives 3 0 0 10 3 
Terrorism 3 0 2 6 4 
Vermont State 
Colleges 3 2 4 2 3 
Reopening Schools 3 0 1 6 4 
Stock Market 3 1 1 7 0 




1 2 2 0 2 




Who Likes Progressives and who Identifies as a Progressive? 
While the Progressive Party is the most successful third party in the country, the Vermont 
Democratic Party is still by far the most popular party in Vermont. In the poll conducted by the 
Vermont Democratic Party, when asked “how favorable are your feelings about each of the 
following public figures and organizations?” Vermont voters were twice as likely or more to say 
they were very favorable to the Democratic Party (16%) than to the Progressive Party (8%) or 
the Republican Party (5%). In aggregate, over half (51%) of Vermont voters said they were 
favorable to the Democratic Party, in contrast to 26% who were favorable to the Progressive 
Party and 205 who were favorable to the Republican Party.  
Table 30: Favorability Towards The Three Parties 
Q: How favorable are your feelings about each of the following public figures and 
organizations? 




Very favorable 8% 16% 5% 
Somewhat favorable 18% 35% 16% 
Neutral 34% 15% 29% 
Somewhat unfavorable 8% 6% 25% 
Very unfavorable 25% 28% 23% 
Never heard of them 8% 1% 2% 
    
Total favorable 26% 51% 20% 
Total unfavorable 32% 34% 49% 
Net favorable -6 17 -28 
 
When looking deeper into the demographics, trends begin to emerge in terms of 
Progressive Party support. Women (31%) are more favorable to the Progressive Party than men 
(21%). In regards to age, those between 18-34 are most likely to be favorable to the Progressive 
Party (30%) closely followed by those 65 and older (29%), compared with voters of other ages: 
35-29 (25%), 50-64 (22%). When looking at education, Vermont voters with a bachelor’s degree 
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(34%) are more likely than those with some college or less (19%) to be favorable to the 
Progressive Party.  
There is also overlap between the Democratic and Progressive Parties. Vermonters who 
identify as Democrats are more likely to be favorable to the Progressive Party (38%) than 
Republicans (3%), and Independents (24%).  
Favorability towards the Progressive Party is relatively uniform across the state. 
Chittenden county residents (29%) and Southeastern Vermonters (29%) are most likely to be 
favorable, closely followed by Northeast Vermont (26%), Southwest Vermont (25%) and then 
the Burlington Metropolitan area specifically (24%). (Note: the Burlington Metropolitan areas is 
within Chittenden County.) 
Vermont voters would also prefer Democratic control of the legislature. When asked, “If 
the election was held today for the Vermont Legislature, which would you prefer as the majority 
party?” over half (51%) of Vermont voters said the Democratic Party, while less than a third 
(32%) said the Republican Party, and fewer than one in five (18%) said the Progressive Party. 








Figure 26: Preferred Majority Party in Vermont
Q: If the election was held today for the Vermont Legislature, which 
would you prefer as the majority party? 
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Independents (27%), those aged 18-34 (25%), and voters in Southeast Vermont (24%) are 
the groups most likely to say they would prefer the Progressive Party as the majority party. 
 
Party Identification 
In Vermont, parties do not require party registration to vote in the primary. In addition, 
many Progressives strategically use the Democratic primary to run as “fusion candidates” and 
coordinate write-ins for the Progressive primary (because election law requires that candidates 
can have their name only one ballot198) thereby distorting Vermont Secretary of State data on 
party identification. For instance, in the 2020 election, Lieutenant Governor David Zuckerman’s 
campaign recruited around 300 Progressive voters for a write-in campaign for the Progressive 
nomination while he also competed in the Democratic primary election.199  
As a result of this political system and situation, public opinion polls give us one of the 
best insights into party identification in Vermont.  
According to the Vermont Democratic Party poll, four-in-ten Vermont voters identify as 
a member of the Democratic Party, while 36% identify as an independent, 22% identify as a 
member of the Republican Party, and only 3% identify as a member of the Progressive Party. 
                                                        
198 Vermont General Assembly, “Vermont Statutes Online, Title 17: Elections, 
Chapter 049: Nominations, Subchapter 001: Primary Elections, (17 V.S.A. § 2353),” accessed December 17, 2020, 
https://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/17/049/02353.  






In contrast, however, when asked “do you consider yourself closer to the Democrats, the 
Republicans, the Progressive Party, or none of the above” almost one in five (17%) Vermont 
voters said the Progressive Party, a third (33%) said the Democrats, and 21% said the 
Republicans. Almost three in ten Vermont voters (29%) said none of the above. Figure 28 
compares those two results. 
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Once again, women (23%) are more likely than men (12%) to consider themselves closer 
to the Progressive Party.  Interestingly, being “closer to” the Progressive party does not track in 
                                                        
200 “None of the above” was only offered as an option for the ideology question, not party identification. While 
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the same way that it did in previous questions. Instead, being “closer to” the Progressive Party is 
most likely at the poles of the age spectrum: voters 35-49 are most likely to consider themselves 
closer to the Progressive Party (21%), closely followed by voters 65 and older (19%), then 18-34 
(18%), in contrast to voters between 50-64 (11%).  
The Vermont Democratic Party poll demonstrates that there is significant and substantial 
support for the Progressive Party in Vermont in terms of favorability and ideological alignment. 
However, when it comes to identifying with only one party label, few Vermonters identify with 
the Progressive Party. That said, future research could ask the party identification as a select all 
that apply questions or potentially a ranked choice question to get a better sense of the 
complicated party identification in Vermont. After all, how would prominent politicians like 
Progressive/Democrat Lieutenant Governor David Zuckerman be able to answer that question 
while also ensuring that the complexity of his party identification was captured in the data?  
When asked “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a…?”, party identification 
in Vermont tracks relatively well between the 2020 Zuckerman campaign poll and the 2019 
Democratic Party poll for the two major parties. This is especially true when initial party 
identification is analyzed prior to combining straight party identification with leaners. 
However, there is a substantial dip in Vermont voters identifying with the Progressive 
Party (17% to 10%) and an increase in voters identifying as “None of the Above” and 




In the Zuckerman campaign poll, when combining initial party identification with 
leaners, over four-in-ten (43%) of likely voters think of themselves as either Democrat or lean 
Democrat, 31% think of themselves as Republican, 13% think of themselves as Progressive or 
lean Progressive, and 13% are pure independents.  
Looking specifically at demographics, women (15%), once again, are more likely to 
be/lean Progressive than men (12%).  Younger voters between 18-34 (19%) are most likely to 
be/lean Progressive, followed by voters over 65 (14%), voters 35-49 (13%), and then voters 50-
64 (10%). Voters with a bachelor’s degree or higher (18%) are twice as likely to be/lean 
Progressive than those with some college or less (9%). Finally, combining these demographics 
gives an even starker picture: women with a bachelor’s degree or higher (20%) are the most 
likely to be/lean Progressive, followed by men with a Bachelor’s degree or higher (15%), then 
women with some college or less (10%), and men with some college or less (9%). 
                                                        
201 “None of the above” was only offered as an option for the ideology question in the VDP poll, 
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Figure 29: Party Identification Comparison between VDP and 
Zuckerman for VT Surveys
VDP Poll: "Closer to..." Zuckerman poll: "think of yourself as..."
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APPENDIX E: Town Clerks Survey Topline 
Topline 
Q1. What town are you a clerk for? 
All 
N=127 
Alburgh, Andover, Barnard, Barre City, Barre Town, Barton, Belvidere, Bennington, 
Berkshire, Bethel, Bolton, Braintree, Brandon, Bridgewater, Bristol, Brookline, Cabot, Calais, 
Cambridge, Canaan, Castleton, Chelsea, Corinth, Cornwall, Coventry, Danby, Dover, 
Dummerston, East Dorset, East Montpelier, Enosburg, Essex, Fair Haven, Fairfax, Fairfield, 
Fayston, Ferrisburgh, Georgia, Goshen, Grafton, Granby, Grand Isle, Granville, Guildhall, 
Guilford, Hardwick, Hartford, Hartland, Highgate, Hinesburg, Holland, Hubbardton, 
Huntington, Ira, Isle La Motte, Jay, Jericho, Lowell, Lyndon, Maidstone, Manchester, 
Marlboro, Marshfield, Milton, Monkton, Montgomery, Mount Holly, Mount Tabor, New 
Haven, Newfane, Northfield, Norton, Pawlet, Peacham, Peru, Pomfret, Proctor, Putney, 
Reading, Richford, Richmond, Ripton, Rutland City, Rutland Town, S Burlington, Salisbury, 
Searsburg, Sharon, Shoreham, Shrewsbury, South Hero, St Johnsbury, St. Albans Town, 
Stamford, Starksboro, Stowe, Strafford, Sudbury, Topsham, Underhill, Vergennes, Vernon, 
Waitsfield, Walden, Wardsboro, Warren, Washington, Waterbury, Waterford, Waterville, 
Weathersfield, Wells, West Fairlee, Westfield, Westford, Westminster, Weybridge, 
Williamstown, Williston, Wilmington, Windham, Windsor, Winooski, Woodbury, Woodford, 
Woodstock 
 
Open Town Meeting Only 
N=25 
Andover, Bethel, Braintree, Brookline, Cambridge, Chelsea, Cornwall, Fairfield, Fayston, 
Grafton, Granville, Hubbardton, Norton, Peacham, Peru, Pomfret, Proctor, Starksboro, 
Strafford, Sudbury, Topsham, Wardsboro, Waterville, Westminster, Windham 
 
Australian Ballot Only 
N=25 
Barre City, Barre Town, Bennington, Berkshire, Castleton, Fair Haven, Grand Isle, Guilford, 
Hartford, Milton, New Haven, Northfield, Pawlet, Rutland City, Rutland Town, S. Burlington, 








Alburgh, Barnard, Barton, Belvidere, Bolton, Brandon, Bridgewater, Bristol, Cabot, Calais, 
Canaan, Corinth, Coventry, Danby, Dover, Dummerston, East Dorset, East Montpelier, 
Enosburg, Essex, Fairfax, Ferrisburgh, Georgia, Goshen, Granby, Guildhall, Hardwick, 
Hartland, Highgate, Hinesburg, Holland, Huntington, Ira, Isle La Motte, Jay, Jericho, Lowell. 
Lyndon, Maidstone, Manchester, Marlboro, Marshfield, Monkton, Montgomery, Mount Holly, 
Mount Tabor, Newfane, Putney, Reading, Richford, Richmond, Ripton, Searsburg, Sharon, 
Shoreham, Stamford, Stowe, Underhill, Vergennes, Vernon, Waitsfield, Walden, Warren, 
Washington, Waterbury, Waterford, Weathersfield, West Fairlee, Westfield, Westford, 
Williamstown, Williston, Wilmington, Woodbury, Woodford, Woodstock 
 
Clerks with Less Time in Office (less than six years) 
N=40 
Andover, Belvidere, Bennington, Bethel, Cabot, Calais, Cambridge, Castleton, Coventry, 
Dummerston, East Montpelier, Essex, Ferrisburgh, Georgia, Guildhall, Hartford, Isle La 
Motte, Jay, Lowell, Maidstone, Manchester, Milton, Montgomery, Newfane, Northfield, 
Peacham, Peru, Putney, Ripton, Rutland Town, Salisbury, South Hero, Stowe, Vernon, 
Waterford, West Fairlee, Windham, Windsor, Woodford, Woodstock 
 
 
Clerks with More Time in Office (six or more years) 
N=87 
Alburgh, Barnard, Barre City, Barre Town, Barton, Berkshire, Bolton, Braintree, Brandon, 
Bridgewater, Bristol, Brookline, Canaan, Chelsea, Corinth, Cornwall, Danby, Dover, East 
Dorset, Enosburg, Fair Haven, Fairfax, Fairfield, Fayston, Goshen, Grafton, Granby, Grand 
Isle, Granville, Guilford, Hardwick, Hartland, Highgate, Hinesburg, Holland, Hubbardton, 
Huntington, Ira, Jericho, Lyndon, Marlboro, Marshfield, Monkton, Mount Holly, Mount 
Tabor, New Haven, Norton, Pawlet, Pomfret, Proctor, Reading, Richford, Richmond, Rutland 
City, South Burlington, Searsburg, Sharon, Shoreham, Shrewsbury, St. Johnsbury, St. Albans 
Town, Stamford, Starksboro, Strafford, Sudbury, Tinmouth, Topsham, Underhill, Vergennes, 
Waitsfield, Walden, Wardsboro, Warren, Washington, Waterbury, Waterville, Weathersfield, 






Q2. How many years have you personally been involved as a voter in town meeting day in 
Vermont? 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Less than 
5 years 2% 0% 0% 4% 2% 0% 
5 to 10 
years 13% 12% 20% 12% 25% 8% 
11 to 15 
years 6% 4% 4% 8% 10% 5% 
16 to 20 
years 9% 24% 4% 5% 5% 10% 
More than 
20 years 69% 60% 72% 71% 53% 77% 
 
Q3. And for how many years total have you served as a town clerk?  









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Average 11.4 11.3 9.1 12.2 3.2 15.4 
Median 8.5 9.0 8.0 8.0 3.0 12.0 
Mode 3 6 12 3 3 12 
 
 















 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Open town 
meeting only 20% 100% 0% 0% 23% 18% 
Hybrid system 




51% 0% 0% 84% 63% 60% 
Only Australian 
ballot 20% 0% 100% 0% 15% 22% 
Representational 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Other 9% 0% 0% 16% 0% 0% 
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*Note: the 9% of all respondents who selected other described hybrid systems with an open town 
meeting and an Australian ballot. Their selection of “other” was driven by their descriptions of 
how the Australian ballot and open town meeting were split. For instance: “Floor vote for 
appropriations and Australian Ballot for Elections”  
 
Q5. In the last 3-5 years, which of the following best describes attending an open town meeting 
in your town? 














 N=90 N=25  N=65 N=44 N=64 
Very 
orderly 84% 76% - 88% 96% 80% 
Somewhat 
orderly 16% 24% - 13% 4% 20% 
Somewhat 
disorderly 0% 0% - 0% 0% 0% 
Very 
disorderly 0% 0% - 0% 0% 0% 





Q6. When issues are brought up in open town meetings how frequently or infrequently are they 
adjusted or amended by the town meeting participants? 














 N=90 N=25  N=65 N=44 N=64 
Total 
Frequently 35% 28%  36% 43% 30% 
Very 
frequently 5% 8% - 3% 8% 3% 
Somewhat 
frequently 30% 20% - 33% 35% 27% 
Somewhat 
infrequently 22% 40% - 14% 19% 22% 
Very 
infrequently 44% 32% - 48% 35% 48% 
Total 
Infrequently 66% 72%  62% 54% 70% 





Q7. What issues, if any, were being raised in open town meetings 5-10 years ago that have now 
become a bigger part of the issue debates in Vermont or national politics?  
























22% 28% - 19% 31% 17% 
None 22% 24% - 20% 19% 23% 
Taxation 17% 8% - 20% 15% 17% 




8% 8% - 8% 8% 8% 
Citizens 
United 6% 4% - 6% 4% 6% 
Cost of living 
(housing and 
wages) 





5% 4% - 5% 4% 5% 
Nuclear 
power 3% 0% - 5% 4% 3% 






Q8. What issues, if any, that have been brought up in recent open town meetings that you believe 
are likely to be raised up in Vermont- or national-level politics?  
*Only asked of towns with open town meeting only or hybrid system 









 N=90 N=25  N=65 N=44 N=64 
Climate 
change 28% 36% - 25% 35% 27% 
None 22% 24% - 22% 23% 22% 
Education 21% 28% - 19% 15% 23% 
Taxes 9% 4% - 11% 4% 11% 




7% 4% - 8% 8% 6% 
Aging 
Population 4% 0% - 6% 12% 2% 
Cannabis 
marketplace 3% 4% - 3% 0% 5% 
Cost of living 3% 4% - 3% 8% 2% 
Budget 3% 0% - 5% 4% 3% 
Other 12% 4% - 16% 8% 14% 
 
Q9. What would you say is the maximum number of registered voters your town could have 
before you think it would be necessary to move to solely an Australian ballot? 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Average 3814 1376 - 4813 5042 3274 
Median 2000 1000 - 2000 2000 1750 
Mode 1000 1000 - 10000 1000 1000 
 




Q10. Thinking about the town you serve, compared to 3-5 years ago, would you say that the 
number of people participating in town meeting day (either physically attending town meetings 














 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Increasing 7% 0% 12% 8% 5% 8% 
Staying about 
the same 67% 84% 60% 26% 78% 63% 
Decreasing 25% 16% 28% 64% 18% 28% 
Not able to 
judge 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 
 
Q11. Thinking about the last 3-5 years, what would you say is the average, the highest and the 
lowest numbers of people who have participated in town meeting day in your town? 
Continued on next page 
Average 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Average 353 112 982 222 341 356 
Median 140 95 622 125 150 125 
Mode 100 75 3500 100 150 100 
 
Highest 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Average 571 135 1522 396 541 581 
Median 180 120 807 175 250 175 















 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Average 240 89 649 152 270 226 
Median 100 73 420 87 120 100 
Mode 150 50 2000 150 250 50 
 
Q12. What specific issue or topic do you think has prompted the highest turnout on town 
meeting day?  

















20% 0% 48% 17% 20% 20% 
Local elections  17% 24% 24% 12% 30% 10% 
Budget and 
bond issues 17% 8% 12% 22% 18% 17% 
"Big ticket" 
purchases 13% 12% 8% 14% 5% 16% 
Infrastructure 6% 8% 0% 8% 3% 8% 
Taxes 6% 4% 4% 8% 8% 6% 
None 3% 8% 0% 3% 3% 3% 
ATVs & 
snowmobiles 
on town roads 
2% 8% 0% 1% 0% 3% 





Q13. In your opinion, is there a point at which there can be too few people for an open town 
meeting to be an effective form of government? 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Yes 43% 52% 40% 41% 30% 49% 
No 30% 24% 20% 36% 33% 29% 
Don’t 
know 27% 24% 40% 24% 
38% 22% 
 
Q14. What would you say is the minimum percentage of registered voters who can attend an 
open town meeting and have it still be an effective form of government? 









 N=55 N=10 N=13 N=32 N=12 N=43 
Average 7% 8% 6% 7% 6% 7% 
Median 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Mode 5% 5% 10% 5% 3% 5% 
 
Q15. And in your opinion, is there a point at which there can be too many people for an open 
town meeting to be an effective form of government? 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Yes 13% 16% 8% 14% 15% 13% 
No 63% 64% 64% 63% 60% 66% 
Don’t 






Q16. Thinking broadly, what would you say is the largest number of people who could attend an 
open town meeting and still have it be an effective form of government? 









 N=17 N=2 N=4 N=11 N=6 N=11 
Average 437 283 203 530 570 371 
Median 300 300 203 500 500 300 
Mode 500 300 N/A 500 1000 300 
 
Q17. What would you say are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the open town meetings 
as a form of government?  
Continued on next page 
Strengths 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
A "voice" and a 
chance to state 
opinion 
39% 44% 20% 43% 43% 37% 
Discussion and 








17% 16% 12% 20% 23% 15% 
Creates informed 
voters 17% 12% 12% 20% 18% 16% 
Ability to amend 17% 4% 12% 22% 18% 16% 
Consensus 
building 3% 0% 8% 3% 3% 5% 

















 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Low participation 
and low interest 25% 36% 24% 21% 18% 29% 
A few people 
have an outsized 
say 
13% 20% 4% 14% 13% 14% 
Work schedules 
and inability to 
attend the 
meeting 
13% 16% 8% 13% 15% 11% 
Peer pressure  8% 20% 0% 7% 13% 6% 




6% 0% 4% 8% 3% 7% 
Disruption and 
disagreement 4% 4% 0% 5% 0% 6% 
Lack of efficiency 4% 4% 4% 4% 8% 2% 
None 2% 0% 4% 3% 3% 2% 





Q18. What would you say are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of an Australian Ballot as a 
form of government?  
Strengths 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Greater ability to 
participate  39% 44% 44% 36% 35% 40% 





21% 12% 24% 24% 23% 22% 
Logistically 
easier to manage 6% 8% 4% 7% 10% 5% 














 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Lack of debate 
and discussion, 29% 32% 40% 24% 35% 25% 
Less informed 
voters 17% 24% 0% 21% 10% 22% 
No ability to 
amend/ voter 
input 




5% 8% 12% 1% 5% 5% 
Less community 
feel 4% 8% 0% 4% 3% 5% 
None 4% 0% 12% 3% 0% 6% 
Logistical 
challenges  3% 0% 0% 5% 5% 2% 





Q19. Which best describes how you feel about the decision-making process in open town 
meetings on town meeting day? 




















5% 4% 4% 5% 3% 6% 
Don’t know 18% 8% 44% 13% 25% 15% 
Both 4% 0% 4% 5% 3% 5% 





Q20. In general, how much do you think open town meetings improve or damage community 
relationships, if at all? 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 























1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 
Total Damages 5% 0% 4% 6% 3% 6% 
Don’t know 10% 4% 36% 3% 8% 10% 
 
Q21. In your opinion, on a scale of 0-10 where 10 is extremely important and 0 is not important 
at all how would you rate the importance of the following: 
Continued on next page 
a. Achieving the highest participation rates as possible on town meeting day 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Average 8.5 8.8 8.9 8.3 8.6 8.5 
Median 9 10 10 8 8 9 





b. Facilitating negotiation and community engagement on town meeting day 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Average 8.4 9.0 7.8 8.4 8.8 8.3 
Median 9 10 9 9 9.5 9 
Mode 10 10 10 10 10 10 
 
Q22. How good or bad of a job would you say the town meeting in the town you represent does 
when addressing the following issues. 
Needing to raise taxes 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Good Job 93% 96% 96% 91% 88% 95% 
Very good 
job 50% 44% 44% 54% 48% 52% 
Somewhat of 
a good job 43% 52% 52% 37% 40% 44% 
Somewhat of 
a bad job 1% 0% 0% 1% 3% 0% 
Very bad job 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Bad Job 1% 0% 0% 1% 3% 0% 
Don’t know 2% 4% 0% 3% 0% 3% 
Not 















 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Good Job 55% 44% 64% 56% 48% 60% 
Very good 
job 21% 20% 20% 22% 18% 24% 
Somewhat of 
a good job 34% 24% 44% 34% 30% 36% 
Somewhat of 
a bad job 10% 0% 16% 12% 18% 7% 
Very bad job 8% 20% 4% 5% 3% 10% 
Bad Job 18% 20% 20% 17% 20% 17% 
Don’t know 2% 0% 0% 3% 3% 1% 
Not 
applicable 25% 36% 16% 24% 30% 22% 
 
Electing municipal officers 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Good Job 90% 96% 84% 91% 88% 92% 
Very good job 60% 52% 52% 66% 50% 64% 
Somewhat of 
a good job 30% 44% 32% 25% 38% 28% 
Somewhat of 
a bad job 2% 0% 4% 1% 0% 2% 
Very bad job 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Bad Job 2% 0% 4% 1% 0% 2% 
Don’t know 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 
Not 





Voting on the town budget 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Good Job 97% 100% 96% 96% 95% 98% 
Very good 
job 67% 64% 60% 70% 68% 67% 
Somewhat of 
a good job 30% 36% 36% 26% 28% 31% 
Somewhat of 
a bad job 1% 0% 0% 1% 3% 0% 
Very bad job 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Bad Job 1% 0% 0% 1% 3% 0% 
Don’t know 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 
Not 
applicable 2% 0% 4% 1% 3% 1% 
 
Voting on the school budget 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Good Job 61% 36% 76% 65% 58% 63% 
Very good 
job 30% 24% 44% 28% 28% 32% 
Somewhat of 
a good job 31% 12% 32% 37% 10% 31% 
Somewhat of 
a bad job 10% 8% 4% 12% 10% 9% 
Very bad job 4% 12% 4% 1% 5% 3% 
Bad Job 14% 20% 8% 13% 15% 13% 
Don’t know 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 
Not 





Petitions brought by town members 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Good Job 85% 80% 84% 88% 85% 86% 
Very good job 45% 40% 44% 47% 40% 48% 
Somewhat of 
a good job 40% 40% 40% 41% 45% 38% 
Somewhat of 
a bad job 2% 4% 0% 3% 0% 3% 
Very bad job 1% 0% 4% 0% 0% 1% 
Bad Job 3% 4% 4% 3% 0% 5% 
Don’t know 4% 8% 0% 4% 3% 5% 
Not 
applicable 7% 8% 12% 5% 13% 5% 
 
Bond Issues 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Good Job 55% 24% 72% 60% 60% 95% 
Very good 
job 31% 8% 40% 36% 33% 30% 
Somewhat of 
a good job 24% 16% 32% 24% 28% 22% 
Somewhat of 
a bad job 2% 0% 4% 1% 0% 2% 
Very bad job 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Bad Job 2% 0% 4% 1% 0% 2% 
Don’t know 8% 16% 0% 8% 8% 8% 
Not 















 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Good Job 86% 84% 92% 85% 88% 95% 
Very good job 41% 36% 44% 42% 45% 39% 
Somewhat of 
a good job 45% 48% 48% 43% 43% 47% 
Somewhat of 
a bad job 2% 4% 0% 3% 8% 0% 
Very bad job 2% 0% 4% 3% 3% 2% 
Bad Job 4% 4% 4% 6% 10% 2% 
Don’t know 2% 4% 0% 1% 0% 2% 
Not 
applicable 7% 8% 4% 8% 3% 9% 
 
Government Staffing Levels 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Good Job 69% 64% 68% 71% 78% 95% 
Very good job 37% 40% 32% 38% 40% 36% 
Somewhat of 
a good job 32% 24% 36% 33% 38% 30% 
Somewhat of 
a bad job 4% 0% 8% 4% 5% 3% 
Very bad job 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 
Bad Job 5% 0% 8% 5% 5% 5% 
Don’t know 6% 16% 4% 3% 3% 7% 
Not 










of a good 
job 
Somewhat 









Voting on the town budget 67% 30% 1% 0% 1% 2% 
Electing municipal officers 60% 30% 2% 0% 1% 7% 
Needing to raise taxes 50% 43% 1% 0% 2% 4% 
Petitions brought by town 
members 45% 40% 2% 1% 4% 7% 
Spending levels 41% 45% 2% 2% 2% 7% 
Government staffing levels 37% 32% 4% 1% 6% 21% 
Bond issues 31% 24% 2% 0% 8% 36% 
Voting on the school 
budget 30% 31% 10% 4% 1% 25% 
Education funding 21% 34% 10% 8% 2% 25% 
 





of a good 
job 
Somewhat 









Voting on the town budget 64% 36% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Electing municipal officers 52% 44% 0% 0% 0% 4% 
Needing to raise taxes 44% 52% 0% 0% 4% 0% 
Petitions brought by town 
members 40% 40% 4% 0% 8% 8% 
Government staffing levels 40% 24% 0% 0% 16% 20% 
Spending levels 36% 48% 4% 0% 4% 8% 
Voting on the school 
budget 24% 12% 8% 12% 0% 44% 
Education funding 20% 24% 0% 20% 0% 36% 










of a good 
job 
Somewhat 









Voting on the town budget 60% 36% 0% 0% 0% 4% 
Electing municipal officers 52% 32% 4% 0% 0% 12% 
Needing to raise taxes 44% 52% 0% 0% 0% 4% 
Spending levels 44% 48% 0% 4% 0% 4% 
Petitions brought by town 
members 44% 40% 0% 4% 0% 12% 
Voting on the school 
budget 44% 32% 4% 4% 0% 16% 
Bond issues 40% 32% 4% 0% 0% 24% 
Government staffing levels 32% 36% 8% 0% 4% 20% 







of a good 
job 
Somewhat 









Voting on the town budget 70% 26% 1% 0% 1% 1% 
Electing municipal officers 66% 25% 1% 0% 1% 7% 
Needing to raise taxes 54% 37% 1% 0% 3% 5% 
Petitions brought by town 
members 47% 41% 3% 0% 4% 5% 
Spending levels 42% 43% 3% 3% 1% 8% 
Government staffing levels 38% 33% 4% 1% 3% 21% 
Bond issues 36% 24% 1% 0% 8% 32% 
Voting on the school 
budget 28% 37% 12% 1% 1% 21% 










of a good 
job 
Somewhat 









Voting on the town budget 68% 28% 3% 0% 0% 3% 
Electing municipal officers 50% 38% 0% 0% 0% 13% 
Needing to raise taxes 48% 40% 3% 0% 0% 10% 
Spending levels 45% 43% 8% 3% 0% 3% 
Petitions brought by town 
members 40% 45% 0 0% 3% 13% 
Government staffing levels 40% 38% 5% 0% 3% 15% 
Bond issues 33% 28% 0% 0% 8% 33% 
Voting on the school 
budget 28% 30% 10% 5% 0% 28% 
Education funding 18% 30% 18% 3% 3% 30% 
 





of a good 
job 
Somewhat 









Voting on the town budget 67% 31% 0% 0% 1% 1% 
Electing municipal officers 64% 28% 2% 0% 1% 5% 
Needing to raise taxes 52% 44% 0% 0% 3% 1% 
Petitions brought by town 
members 48% 38% 3% 1% 5% 5% 
Spending levels 39% 47% 0% 2% 2% 9% 
Government staffing levels 36% 30% 3% 1% 7% 23% 
Bond issues 30% 22% 2% 0% 8% 38% 
Voting on the school 
budget 32% 31% 9% 3% 1% 23% 





Q23. In what ways do you think town policy formation would be better or worse if open town 
meetings were eliminated? 









 N=127 N=25 N=25 N=77 N=40 N=87 
Total Worse 51% 60% 48% 49% 68% 44% 
Total Better 6% 4% 12% 5% 5% 8% 
No real change 15% 12% 16% 16% 8% 18% 
       
Less discussion 
and voter input 
into decisions 





13% 16% 4% 16% 20% 10% 
Less informed 





8% 16% 8% 5% 13% 7% 
Less democracy  5% 0% 0% 8% 8% 3% 
Don't know 15% 12% 12% 17% 8% 18% 
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